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Abstract 
The problematique driving this research stems from the different approaches 
concerning Turkish foreign policy (TFP) under the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) since 2002. Moreover, the controversy about TFP, also expands to a 
theoretical debate within the International Relations, and Foreign Policy 
Analysis, literature. However, although more balanced approaches have 
emerged in recent years to explain TFP, a comprehensive and systematically 
integrated approach that deals with TFP drivers, causal chains and foreign 
policy behaviour is yet to be seen; and this is a gap that this thesis seeks to fill. 
In this light, this thesis’ objective is to explain TFP towards the Middle 
East under the AKP. Thus, the central and overarching question to be answered 
is: what are the foreign policy-making dynamics under the AKP? The goal is to 
trace the causal relationship between the (independent and intervening) 
variables (system and domestic level) vis-à-vis the dependent variable (foreign 
policy behaviour) in terms of the foreign policy outcomes of “revisionism” and 
“status quo.” In answering the overarching question, the thesis also addresses a 
set of sub-questions: how are domestic developments linked to external 
developments? Is there evidence of revisionism or ideological incentives in 
TFP? Answering such questions also allows for inferences on long-standing 
questions about TFP to be made. For example: is Turkey turning away from its 
traditional Western allies? Has Turkey been promoting peace and cooperation, 
or have its policies created polarisation between international actors? 
The main argument is twofold. First it is argued that TFP under the AKP 
towards the Middle East has been revisionist. This stems from the fact that AKP 
elite ideology is revisionist and the domestic driver that has the primary role in 
filtering systemic dynamics and leading to the foreign policy outcome. Thus, 
whenever the circumstances – namely, little to no external or domestic effective 
opposition – allow AKP policy-makers to act according to their ideologically-
charged rhetoric, TFP behaviour is revisionist. When AKP is constrained by 
other external or domestic drivers, TFP is more prone to maintaining the status 
quo. As such, system-level drivers (international power relations, external threat 
perceptions and international economic interdependencies), and most 
importantly international power relations, play the primary role in shaping and 
causing shifts in TFP but always in conjunction with unit-level variables. 
Lastly, it is suggested that the region’s volatility will keep forcing Turkey 
to switch back and forth in its alliance with the West not least because of the 
gap between its revisionist aspirations and its limited capabilities. The same 
aspirations will unavoidably be challenged as they face the reaction of other 
regional and international players. 
xii 
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1. Introduction 
The problematique driving this research stems from the contradictions in the 
foreign policy pursued by the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
since 2002 and the subsequent academic debate on how to explain Turkish 
foreign policy (TFP) behaviour. Moreover, the controversy about TFP, as 
presented in the first part of this thesis, also expands to a theoretical debate 
within the International Relations (IR), and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), 
literature.  
More specifically, various authors and commentators have dwelt on 
whether Turkey has abandoned its traditional, status quo-oriented foreign policy 
for a more proactive – even revisionist – foreign policy that would also hinder 
Turkey-West relations. Others disagree, arguing not only that Turkey is still a 
status quo power but also a growing source of stability and peace-promotion in 
the region and beyond. Simultaneously, there are conflicting approaches 
towards understanding Turkey’s foreign policy. Some of them explain it as 
being a consequence of the AKP’s Islamic identity or ideology; as driven by 
realist security concerns; or as an indication of liberal desires for economic 
prosperity and regional cooperation. Although more balanced approaches have 
emerged in recent years, a comprehensive and systematically integrated 
approach that would deal both with TFP drivers and foreign policy behaviour 
is yet to be seen. 
In this light, and given that the “new” doctrine of TFP has been the subject 
of much disagreement, the objective of this thesis is to explain TFP towards the 
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Middle East under the AKP. Thus, it is proposed that the central and 
overarching question to be answered is: what are the foreign policy-making 
dynamics under the AKP? The goal is to trace the causal relationship between 
the (independent and intervening) variables (system and domestic level) vis-à-
vis the dependent variable (foreign policy behaviour) in terms of the foreign 
policy outcomes of “revisionism” and “status quo.”  
Furthermore, in answering the overarching question, the thesis also 
addresses a set of sub-questions: how are domestic developments linked to 
external developments? Is there evidence of revisionism or ideological 
incentives in TFP? Answering such questions with regard to Turkish Middle 
East foreign policy also allows for inferences on long-standing questions about 
TFP to be made. For example: is Turkey turning away from its traditional 
western allies? Has Turkey been promoting peace and cooperation, or have its 
policies created polarisation between international actors? 
These questions are not new. They rather stem from the rarely reconcilable 
approaches in the literature. Thus, this thesis does not aim to come up with new 
questions but to provide new and arguably more comprehensive answers than 
those in the literature, through the adoption of an integrated theoretical 
framework. 
As such, the main argument of the thesis is twofold. With regard to TFP 
behaviour it is argued that TFP under the AKP towards the Middle East has 
been revisionist. Yet this argument could not have been made without the 
identification of TFP drivers. Thus, through a careful examination and analysis 
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of the different variables, this thesis argues that system-level drivers, and most 
importantly international power relations, play the most important role in 
shaping and causing shifts in TFP. External threat perceptions are of secondary 
importance and international economic interdependencies are third among 
systemic drivers. While there is a causal relationship among these three factors, 
since power relations affect threat perceptions and threat perceptions affect 
economic relations, Turkey’s foreign economic relations are more often than not 
dissociated from other political and security relations. 
However, it is argued that while system-level drivers are primary in 
calling for some foreign policy (re)action, Turkey’s particular foreign policy 
decisions under the AKP would not have come to be without the particular 
intervening role of the domestic variables and most importantly the ideological 
outlook of AKP elites. In addition, the analysis reveals that the intervening 
variable which concerns AKP elite ideology is more significant in Turkish 
foreign policy-making than the role of domestic interest groups, which is 
relatively limited. Yet, despite the fact that AKP elite ideology occurs as the 
most significant domestic variable, it is argued that it does not always 
determine TFP as it can be constrained by other domestic and external factors 
under certain circumstances. 
This is an argument inclusive of different levels, factors and policies which 
effectively bridges the analytical gap in the literature. It provides a specific and 
well-substantiated answer on TFP behaviour without merely attributing TFP 
decisions or changes to the international system or ideology, but by tracing the 
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role that each of these factors or levels has to play in the making of certain 
foreign policy outcomes.  
 The argument in this thesis will be articulated in three parts as follows. 
The first part deals with the literature on and explanations of TFP (chapter 2) 
and the theoretical framework and methodology adopted in this thesis (chapter 
3). The second part is concerned with the analysis of TFP towards the two case 
studies (Syria and Israel) for the first period under examination (2002-2011). It 
does so in a systematic variable-based way, according to the Neoclassical 
Realist (NcR) theoretical framework (chapters 4, 5, and 6). The third and final 
part looks at the second period (2011-2013) under examination (chapter 7) and 
also includes a comparative analysis (chapter 8) of the case studies: across cases 
and across time periods. The thesis ends with the concluding chapter (9) that 
addresses the empirical, theoretical, and methodological strengths and 
limitations of the thesis and sets out an agenda for future research in TFP. 
Based on the weaknesses identified in the literature, chapter 2 suggests 
that an alternative approach to TFP is needed that would integrate levels of 
analysis, material and ideational factors, as well as economic and security 
policies. This is achieved in two steps: first, the review of the literature on the 
explanations of TFP focusing on the AKP period; and second, the different 
explanations and analytical approaches to TFP are juxtaposed and associated 
with the relevant IR theories. This allows for two things: 1) to determine the 
problematic characteristics of the existing literature in understanding TFP; and 
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2) to locate the theoretical framework needed to address the primary research 
question, as well as situate the thesis within the broader debate and literature. 
Chapter 3 reviews and explores some of the IR and FPA theoretical 
approaches identified in chapter 2 in more detail, and argues that NcR is the 
most suitable analytical approach within the Political Science sub-fields of IR 
and FPA, for this study. The NcR theoretical framework sets and elaborates on 
three independent variables (system level) and two intervening variables 
(domestic level). The system-level variables are: international power changes, 
external threat perceptions, and international economic interdependence. The 
domestic level variables are:  AKP elite ideology, and domestic interest groups. 
According to the theoretical framework, the system level has primary 
impact on policy-making while the domestic level plays an intervening role as it 
filters systemic dynamics in policy-making. Among other things, the goal of the 
analysis is to identify the causal role and weight of the different variables in the 
foreign policy outcome (dependent variable), which may vary between 
revisionist and status quo foreign policy behaviour. That is, to identify the causal 
chains that lead to foreign policy behaviour and the causal hierarchy of foreign 
policy drivers. 
Chapter 3 also accounts for the methodology of the thesis. It is concerned 
with the research design, research methods, data collection methods, and the 
different primary and secondary sources. More importantly, it puts forward a 
limited number of propositions and elaborates on the methodology of 
comparative analysis adopted in the thesis. Specifically, the case study and 
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comparative methods are discussed, explaining how the two case studies are 
divided into two periods each. Accordingly, the comparative analysis chapter 
(8), first makes a Cross-Case (CC) comparison for each period (2002-2011 and 
2011-2013) and then a Cross-Time (CT) comparison which compares the 
conclusions of the CC analysis of each period. 
Following the logic of the theoretical framework, chapter 4 looks at the 
three independent variables (system level) in the context of the 2002-2011 
period, specifically examining  international and regional (Middle East) 
dynamics. Chapters 5 and 6 take an in-depth approach to the intervening 
variables with regard to the cases of Syria and Israel, respectively, in 
conjunction with the system-level observations of chapter 4. Each of these 
chapters examines the role of AKP elite ideology and domestic interest groups 
in a systematic way and draws conclusions about the role of intervening 
variables which are then taken into account by the broader comparative 
analysis. 
Chapter 7 follows the same analytical logic and examines TFP towards the 
two case studies between 2011 and 2013 – that is, after the break out of the 
“Arab Spring.” At the system level it focuses on the changes the “Arab Spring” 
and other dynamics brought about to the three independent variables and 
continues with the intervening variables in Syria and Israel. From the 
perspective of the two time periods, which are divided based on changes in 
regional and international power relations (i.e. the primary independent 
variable), it becomes easier to evaluate change and continuity in TFP. 
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Chapter 8 employs the analysed information and conclusions of the 
previous chapters to conduct the CC and CT comparative analysis and 
ultimately address the initial and broader questions posed at the beginning. To 
better capture the causal role of the analysed and mainly domestic foreign 
policy drivers it compares them with counterfactual policies that depict TFP 
under the previous (Kemalist) political and military establishment. Lastly, it 
concludes by evaluating the system and unit levels, Turkey’s economic and 
security policies, the hierarchy of foreign policy drivers, Turkey’s revisionist or 
status quo foreign policy behaviour, and the issue of continuity and change in 
TFP. 
Although the thesis is not meant to be primarily theoretical, but to rather 
construct and employ a theoretically informed framework for the analysis of 
TFP, its theoretical aspect is key in differentiating it from other studies. Further, 
the thesis has two major contributions to make to the literature. The first is 
empirical and has to do with identifying the drivers of TFP, their causal 
relationships and TFP behaviour. The second contribution is theoretical. This 
thesis does not build a theory but develops a theoretical framework based on 
NcR. Given that NcR is a rather underdeveloped theory especially when it 
comes to the independent and intervening variables it employs, this thesis 
furthers the research project of this theory by choosing certain variables and 
elaborating on their operationalisation. Moreover, it offers a comprehensive, 
systematic and extensive analytical (NcR) perspective on TFP that has not thus 
far been explored adequately or to this extent in the case of Turkey. 
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An additional strength and potential contribution of this thesis is that it 
goes beyond simply discussing TFP drivers by establishing causal chains that 
lead to certain foreign policy decisions. This is an essential element that 
distinguishes this study from other works on TFP that merely identify 
domestic, systemic or both kinds of foreign policy drivers. This approach also 
allows the reader to better understand what drivers are most important in TFP 
as well as the specific chains of drivers that correlate with different foreign 
policy behaviours. Indeed, the identified relationships between the drivers may 
not always be so definite as to argue for direct or certain causation, mainly due 
to some empirical limitations. Yet, the correlations deducted in such instances 
remain valuable given that they offer significant insights about each variable 
and its relationship with other domestic or external variables. 
Lastly, it should be noted that just like any research and study, the thesis 
has its own limitations. There are primarily two kinds of limitations: 
methodological and theoretical. The methodological limitations mainly concern 
the Turkish language barrier and the limited access to elite interviewees due to 
the socially and politically busy period the country was going through during 
the research, and possibly the reluctance of politicians to expose their views and 
ideas. This has contributed to the lack of interviews from political personalities 
and specifically AKP politicians which could have confirmed some of the 
findings or strengthen some aspects of the thesis such as the argument about 
the worldviews of AKP elites. Although the language barrier may have limited 
the ability for the study of Turkish literature and the research of primary 
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Turkish documents, the multitude of Turkish sources in English and the great 
body of literature produced by Turkish academics and politicians compensated 
to a satisfactory degree. 
In terms of theory, the thesis’ NcR theoretical framework does not claim to 
cover all aspects of TFP under the AKP. It rather seeks to identify the main 
drivers of TFP and bridge certain analytical dualisms that can often be found in 
the literature such as, the relationship between the system and unit level, 
economic and security policies, and material and ideational drivers. In the 
process of the analysis other factors occasionally come up as noteworthy such 
as the individual personalities and political psychology of AKP leaders as well 
as domestic groups that the theoretical framework does not account for e.g. 
think tanks. Although it is suggested that taking into account these factors 
would not have produced significantly different results, further research on 
these aspects could indeed shed more light on some other dimensions of TFP.  
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2. Reviewing the Explanations of Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
A Brief Historical Background of Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, TFP was 
primarily influenced by the events of World War I (WWI) and the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. Apart from creating adversity towards imperialistic 
tendencies and strengthening the willingness for maintaining the status quo, 
these events, also defined how Turkey perceived the Arab world, since the 
Arabs played an important role in its defeat.1 The “Ismet Inonu doctrine” (1938-
1950) of reservation, neutrality, maintenance of the status quo and 
compartmentalisation, is a good example that reflects the TFP of the time, 
between the establishment of the Turkish state and the beginning of the Cold 
War.2 These features were also a reflection of Kemal Ataturk’s – the founder of 
the Turkish Republic - principles that influenced TFP, such as a nationalist and 
independent understanding of statehood, modernization and secularisation, 
and the adoption of a realpolitik approach to foreign policy. 3  
                                                          
1 Joshua W. Walker, "Turkey’s Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey Through its 
Ottoman Past," Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 8(2009): 499. 
2 Malik Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea  (New York: Palgrave, 
2009). 31-32. 
3 During the period from the establishment of the Turkish Republic to the end of WWII, a one-party 
(Republican People’s Party – CHP) political system was in place and Kemalism was the dominant 
ideology both among the bureaucratic and military elites. Kemalism remained the dominant ideology 
until the late 20th and early 21st century. The CHP’s ideological principles were republicanism, 
nationalism, populism, etatism (statism), secularism, and revolutionism. Republicanism entailed a 
political system that ensured and safeguarded the “ideal of national sovereignty” while nationalism 
focused on the preservation of the “special character and independent identity of the Turkish social 
life.” Populism meant the equal responsibility of the state and the citizen towards each other, as well as 
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After the end of WWII – during which Turkey remained mostly neutral4 - 
and the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey’s actions could be described as 
inconsistent with its traditional foreign policy. Although its accession into 
NATO (1952) contradicted its previous impartiality, it can be explained as a 
result of “Stalin’s expansionist statements”5 and part of Kemal Ataturk’s 
programme of Westernisation. Thereafter, Turkey acquired the role of 
containing the Soviet Union and thus its threat perceptions were, for the most 
part, in line with those of its regional and international anti-Soviet Union allies. 
Yet during the same period, the governments of Menderes (1950-1960), Demirel 
(1965-1971), Ecevit (1974, 1977-1979), and Özal (1983-1989), sought to improve 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the equalisation of the Turkish people with an organised community of different professions, as 
opposed to a class-based society. Etatism introduced the active interference of the state in all issues 
that concern the nation’s interests, whilst secularism separated the state from religious beliefs and 
declared that state decisions and actions should be based upon science and secular principles. Lastly, 
revolutionism holds that CHP should remain faithful to the principles that had stemmed from the 
people’s revolutions and conquests. Overall, as it occurs from the importance of Kemalist ideology, the 
individual leadership of Kemal Atatürk played a determining role both in the establishment of Turkish 
Republic and TFP. His dominance over the military and CHP essentially gave him the control over every 
aspect of the state and its policies. This lasted not only until his death in 1938 but also until 1950 
(continued by İsmet İnönü) when a two-party political system emerged. Turkish politics was perhaps not 
so much concentrated on individual leadership after that but the dominance of the Kemalist military 
elites over politics did not weaken up until the late 2000s, thus consolidating to a great extent the 
emergence of a secular Kemalist national identity. Yet, even in contemporary Turkey, after the election 
of the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoǧan to power, the role of a dynamic leader and its acceptance by 
society remains important as the case of Erdoǧan showed. It is worth noting that although the AKP and 
the Prime Minister are situated somewhere between conservative democracy and political Islam, a big 
part of society has not stopped aspiring to the principles of Kemalism and has not forgotten about the 
modernization and westernization programme promised and pursued by the founder of the Republic. 
See, Niyiazi Kizilyürek, Κεμαλισμός: Γένεση και η Εξέλιξη της Επίσημης Ιδεολογίας της Σύγχρονης 
Τουρκίας [Kemalism: The Birth and Evolution of the Ideology of Contemporary Turkey] (Athens: 
Mesogeios, 2006). 55-57. 
4 Walker, "Turkey’s Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey Through its Ottoman Past," 
398-99. 
5 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War  (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2003). 162. 
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Turkey’s relations with the Arab states: Menderes also tried to approach Israel6 
while Demirel approached even the Soviet Union.7 Moreover, Ecevit’s coalition 
government (1972-1980) went on to unilaterally invade Cyprus in 1974 in a 
demonstration of independent foreign policy and national interest, following 
the disappointing US stance on the Cyprus and Cuban crises of the 1960s. 
Although that was celebrated in Turkish public opinion, it led to the 
deterioration of its relations with the US and the international community.8 
One of the most unique governments – as it challenged some of the central 
tenets of Kemalism – was that of Özal (1983-1989 as Prime Minister and 1989-
1993 as President). Özal followed a policy of intense liberalisation, along with a 
wide – albeit rather unsuccessful – opening in foreign policy, especially as 
President after the end of the Cold War. His policies contradicted the military 
thus making the latter feel rather threatened.9 Under his governance Turkey 
also sought better trade relations and economic development, and adopted a 
new ethnic policy that strayed from the traditional Kemalist doctrine – which 
sought the creation of a homogenised (ethnocentric) Turkic nation – by 
recognising “the existence of other ethnic groups and the multi-ethnic structure 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 99-100; Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey, and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East 
Mediterranean  (London: Frank Cass, 1987). 50-52. 
7 Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-
1974, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), 125-33. 
8 Erik J. Zücher, Turkey: A Modern History  (London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004). 275-76. 
9 Kerem Öktem, Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989  (Nova Scotia: Zed Books, 2011). 56-83; Mufti, Daring 
and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea: 50-84; Zücher, Turkey: A Modern History: 278-
94. 
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of the country, and defin[ing] Turkish ethnicity based on cultural and ethnic 
dimensions.”10 
Additionally, Özal’s domestic reforms and policies targeted, among other 
things, the military’s administrative dominance.11 Similarly to the AKP, Özal 
tried to pursue a proactive foreign policy, more autonomous and not so 
dependent on the West; a policy that has been called by some neo-
Οttomanism.12 In this context, he improved Turkey’s relations with the region, 
the states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Islamic 
world more generally.13 It was specifically after the end of the Cold War that 
Özal supported a neo-Ottoman “diversified foreign policy in the region based 
on the Ottoman historical heritage” of Turkey.14 
After Özal’s death (1993) his foreign policy orientation was largely 
abandoned – apart from attempts such as those of Erbakan (1996-1997).15 In the 
post-Cold war era, TFP was defined by external systemic changes and Turkey’s 
search for a new role. The Soviet threat was replaced by newly emerged “zones 
                                                          
10 Muhittin Ataman, "Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s," Middle 
Eastern Studies 38, no. 4 (2002): 128. 
11 Muhittin Ataman, "Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy," 
Alternatives: Turkish Jounal of International Relations 1, no. 1 (2002): 124. 
12 It will be shown below that there are different interpretations of what a neo-ottoman policy entails. 
See, for example, Ömer Taspinar, "Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and 
Kemalism," Carnegie Papers 10(2008); Inan Rüma, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: New-
Activism, Neo-Ottomanism or/so What?," Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 4 (09/03/2011): 134-40; 
Michael Rubin, "Shifting Sides? The Problems of Neo-Ottomanism," National Review Online 10/08/2004  
13 Ataman, "Leadership Change," 131-40. 
14 Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle Eastern Studies 
42, no. 6 (2006): 946. 
15 Alan Makovsky, "How to Deal with Erbakan," Middle East Quarterly IV, no. 1 (1997). 
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of conflict,” and other bilateral security border problems.16 The crises with 
Cyprus, Greece, and Syria, the “soft” or “postmodern” coup of 1997, the weak 
coalition governments of the 1990s, as well as divisions within the Islamic 
parties17 created the conditions for the formation of the AKP.18  
In the wake of the new millennium Turkey was also faced with significant 
geopolitical problems in its external environment. Apart from the global reach 
that the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks had, the US reaction and the 
initiation of the Global War on Terrorism brought about structural changes in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood.19 After 9/11, terrorism, and particularly Islamic 
terrorism, became a prioritised national security threat. In this light, Turkey as a 
Muslim country and a traditional US ally gained significant value for the West – 
i.e. the US, EU and NATO. However, its alliance with the West on the one hand, 
and the US’s intention to go after “states procuring weapons of mass 
                                                          
16 Mustafa Aydin, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation," The 
Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2003): 322-25; Soli Özel, "Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: 
Turkey’s Strategic Quest," in On Turkey (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 30/01/2012), 
87, 154; Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World  
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2008). 
17 Around the mid-1990s, under Necmettin Erbakan, there emerged differences of opinion within the 
RP. After the RP was banned by the Constitutional Court and its Islamist successor FP was established, 
an ideological split became clearer between traditionalists (pro-Erbakan) and modernists (pro-Erdoǧan). 
The race for the party’s leadership between Kutan (Erbakan’s choice) and Gül (as Erdoǧan was at the 
time banned from politics) in 2000 ended with the victory of Kutan. The banning of the FP soon after 
that (2001) led to the establishment of two different parties with Islamic roots: the Felicity Party (SP) of 
the traditionalists and the Justice and Development party (AKP) which came to power in 2002. See, 
William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP  
(London and New York: Routledge, 2010). 18-19. 
18 Aydin, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation," 325; Hale and 
Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP: 13-19. 
19 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 297-98. 
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destruction (WMD)” on the other, posed new threats to Turkey.20 The former 
made it a target of terrorist attacks in 2003, which were allegedly connected to 
Al-Qaeda, while the latter led to the 2003 Iraq War which intensified Turkey’s 
fears about the prospects of a permanent Kurdish autonomy thus creating 
conflicting geopolitical interests between the US and Turkey.21      
Within such external turmoil Turkey was led to elections in 2002. They 
were mainly the result of the instability in the 90s and the collapse of Turkish 
financial markets in 2001, with all the negative repercussions it had for 
society.22 The general elections of November 4, 2002, brought to power the AKP 
and, by extension, stirred up a lively debate about contemporary TFP.23 The 
AKP implemented the economic stabilization programme which was adopted 
in 2001, along with a number of reforms. The rise of the AKP to power was also 
accompanied by a pro-active foreign policy in response to Turkey’s post-9/11 
geopolitical challenges. 
The AKP managed, more successfully than any previous government, to 
deal with domestic and external problems by commercially engaging its 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 297. 
21 Soner Çağaptay and Tyler Evans, "Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq: Kurdistan Up, Baghdad 
Down," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Focus 122(October, 2012); Adam Ward and 
James Hackett (eds), "Terror in Turkey: The Problem of Intelligence Gathering,"  Strategic Comments 9, 
no. 10 (December 2003), http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-9-
2003/volume-9---issue-10/terror-in-turkey/; Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq," United 
States Institute of Peace Special Report 237(2010); Bill Park, "Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US 
Policy," Parameters 34, no. 3 (2004): 18-30. 
22 Melia Benli Altunişik and Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change  (London and New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2005). 83-86. 
23 The AKP won 34.4% of the votes and 363 of the 550 seats in the parliament, thus forming a single-
party government. 
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neighbours thereby gradually abandoning its adversity towards outwardness.24 
Despite examples of previous similar policy attempts, such as those of Özal and 
Erbakan, the AKP’s foreign policy orientation attracted particular attention. 
Some scholars led by the fact that the AKP “describes itself as ‘conservative 
democrat’,” suggested that its “different worldview... has influenced its policy 
choices.”25 In addition, the debate was influenced by claims that whilst Turkey 
promoted regional peace and cooperation, it seemed to be gradually turning 
away from its Western allies thus seeking a more autonomous role, to the end 
of becoming a regional hegemony.  
 
The Debate over the AKP’s Foreign Policy 
 
In this context, Turkey’s “new” foreign policy under the AKP has become 
subject to many and different explanations. These explanations can be 
categorised into two main and overarching analytical approaches, namely, 
“systemic” (or system-level) and “domestic” (or Ιnnepolitik) based on IR and 
FPA literature.26 The distinction between systemic and domestic approaches can 
also be related to the structure-agent problem. It is useful because it allows for 
the examination of different factors influencing TFP on different levels and will, 
therefore, help in the selection of the variables that will be analysed. In what 
follows, these “approaches” will be presented and contextualised within a 
                                                          
24 Özel, "Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: Turkey’s Strategic Quest," 3. 
25 Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP: 24; Nader 
Habibi and Joshua W. Walker, "What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?," Crown 
Centre for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief 49(April, 2011): 1. 
26 This categorisation is made by this thesis. 
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broader theoretical debate. The aim is to identify their weaknesses and 
strengths in order to arrive at an alternative approach to analysing the AKP’s 
foreign policy. 
Malik Mufti identifies two main “schools of thought” in the literature with 
regard to explaining TFP under the AKP. The first one maintains that the AKP’s 
foreign policy “arises not from pragmatic calculations of Turkish state interest... 
but out of ideological fanaticism... that is creating a virulently anti-American 
and anti-Western Turkish public opinion and political culture.” The second one 
argues that the shift in TFP since the end of the Cold War has what could be 
called a “liberal orientation” based on pragmatic – mainly commercial – 
interests seeking regional cooperation and integration, while at the same time 
remaining pro-Western. Mufti names these schools “anti-Western Islamism” 
and “integrationist liberalism,” respectively.27 Moreover, he writes that the 
policy approach of neo-Ottomanism, as put forward by Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu,28 in his book Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), is 
pragmatic.29 To be sure, the critiques and interpretations of Turkey’s “neo-
Ottomanism” vary and could not be simply described as pragmatic. 
                                                          
27 Malik Mufti, "A Little America: The Emergence of Turkish Hegemony," in Middle East Brief (Crown 
Centre for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, April 2010), 2-3. 
28 During the period under examination in this thesis, Ahmet Davutoğlu went from a foreign affairs 
consultant to the Prime Minister to a Foreign Minister in 2009. Yet, his contribution to the AKP’s foreign 
policy is pivotal throughout the governance of the party. In the summer of 2014 Ahmet Davutoğlu 
became Prime Minister and the Chairman of AKP after Prime Minister, Recep Tayiip Erdoğan, was 
elected President. Because the timeframe of this thesis stops at 2013, Davutoğlu is referred to as foreign 
minister and Erdoğan as Prime Minister. 
29 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Το Στρατηγικό Βάθος: Η Διεθνής Θέση της Τουρκίας [Strategic Depth: Turkey’s 
Place in the World] (Athens: Poiotita, 2010). 146-48. 
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Contrary to Mufti’s schools of thought that are mostly defined in 
theoretical and epistemological terms, a broader categorisation that would 
divide the explanations of TFP into systemic/structural and 
domestic/Ιnnepolitik approaches seems more appropriate, given the debates in 
the existing literature and the aim of this thesis. In addition, within the 
framework of the two broad categories, further classification of these 
approaches could be made along epistemological and theoretical lines such as 
positivism, post-positivism, constructivism, realism, and liberalism. By 
following this method of categorisation and classification of the literature, the 
theoretical approach of the thesis will be better contextualised and equipped to 
address the existing gaps in the explanations of TFP with regard to the 
structure/agency question, and pragmatic/ideational incentives in foreign 
policy-making. 
As mentioned above, one of the most significant debates about Turkey’s 
“new” foreign policy is whether – and if so, why – Turkey is abandoning its 
traditional Western allies, namely the US and NATO, as well as its willingness 
to enter the EU, for a more autonomous role and a closer relationship with the 
Muslim world in general and the Arab world in particular. There is a 
contribution to this debate through analyses of debatable facts and Turkish 
policies, such as Ankara’s decision not to allow American troops into Iraq 
through its territories during the 2003 Iraq war; its vote against the US-backed 
sanctions for Iran in the UN Security Council in 2010; its cooperation with 
Russia and Brazil in the energy and nuclear fields; its deteriorated relations 
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with Israel; and its closer and multileveled cooperation with Middle East and 
Balkan states under proclamations and the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity.30 
Looking at how the different analytical approaches to TFP explain some of 
these facts and policies will help in identifying the weaknesses in the literature 
and in demonstrating more clearly how this thesis will seek to add value to it. 
This chapter reviews some works on TFP according to their level-of-
analysis and theoretical approach – e.g. realism, liberalism, Constructivism. It 
begins by looking at works on TFP that fall under the category of System-Level 
approaches. It then continues with Innepolitik (or domestic-level) approaches, 
and concludes with some academic works that have made efforts to integrate 
these levels thus adopting a “third way.” It is argued that this thesis contributes 
to and advances the latter category through a Neoclassical Realist theoretical 
framework that integrates both levels-of-analysis as well as different drivers – 
i.e. material and ideational. 
 
2.1. System-Level Analytical Approaches 
 
To begin with, one of the most prominent analytical approaches to IR and 
foreign policy diachronically is structuralism, be it realist, liberal, or otherwise. 
Generally, structuralism holds that “individuals act in accordance with 
structures that they cannot see, and of which they may have no awareness.”31 
                                                          
30 Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey-Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What is the big Deal?," Strategic 
Analysis 35, no. 1 (January, 2011): 26-30; Söner Çağaptay, "Is Turkey Leaving the West?," Foreign Affairs 
(26/10/2009). 
31 Stuart McAnulla, "Structure and Agency," in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh 
and Gerry Stoker (London: Palgrave, 2002), 275. 
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For example, James Fearon divides system-level (structural) IR theories into two 
“broad classes” – i.e. S1 and S2. He maintains that S1 is “a systemic IR 
theory…that envisions states as unitary and purposive actors” while S2, 
although largely the same as S1, conditions certain “explanatory variables” in 
order for the theory to remain systemic.32 
Overall, systemic theories of IR or FPA seem to be dominated mainly by 
positivist epistemologies, which are concurrent with the principles of 
liberalism, neoliberalism, and realism as well as, to a lesser extent, the 
principles of certain strands of constructivism.33 However, it is worth noting 
that with regard to the analysis of TFP the structural approaches are mostly 
limited to (neo)liberalism and (neo)realism; this observation, of course, is not 
without exceptions. 
Liberal theories see democratic states as actors “fundamentally against 
war” because they are “founded on such individual rights as equality before the 
law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected 
representation.”34 Also, in line with neorealism, neoliberalism perceives states 
as rational actors which exist in an anarchic state-centric international system. 
The anarchy of the international system, the lack of a central authority, is seen 
by neorealists and neoliberalists as the primary and fundamental factor that 
                                                          
32 James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," Annual 
Review of Political Science 1(1998): 291. 
33 See for example, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it:The Social Construction of 
Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425. 
34  Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 8, no. 4 (1986): 
1151; see also, Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 205-35. 
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shapes foreign policies and therefore international political outcomes. The 
absence of central authority, the argument goes, necessitates that states adopt a 
self-help stance whereby they rely only on themselves. In turn, they find 
themselves in a constant international struggle for power and preparation for 
conflict. This leads to a number of strategies, among which power 
maximization, alliance formation, etc. 
However, whereas realism argues that the anarchy of the international 
system leads to power struggles and the “security dilemma,” neoliberalism 
argues that it leads to cooperation and the establishment of international 
regimes.35 The differences between the two lies primarily in the outcomes of 
anarchy. In other words, liberal states, according to neoliberalism, tend to seek 
political and economic cooperation, which is in their best interest as it is driven 
by “material incentives,” thus creating common interests and alleviating any 
disputes. This is in contrast to the neorealist understanding that anarchy leads, 
more often than not to conflict. Further, neoliberalism also sees institutions as 
important “patterns of practice... because they affect state behaviour.”36  
In terms of the previously mentioned debatable foreign policies of Turkey, 
as far as the systemic analytical approaches to TFP are concerned and especially 
its neoliberal explanations, Turkey’s actions, like its cooperation with Iran, 
Russia, and Brazil in the field of nuclear energy, constitute efforts of building 
trust among regional and international actors by cautiously, but not entirely, 
                                                          
35 David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in Neorealism and Neorealsim: The 
Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University, 1993), 4-5. 
36 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy  (New 
Jersey, West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1984). 8. 
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stepping away from Western interests in order to promote cooperation and thus 
peace and security. 
A similar interpretation is being given for the decline in Turkish-Israeli 
relations and the Islamic solidarity rhetoric, based on the fact that Turkey needs 
to maintain the good economic relations it has developed particularly with the 
Arab states.37 Ioannis Grigoriadis, for example, by slightly straying from a 
traditional structural analysis as he looks at domestic factors (e.g. individuals) 
as well, argues that for Turkish FM, Davutoğlu, and therefore for Turkey, the 
issue of the Iranian nuclear programme was an “opportunity to put his 
proactive foreign policy into work.”38  
In a similar vein, Stephen Kinzer argues that in the long-term, Turkey, 
along with Iran and the US could create a new strategic triangular partnership 
since they all share common regional interests, like the desire for democratic 
values and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also argues that Turkey’s shift 
towards Islamism could be beneficial for the West, and particularly the US, 
because as a Muslim country “Turkey can go places, engage partners, and make 
deals that America cannot.”39 
Other scholars emphasise structural/realist determinants of TFP even 
more, and place the Iranian issue within the framework of the increasing 
orientation of TFP towards the Middle East. From that perspective Turkey is 
indeed focusing more on its neighbourhood, though not because of a calculated 
                                                          
37 See for example Habibi and Walker, "What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?," 
6-7. 
38 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy," (ELIAMEP, 2010), 7. 
39 Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey and America’s Future  (New York: Times Books, 2010). 198, 208-09. 
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plan, as other Innepolitik explanations suggest, but because it “has gradually 
become inevitable” due to the role that the Middle East plays in Turkey’s 
“national security interests” and its relations with the US and the EU. In this 
context it would not be “a realistic course of action” for Turkey to exclude Iran 
from its regional policies, especially since it “does not share the same security 
perceptions of the West vis-à-vis Iran.”40 However, it is still maintained that 
Turkey’s relations with the West are not compromised but rather that there is a 
“growing salience of the Middle East” in their relations.41 
In this spirit, Bülent Aras argues that the AKP’s neo-Ottoman policy 
approach is a continuation of Özal’s proactive foreign policy and of the efforts 
of previous governments for EU membership while he goes on to note that 
“Davutoğlu formulated a more comprehensive foreign policy vision and 
developed policy mechanisms to tackle the challenges of globalization in a post-
nation state age.”42 Grigoriadis makes a similar argument while he adds that 
Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision includes “liberal elements, such as soft 
power, conflict resolution and promotion of ‘win-win’ solutions.”43 
Hugh Pope, although he acknowledges a shift in TFP and considers 
Ankara’s recent behaviour towards Israel and Iran flawed because it puts it in a 
problematic position vis-à-vis the US, still argues that “Turkey remains engaged 
                                                          
40 Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the 
West?," Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (March, 2008): 3, 9; Tarik Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy," 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (March, 2007): 93. 
41 Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy," 3. 
42 Bulent Aras, "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," in SETA Policy Brief (Foundation for Political, 
Economic and Social Research, May, 2009), 6-7. 
43 Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy," 4. 
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principally with the West.”44 His reasoning is based on the fact that the EU is 
Turkey’s most important economic partner, on the one hand, and that the US is 
its most important ally on the other – in terms of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 
as well as the Kurdish insurgency and the Israeli-Palestinian problem.45  
Many structural – and especially liberal – approaches do not take into 
account that, despite the strong EU-Turkey economic partnership, Turkey’s 
economic and trade relations with the states of the Middle East, especially with 
those of the Arab world, have risen rapidly throughout the 2000s, while the 
opposite has happened in its trade relations with the EU. For example, the total 
exports from Turkey to the EU dropped from 58%, in 2007, to 48% in 2009; in 
the same period, its exports to its Muslim neighbours have risen from around 
28% to 38%.46 In the years that followed Turkey’s exports to the EU dropped 
even more: around 43% in 2008 and around 45% in 2011.47 As seen below, a 
return to the EU can be noticed in Turkey’s foreign economic policies, but it is 
argued that system-level changes such as the “Arab Spring” have played a 
primary role in that. 
Furthermore, approaches like Kinzer’s, about the cooperation between 
Turkey, the US and even Iran, seem to neglect the multidimensional nature of 
Turkey’s regional role, and also the many conflicting interests between Turkey 
                                                          
44 Hugh Pope, "Pax Ottomana?: The Mixed Success of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 89, 
no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2010): 169-71; Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a ‘Post-
Islamist’ Government and a Kemalist State," International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 290, 89-304. 
45 Pope, "Pax Ottomana?: The Mixed Success of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy," 169-71. 
46 Habibi and Walker, "What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?," 4. 
47 EuropeanCommision, "Trade - Countries and Regions: Turkey,"  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/. 
26 
 
and the US that stem not only from the external geopolitical environment of 
Turkey but also from “internal enemies,” security complexes and perceptions 
within the country itself. In that sense, purely structural understandings of 
Turkey’s policies, despite their moderate conclusions that point to Turkey 
adopting a “Middle Easternized” foreign policy without dissociating from the 
West, lack focus on domestic agents, thus missing possible correlations that 
could be made between ideologically driven rhetoric and policy decisions.48  
 
2.2. Innepolitik Analytical Approaches 
 
At the other end of the analytical spectrum can be found Innepolitik/domestic-
level foreign policy explanations related to identity, ideology, norms, values, 
individuals, culture, psychology, political systems, etc. With regard to the 
literature on TFP these explanations are consistent with theories like 
constructivism, culturalism, and orientalism, as well as, to a lesser extent, 
(liberal) institutionalism and political economy, while their epistemologies 
range from positivism, to post-positivism, to orientalism. 
Fearon divides domestic-political IR theories into two categories (D1 & 
D2) in such a way so as to correspond to the above-mentioned S1 and S2 
categories of systemic IR theories. Thus, according to him, the D1 category 
includes theories that “picture one or more states as non-unitary, with domestic 
interactions yielding suboptimal foreign policy choices.” On the other hand, D2 
includes D1, as well as “arguments that explain differences in state’s foreign 
                                                          
48 Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy." 
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policies by referring to unit-level attributes of states.”49 The two categories may 
not necessarily seem to be embracing post-positivist or orientalist 
epistemologies, but “domestic interactions” as well as “unit-level attributes of 
states” may indeed be referring to ideational, cultural or psychological factors 
which could lead to epistemologies other than positivism. As far as the way 
such different epistemologies could occur it depends on the operationalisation 
of each theory and the ontological and causal understandings they maintain for 
the system and other domestic agents. 
 
Identity, Ideology, and Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
As identity and ideology are two of the most important characteristics of 
Innepolitik theories of foreign policy, and of TFP in particular, it would be 
helpful to first pay some attention to the these concepts, and identify the 
different understandings of identity as well as highlight the distinctions and 
relationship between them and ideology. 
Generally, it can be said that “Social identification is the process by which 
we deﬁne ourselves in terms and categories that we share with other people…, 
[while] social identities assume some commonalities with others.”50 When the 
identity in question is the national one, then there can be more than one 
understanding of it. Daniele Conversi, drawing, among others, upon Anthony 
                                                          
49 Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," 299-300. 
50 Kay Deaux, "Social Identity," in Encyclopedia of Women and Gender: Sex Similarities and Differences 
and the Impact of Society on Gender, ed. Judith Worell (California, London: Academic Press, 2001), 1059. 
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Smith and Donald Horowitz, distinguishes between primordialist and 
instrumentalist understandings of national identity.51 
From this perspective, on the one hand primordialist approaches “appeal 
to emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations for national 
mobilisation,” thus challenging the notion of state rationality on the basis of 
material incentives when it comes to decision-making, which is a mostly 
positivist approach.52 On the other hand, the instrumentalist approach 
acknowledges the “strategic utility” identity has for the achievement of 
pragmatic ends – whether realist or liberal.53 It is important to note that the 
instrumentality, or even manipulation, of various identities (national, religious, 
ethnic, etc.) is acknowledged by liberalism and realism as a means for the 
achievement of political ends and thus also falls under the positivism category. 
Theoretically, ontologically, and even epistemologically primordialism, 
with regard to national identity, can be associated with orientalism as “a style 
of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between the ‘Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’,”54 while 
instrumentalism can be associated with constructivism. This latter linkage 
between instrumentalism and constructivism has been suggested by David 
                                                          
51 It needs to be acknowledged that these two distinctions remain narrow within the fields of 
International Relations and Security, while they are not – necessarily – followed by post-positivist 
epistemologies.  
52 Daniele Conversi, "Mapping the Field: Theories of Nationalism and the Ethnosymbolic Approach," in 
Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations, ed. Athena 
S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 15-16. 
53 Ibid., 16. 
54 Edward W. Said, Orientalism  (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 2; A. K. Ramakrishnan, "The Gaze of 
Orientalism: Reflections on Linking Postcolonialism and International Relations," International Studies 
36, no. 2 (1999): 131-32. 
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Brown.55 Brown argues among other things that constructivism is a “conceptual 
language” that sees nationalism as an ideology, that is, “based on ideological 
myths constructed by displaced or aspiring élites, and appealing to societies 
whose social structures and political autonomy had been displaced.”56 It should 
be noted that constructivism is a very broad conceptual framework which has 
been categorised into variants or strands by various scholars mainly based on 
epistemological criteria.57 
Admittedly, Conversi’s and Brown’s reference to constructivism would be 
more consistent with the “neoclassical” or “thinner” epistemological 
understandings of the theory – as it does not refute an empirically identifiable 
reality.58 Yet, key overarching features of constructivism would suggest that “a 
set of ideas, a body of thought, [and] a system of norms, which has been 
arranged by certain people at a particular time and place”59 could be both 
                                                          
55 Conversi, "Mapping the Field," 16; David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural & 
Multicultural Politics  (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). It should be acknowledged here that 
there is a great body of literature on the relationship between identity and IR which, however, cannot 
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Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics  (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 1-44. 
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instrumentalised as well as affect the actions of policy-makers.60 From that 
perspective, at the same time that human beings are, for many constructivists, 
the primary agents “who fashion – and have the capacity to change – social 
reality,” their “collective ideas and norms” construct, and thus also constitute, 
“both identities and interests;” therefore, “‘national interest’ is not objectively 
given... but must be interpreted through the prism of ideas.”61   
This is the point where the difference between the two understandings of 
identity and ideology becomes clear. The primordialist understandings of 
identity, apart from being orientalist, suggest an essentialist and direct 
relationship between national identity and decision-making. As such, a 
primordial identity is the most important factor – or at least one of them – in 
shaping ideas, ideologies, and therefore policies, through decision-making 
processes. The (neoclassical/thinner) constructivist/instrumentalist 
understanding of identity, as put forward by Conversi and Brown specifically, 
maintains a somewhat reverse logic suggesting that ideas construct identities as 
well as instrumentilise them for political reasons. If this is the case, and to 
present a simplified version of the above elaboration of the role of ideational 
factors in policy-making, it occurs that there are two main ways of 
understanding ideas, and thus ideology, as well: that suggested by 
                                                          
60 Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," International Studies 
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primodialism/orientalism, and that suggested by 
constructivism/instrumentalism.62  
In a different text, Conversi describes ideology as “a set of ideas 
articulated around a sociopolitical programme devised by specific individuals, 
whom we may recognise occasionally as the ‘ideologues’ and, until recently, 
could be identified as ‘intellectuals’.”63 Although Conversi’s definition is very 
much in line with the constructivist approach, she also notes that it is difficult 
for an ideology to be seen neutrally “since scholarly endeavours are also 
informed by ideology.”64 
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane define ideas as beliefs “- shared by 
large numbers of people – about the nature of their worlds that have 
implications for human action” including, among other things, “general moral 
principles” and “agreement on a specific application of scientific knowledge.”65 
As such, Goldstein and Keohane are not interested in what created these ideas 
and beliefs but rather in their effects on (foreign) policy-making.  
Therefore, although there could be a relationship between identity and 
ideas, the emphasis is given on the identification of the beliefs – which can be 
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Ideas 40, no. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1979): 353-68.  
64 Conversi, "Ideology and Nationalism," 27. 
65 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Ideas 
& Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 7. 
32 
 
done through a number of methods – and their impact on policy outcomes.66 
Likewise, authors who deal with foreign policy, and in this case, TFP could 
treat ideology in either way: a) like a product of identities (thus acknowledging 
identity as a policy-making factor); or like a (“ahistorical”) factor that directly 
impacts policy-making.  
In the debate about TFP under the AKP, the issue of identity and ideology 
in particular is salient. For example, one of the arguments holds that the policy 
of neo-Ottomanism is a process of “re-Islamization” which “is accompanied 
with another process: ‘re-Ottomanization’[;] [a]nd that in the case of Turkey 
Islamization is proceeding on according to the Ottoman tradition.”67 This 
interpretation of neo-Ottomanism contrasts previously presented, more liberal 
interpretations, and could easily be associated with primordial understandings 
of (religious and imperial/national) identity which inform and shape 
ideologies.  
Yet, neo-Ottomanism has also been characterised as an “expansionist 
policy in new terms, namely a combination of economic, military and 
geopolitical power, which uses both Islam and the strategic partnership with 
the West as its two pillars.”68 Although this is a realist interpretation of neo-
Ottomanism the difference of opinion about the role of identity is clear. 
Moreover there are also scholars who do see the Islamist rhetoric, and thus the 
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instrumentalisation of Islamic identity, as an “ideological cover up and a 
communicative instrument for the legitimisation of [Turkey’s democratisation 
and liberalisation] choices both domestically and abroad.”69 In addition, given 
that according to realists “the public largely defers to or is readily manipulated 
by” power maximisation seeking elites, it becomes clear how the 
instrumentalist approach can be applied to realist explanations as well.70  
More such Innepolitik explanations of TFP with particular reference to 
ideology can be found in texts by authors like Svante Cornell and Söner 
Çağaptay. Cornell, for example, thoroughly looks at the writings, speeches and 
worldview of Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Prime Minister, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, arguing that both politicians have strong ideological 
incentives and that, since they have great influence over policy-making, TFP is 
largely ideologically driven. More specifically, he writes that Turkey’s 
“impulses are likely to continue to have policy consequences as Turkish leaders 
will interpret events from a distinctively different – Islamically-tinged – 
viewpoint than their Western counterparts.”71 
Cornell’s approach is more similar to the one suggested by Goldstein and 
Keohane; that is, ideology is explored, identified, and treated as a factor that 
directly impacts policy-making, without its roots being questioned. In the same 
                                                          
69 Dimitrios Triantafyllou and Eleni Fotiou, Τουρκική Εξωτερική Πολιτική την Εποχή του ΑΚΡ. Προς μια 
PAX OTTOMANA; [Turkish Foreign Policy in the AKP Era. Towards a PAX OTTOMANA?] (Athens: 
Papazisis, 2010). 300. 
70 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East  (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2003). 141-42. 
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spirit, Çağaptay argues that “the AKP has focused its energy on the Middle 
East, with a slant toward Islamist and anti-Western actors” while on a different 
occasion he wrote that TFP “transition is feeding into new and powerful 
political sentiments in the form of Muslim nationalism, with many Turks 
concluding – in line with the AKP’s arguments – that their interests lie with 
other Muslim-majority countries.”72 
While both authors talk about ideology (either Islamism or Muslim 
nationalism), one can easily trace the connection between Islamist ideology and 
Islamic or Muslim identity. The implication is that (Islamic) identity and 
ideology have an impact on policy outcomes. Thus, the texts in question could 
be called orientalist, due to the essentialist distinction they make between East 
and West, and could better be associated with primordial understandings of 
identity. Further, as regards the Innepolitik character of these approaches, it is 
noteworthy that especially Cornell, despite his brief mention of systemic and 
economic factors, mainly pays attention to the perceptions of the policy makers, 
which is an element that largely differentiates systemic and Innepolitik theories 
since the latter emphasise, for the most part, different agents (e.g. policy-
makers, political leaders, etc.).73 
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Like-minded scholars see “a profound shift in Turkish foreign policy,” 
arguing that Turkey’s movements are consistent with a plan for a more 
autonomous role which, as seen earlier, is largely driven from ideological 
incentives.74 Thus, the AKP government is often referred to as “Islamist” while 
it has been argued that “Ankara's dramatic policy transformation seems 
inconsistent with the fundamental values that underpin the alliance” of 
NATO.75 Within this context Turkey’s decision not to let American troops into 
Iraq through its territories, in 2003, its opposition to the US idea for Iraq’s 
division, the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations and the improved 
relations between Turkey and Muslim states, are often seen as evidence of anti-
Western behaviour.76 The same scholars see, for example, Erdoğan’s 2011 
speech in Kuwait, where he was celebrated as the ultimate Islamic leader of his 
time, as proof of Ankara’s ideological foreign policy orientation, or what has 
been called “Islamist causes.”77 This is not very different from the orientalist 
argument that “Culture, Muslim identity, and affinity with the global Muslim 
ummah (global community) affect the AKP’s world view” and its foreign 
policies.78  
Generally, whereas Innepolitik/domestic-level analytical approaches to 
TFP can often overlap with the systemic/structural ones in terms of their 
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positivist epistemologies, they diverge significantly in ontological terms and 
sometimes in their epistemological approach as well. As such, both approaches, 
apart from few exceptions, often take into account only some of the realities of 
TFP.  
Some Innepolitik explanations, not in general but with particular regard to 
TFP under the AKP, miss the pragmatic incentives behind much of Ankara’s 
liberal and commercial foreign policies as well as the actual domestic 
democratic improvements by focusing on identity, ideology and policy-makers 
perceptions. Alternatively, they often focus on liberalist and political economic 
institutionalist explanations thus neglecting important ideational factors. 
Conversely, structural approaches disregard domestic level factors that could 
be important in foreign policy making, while structural realist or liberal 
approaches that see identity as instrumental rarely take into account the pacifist 
or power maximization policies of Turkey, respectively. That is to say that, one-
dimensional analyses could be easily challenged.  
It is evident that there is a long debate and a large body of literature on the 
character of TFP – and only a small part of it has been reviewed here. As far as 
TFP under the AKP is concerned, apart from a few isolated efforts to find the 
middle ground between the different approaches, the literature has been mainly 
dominated by explanations that lack a coherent multidimensional and 
multileveled analysis. Yet in the last few years, not least because of the 
developments in 2010 and 2011 (Arab Uprisings, etc.), a new debate has been 
provoked about the methodology of analysis and the so called “new wave” of 
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TFP, which could constitute the basis for a better understanding of TFP under 
the AKP. 
In this light the efforts of this study are aimed at synthesizing systemic 
and domestic accounts, since such a task would provide a more complex and 
potentially more accurate picture. At the same time, this thesis remains a 
contribution to the positivist literature, as explained below, and the causal role 
of ideology is accounted for through a primarily instrumentalist reading of 
identity.   
2.3. The “Third Way” – Integrating System-Level and 
Innepolitik Approaches 
 
Theoretically the agent-structure question in IR and FPA is not new and it is in 
many ways related to the levels-of-analysis problem.79 While structural, and 
particularly realist, approaches were the mainstream ones in IR scholarship 
during the Cold War, other theories and domestic level factors acquired more 
attention later on leading to the intensification of the debate about the 
relationship and interaction between the unit (state) and system (international) 
level.  
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As it has been demonstrated thus far, both structural and domestic-level 
approaches to the analysis of TFP have strong proponents. In Turkey, the rise of 
AKP was what intensified the discussion about the role of agency in TFP.80 That 
of course led to all the previously reviewed Innepolitik explanations and other 
systemic explanations that, among other things, do not neglect the ideological 
roots of the party. Unavoidably the debate also led to the gradual synthesis of 
different levels of analysis – what can be called the “third way” – with some 
authors trying to open the “black box” of the state and come up with ways of 
decoding the complexity of TFP. 
From a constructivist-culturalist perspective (i.e. strategic culture), for 
example, Mufti looks at how cultural factors play a role in shaping foreign and 
security policy as well as how culturally based foreign and security policy 
paradigms – namely, strategic culture paradigms – could be constructed for 
instrumental purposes. This mostly Innepolitik approach was selected by Mufti 
because, as he writes, “the dynamics of Turkish security policy during the past 
two decades cannot be explained adequately by external systemic pressures.”81 
In this context he writes “that established security paradigms... have to resonate 
at least as robustly with the polity’s particular historical and cultural 
heritage.”82  
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In addition to the structural analysis, he adopts what has been called by 
Alastair I. Johnston, “Third Generation Strategic Culture” theory.83 Strategic 
culture theorists are often referred to as culturalists, as opposed to 
constructivists; however, as Theo Farrell notes, there is significant overlap 
between the two since both of them examine how norms shape politics.84 Yet, 
culturalists are more interested in how ideational variables shape state 
behaviour while constructivists – specifically the neoclassical/thin ones – are 
more interested in interstate relations and the international system. Because of 
the significant overlap between them and the fact that some strategic culture 
theorists are often called constructivists, the category/strand of constructivism 
that would fit them best would be the broad category of “conventional 
constructivists” rather than the one of “critical constructivists.” The former 
maintains a positivist epistemology and seeks to communicate with rationalist 
approaches while the latter maintains an interpretivist epistemology.85  
As part of the same approach, Ali Karaosmanoğlu, while taking into 
account structural factors, argues that Turkish security culture “has been 
shaped by the accumulation of historical experiences and interpenetration of 
diverse kinds of discourses.” He also explains that in the post-Cold war period, 
“Turkey’s non-Western cultural and political peculiarities that came to the fore” 
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have been moderated by its “soft power” and “Kantian” orientation, although 
there are still some remaining elements of power politics.86 
Further to the external systemic international environment, Mufti and 
Karaosmanoğlu, try to analyse the Turkish domestic political scene. However, 
as both authors note, they deal primarily with security issues (i.e. 
security/strategic culture), thus not paying enough attention to other aspects of 
foreign policy (e.g. economic). Moreover, the focus on culture and norms, while 
very valuable, could lead to false or inaccurate generalisations about (political 
or strategic) culture by the labelling of the different culture “paradigms” (i.e. 
imperial, republican) within Turkey. It would be helpful if other analytical 
tools, beyond norms, identity, or culture, were used as well. Yet, it is 
noteworthy that the studies of Mufti and Karaosmanoğlu do not focus 
exclusively on TFP under the AKP and thus their historical cultural approach 
was perhaps appropriate for their purposes. 
Recent alterations in the regional balance of power of the greater Middle 
East have given this very debate about agency and structure another push 
forward. The seismic events of the “Arab Spring” that dominated 2011, as well 
as other developments in the Middle East and its immediate neighbourhood 
such as the escalation of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme, the 
intensification of the transnational Kurdish problem, and the Mediterranean 
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crisis over Cypriot natural gas, arguably signified an altered security 
environment.87 
On the one hand, it has been argued that Turkey’s “new appetite for 
confrontation” as well as “the AKP’s self-aggrandisement and threats of force – 
mainly towards Israel and Cyprus –” were influenced by the developments of 
the “Arab Spring” and the confidence that Turkey acquired from its on-going 
religious and soft power engagement with the countries of the Middle East.88 
On the other hand, Şaban Kardaş, for example, while acknowledging that the 
“Arab Spring” challenged Turkish foreign and security policy, argues that 
Turkey’s response to the Arab uprisings, especially in the case of Libya, “is 
pragmatism par excellence, and reflects the ability to follow dictates of Realpolitik 
in difficult times.”89 
Admittedly, a structural explanation of post-Arab Spring TFP would be 
justifiable and it is within this context that Ian Lesser suggests that “Turkey 
may be entering a ‘third wave’ in the evolution of its modern foreign policy” 
which signifies a shift from foreign commercial activity to security 
considerations.90 However, as Kardaş warns, while structural factors are 
important in understanding foreign policy, “one has to be careful to avoid 
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falling into the trap of structural determinism and downplaying the role of 
agency.”91 Özel mitigates the two positions by pointing out that although 
agents do indeed try to shape their environment, at the same time, “they are 
circumscribed by their capacities, by other actors’ relative power, and the 
conditions created by major shifts in that environment.”92 
While in agency-structure integrated approaches the structural analysis 
remains largely based on neorealism, the domestic level variables of analysis, or 
foreign policy determinants, vary. In their effort to identify the determinants of 
change in the AKP Middle East foreign policy, Meliha Altunişik and Lenore 
Martin, suggest that, apart from external factors, three domestic developments 
played an important role: 1) the rise of the AKP; 2) “the political transformation 
of Turkey;” and 3) the liberalisation of the Turkish economy.93 In a different 
context the domestic change determinants of Altunişik and Martin could have 
been domestic level variables of a broader analysis of TFP. That is because 
through them the authors engage with issues such as AKP ideology, political 
reforms and the development of the Turkish political system, as well as with 
economic issues, which means that together with structural external factors 
they provide a comprehensive, multileveled and multidimensional analysis.  
Provided that, as the review of the literature has shown so far, systemic or 
Innepolitik approaches are inadequate to analyse TFP by themselves, then a 
synthesis of the two needs to be sought. It is true that Innepolitik approaches 
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mostly pay attention to a very tangible reality which is the increasing eastward 
orientation of Turkey, as well as the salient ideological features of TFP – at least 
at the rhetorical level. This is not to say that system-level approaches are wrong 
or that Turkey has not indeed pragmatic, either liberal (economic) or realist 
(power), benefits from this shift. Neither is it to say that this might not be a 
“bargaining chip” that Turkey uses in its relations with the West. On the other 
hand, Turkey’s actions, especially since the Arab uprisings broke out and 
escalated in 2011, have been reaffirming some of the arguments of the authors 
who argue that TFP is indeed shifting. Yet, whether or not this shift – if that is 
the case – in Ankara’s policy is driven by ideological or pragmatic dynamics – 
or both – is still not clear.  
What does become clear is the increasing need to take into account both 
the structural external environment and the domestic policy-making dynamics 
of Turkey in the analysis of its foreign policy. In one such approach, and 
perhaps the most comprehensive and complete work on Turkish-Syrian 
relations, Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, draw significant conclusions 
with regard to the role of material, ideational, domestic, and systemic drivers as 
well as the relationship between regional powers and the global hegemon. They 
acknowledge the role of both the system and unit levels, and they pay 
particular attention to identity while arguing that “elite learning and elite change 
are arguably decisive for alignment change” in the case of Turkey-Syria 
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relations; thus despite the integrative approach, their focus is on the domestic 
level.94 
Although important for the understanding of Turkish-Syrian relations, the 
foreign policies of these two countries and the different drivers that shape them, 
the establishment of clear causal chains was not among the goals of the edited 
volume. Therefore, while the identification of the domestic, external, ideational 
and material drivers is key, this thesis seeks to go beyond that. It also seeks to 
determine the causal relationship between the drivers that lead to a certain 
foreign policy outcome and Turkey’s overall foreign policy behaviour under the 
AKP. 
In this light, and in line with the logic of approaches taken by Hinnebusch 
and Tür, Özel, and Altunişik and Martin, the need for the development of an 
NcR framework which pays attention to both the unit and system levels, 
becomes clear. A similar NcR framework was adopted by Emre İşeri and Oğuz 
Dilek in explaining TFP towards the Caucasus. İşeri and Dilek’s paper factored 
in both the system level and domestic factors, such as the perceptions of 
political leaders which, as far as this author is aware, was the first usage of NcR 
for TFP.95 
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The second usage which is also more relevant to this thesis’ framework 
given its focus on the Middle East, is Ahmet Han’s work on Turkish-Syrian 
relations. Han recognizes the importance of ideas in TFP-making and thus sets 
the AKP worldviews as an intervening variable between the effects of the 
systemic environment and foreign policy behaviour.96 As analysed in the next 
chapter, this thesis proposes that a distinction should be made between the 
worldviews of the party as a whole and its elites, proposing an intervining 
variable based on AKP elite ideology – a distinction that differentiates this thesis 
from existing studies. Yet it is here argued that ideology is not enough in 
understanding TFP and that domestic interest groups should have the role of a 
second intervening variable. Thereby both ideational and pragmatic drivers of 
TFP can be accounted for in relation to the external and domestic environment. 
This is another particularity of this thesis’ theoretical framework which, 
together with the establishement of specific causal chains as noted earlier, has 
not been found in existing literature. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
Through the review of the literature on TFP it has been observed that most 
works adopt an either system or domestic-level approach while there is also a 
gap between the examination of material and ideation factors in TFP as well as 
between security and economic policies. However, a relatively new body of 
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literature on TFP under the AKP has emerged which has made significant 
efforts to fill these gaps. Among such works are those that employ an NcR 
approach. To the end of contributing to this new body of literature, this thesis 
seeks to develop a new NcR framework by building on and refining the already 
existing integrating and NcR frameworks. 
The next chapter develops the research design, sets the research objectives, 
and develops its own theoretically informed framework based on NcR. 
Ultimately, the added value this framework provides over other works is not 
only the synthesis of levels of analysis or the effort to incorporate ideational 
factors and material (security and economy) ones. It is also the attribution of 
specific causal significance to each foreign policy driver which will ultimately 
enable the identification of TFP behaviour. At the same time it constitutes an 
effort to systematise the analysis of TFP, develop the already existing NcR 
approaches in this domain, and provide a more comprehensive and extended 
explanation and research agenda. 
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3. Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1. Research Design and Objectives 
 
The objective of this thesis is to explain TFP (towards the Middle East) 
under the AKP. More specifically, the overarching question to be answered is 
“what are the foreign policy-making dynamics under the AKP?” The goal is to 
trace the causal relationship between the (independent and intervening) 
variables vis-à-vis the dependent variable in terms of the foreign policy 
outcomes of “revisionism” and “status quo” behaviour as elaborated below. 
The argument is that systemic drivers are primary in bringing about change in 
TFP. However the character of the changes, namely, the ways in which Turkey 
responds to systemic pressures depends on domestic drivers and, most 
importantly, the ideology of policy-makers. 
This is to be achieved through looking at both Turkish security and 
economic policies towards two countries of the Middle East in comparative 
perspective – Syria and Israel. As argued above, the thesis will make a 
significant contribution to the literature in trying to mitigate – not necessarily 
combine – contradictory or non-sufficient explanations of TFP made by various 
theoretical approaches and provide answers about TFP behaviour and drivers. 
At the same time it will attempt an empirical contribution that would not only 
help refine some aspects of the employed theoretical framework but also help 
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towards providing an enhanced explanation of the TFP phenomenon under the 
AKP – at least regarding the Middle East. 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett suggest five questions to be 
addressed for determining the research objectives. Such questions regard the 
kind of  phenomenon or behaviour to be examined, the type of explanation to 
be made about the phenomenon in question, the theoretical framework to be 
employed, the specific aspects of the theory to be “singled out for testing, 
refinement, or elaboration,” and the relationship between the research objective 
and the employed theoretical framework.97 The following points aim at 
addressing George and Bennett’s questions thus highlighting the research 
objectives of the thesis as well as the selection of theory and methodology: 
 
 The phenomenon to be examined is TFP toward the Middle East under the 
AKP – through the analysis of its driving dynamics – and this is the class of 
events of which the cases will be instances. 
 The phenomenon [TFP under the AKP] is not thought to be an empirical 
universal. The goal is to explain an observable variation in the dependent 
variable (foreign policy outcome): revisionism or status quo (foreign policy) 
behaviour. 
 NcR will be used as the theoretical framework. Rival theories do exist with 
regard to the explanation of TFP under the AKP, as already presented, 
while NcR is considered to be an effective “middle ground” or “third way”. 
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 The intervening variables of the Neoclassical Realist theoretical framework 
are singled out for refinement and elaboration. 
 The theoretical framework, after the elaboration of the way the intervening 
variables are utilised, is sufficiently specified and operationalised to assess 
causal effects. But predictions cannot be specific, rather probabilistic given 
the dynamic nature of the phenomenon in question, as well as the greater 
degree of complexity rather than parsimony which is sought in the 
analysis.98 
 
Having addressed the research objectives it can be said that the research design 
of this thesis seeks to “accomplish more than one purpose,” that is, “heuristic 
and theory testing.”99 In this instance, theory testing refers to the thesis as a case 
of implementing NcR and enriching the literature regarding the 
operationalisation of its variables – since it is a rather underexplored theory. 
In what follows, this chapter develops an NcR theoretical framework by 
building on existing (neo)realist and NcR literature and by explaining and 
elaborating on the independent, the intervening, as well as the dependent 
variables. Then, it addresses the research methodology and the employed 
methods that complement the theoretical framework. These include case study 
and comparative methodologies which will ultimately allow for more 
generalizable conclusions to be drawn. 
                                                          
98 Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Neorealism and its 
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3.2. A Neoclassical Realist Framework for Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
A theory of foreign policy should “seek to explain what states try to achieve in 
the external realm and when they try to achieve it.”100 Having that in mind, 
NcR is employed as the ideal analytical framework because of its theoretical 
flexibility and its “clear guidelines for... achieving greater richness and fit.” 
Moreover, it is considered as ideal because of its emphasis on the relationship 
between the system and unit level as well as its “theoretically informed” 
explanations about how international relative material power changes are 
filtered by political decision makers.101 Overall, NcR draws upon classical 
realism and neorealism as well as Innepolitik theories. 
Given that “foreign policy is driven by both internal and external 
factors,”102 Kenneth Waltz explains that his theory of neorealism, as an 
international politics theory, “cannot be made sufficient, for the making of 
unambiguous foreign-policy predictions,” “because international-political 
theory can explain states’ behaviour only when external pressures dominate the 
internal disposition of states, which seldom happens.”103 Other theories, i.e. 
Innepolitik, or strands of realism, like offensive realism, challenge this line of 
argument. Whereas the latter argues that structural factors are dominant in 
explaining foreign policy, the former stresses that “foreign policy is better 
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understood as the product of a country’s internal dynamics” such as ideology, 
culture, individual and group political psychology, and the political system.104 
Despite common assumptions among the different strands of realism, 
classical realism’s emphasis on the role that human nature plays in shaping 
society and politics could, to a certain extent, be seen as an Innepolitik 
approach.105 The “democratic peace” concept of liberal theory is also in many 
ways an Innepolitik understanding of foreign policy since it holds that the 
political system (democracy) of a state determines its behaviour.106 Other 
approaches within the discipline of FPA hold that what matters the most is 
neither the system nor the state level but the individual level and ultimately the 
decision-making of the leaders. From that perspective, FPA seeks to explain 
“how and why” bad foreign policy decisions “come about.”107 In line with such 
Innepolitik approaches constructivism, although not so much focused on the 
individual, takes into account ideas and norms and explains how they affect the 
actions of policy-makers in pursuing aims which are often referred to as non-
rationalist.108 
As pure structural analysis is not sufficient to explain foreign policy, 
neither can Innepolitik approaches by themselves adequately understand it. 
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Structural neorealist analysis as explained above can merely explain patterns of 
outcomes of international interaction while “a theory of foreign policy limited 
to systemic factors alone is bound to be inaccurate much of the time.”109 On the 
other hand Innepolitik approaches, which maintain that it is primarily domestic 
processes that affect foreign policy, are unable to explain “why states with 
similar domestic systems often act differently... and why dissimilar states in 
similar situations often act alike.”110 Moreover, given that the international 
system constraints in one way or the other the choices of a state’s domestic 
groups, the internal dynamics of a state do not play as important a role as 
Innepolitik theories assume.111  
In this light, when Innepolitik approaches to TFP overemphasise factors 
like institutionalised change, political systems, ideology, identity, culture and 
perceptions, they tend to “miss the wood for the trees” while they often fail to 
identify structurally informed foreign policy decisions or evaluate the relevance 
of the relationship between the external environment and the domestic political 
scene with regard to the foreign policy outcome.112 On the other hand, realist or 
other structural explanations neglect, more often than not, the role of domestic 
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politics and how structural changes or shifts in international relative material 
power are filtered by domestic actors or groups.  
It is thus evident that most of the attention has been given to both 
structural and domestic factors that affect foreign policy, separately; but given 
that a state acts within an international system and that “Foreign policy choices 
are made by actual political leaders and elites,” it is important, as Waltz said, to 
take into account both structural and domestic factors when analysing a state’s 
foreign policy.113 NcR does exactly that in a systematic way by adopting the 
structural analysis of neorealism on the one hand, and by “introduc[ing] 
domestic-level intervening variables that act as filters between the independent 
(relative power) and dependent variables (foreign policy outcome),” on the 
other.114 In this context the independent variable could be further described as 
the effect of the external security (geopolitical) environment of a state at a 
particular time period,115 “usually operationalized by its polarity.”116 Yet 
neoclassical realists have used more intervening variables in their analyses such 
as “threat perception,” “diplomatic leverage,” “economic interdependence,” 
“alliance resolve,” “offense/defence balance” and “geography”.117 
This thesis employs three independent variables: changes in international 
relative power, external threat perceptions, and international economic 
                                                          
113 Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 147. 
114 Thomas Juneau, "Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: A Statement," in European Consortium on 
Political Research Graduate Student Conference (Dublin, Ireland Aug. 30 - Sep. 01, 2010), 1. 
115 Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War," 211. 
116 Juneau, "Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: A Statement," 11. 
117 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power  (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 37-38; Yew Meng Lai, "Nationalism and Power Politics in 
Japan's Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation" (University of Warwick, 2008), 61; 
Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War," 214. 
54 
 
interdependence. The intervening variables, as elaborated below, are AKP Elite 
Ideology and Domestic Interest Groups. As far as the dependent variable is 
concerned it is defined as the various responses, behaviour, or strategies of a 
state vis-à-vis its external environment. Jeffrey Taliaferro wrote that for his 
study the dependent variable was “the variation in the types of intensity of the 
adaptive strategies the state will pursue: emulation, innovation, or persistence 
in existing strategies.”118 For this study, the dependent variable will be the 
variation in the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey with regard to revisionism 
and status quo, along with the subcategories that these two entail (see below).119 
Just like other strands of realism, NcR has its own assumptions many of 
which are based either on classical or offensive (neo)realism.120 For example, 
NcR sees the “conflict group”121 as the “fundamental unit of social and political 
affairs” and accepts that the state is the primary conflict group;122 as Waltz put 
it, “states set the scene[;] ... states... set the terms of the intercourse[;] ... [and] 
states remake the rules by which actors operate.”123 Juneau notes that this 
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statement “does not preclude opening the black-box of the state in the analysis 
of foreign policy,” as NcR does.124  
The second fundamental assumption is that the international system is 
anarchic and therefore inherently conflictual; “In the absence of a supreme 
authority, there is then constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by 
force,” writes Waltz.125 Nonetheless, NcR “view[s] conflict in terms of 
probability not possibility” thus accepting that “states can focus on matters 
other than security.” From that perspective NcR goes beyond the structural 
realist focus on states’ self-help.126 
Another NcR assumption is that the place of a state in the international 
system, and thus its relative power within it, is the independent variable that 
determines its behaviour.127 However, neoclassical realists, in line with their 
more flexible approach, argue that apart from power, other domestic level 
factors play a role in shaping state behaviour such as “politico-military 
institutions... as well as nationalism and ideology.”128 Moreover, neoclassical 
realists, although they acknowledge the role of power, argue that states may 
pursue more than one end, instead of mere power maximisation or security.129  
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Another assumption has to do with the long debated issue of rationality. 
Although for some realists rationality is believed to be central to realism, other 
realists disagree. Waltz, for example, writes that the balance-of-power “theory 
requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all 
of the actors.”130  Therefore, despite several criticisms of NcR,131 it does not stray 
from traditional realist core assumptions. After all, according to the majority of 
rational choice theorists, no matter how good or bad a decision, “the main 
requirement of rationality” is “that a decision maker have some purpose in 
mind and make choices designed to achieve those predetermined ends.”132 
From that perspective, even though NcR introduces intervening variables at the 
unit level thus accepting a “confined rationality” of the state, at the same time it 
maintains that states (their foreign policy executives) do evaluate the costs and 
benefits in their pursuit of certain goals.133 
Within the above framework of NcR there have been identified two main 
levels of analysis: the system level and the unit level. As already elaborated, 
NcR uses both levels in its analysis of foreign policy by introducing intervening 
variables at the unit (state) level that explain how domestic actors translate the 
relative power changes of the systemic level (external environment). The next to 
sections further examine the unit and system levels and their different 
variables. The three system-level independent variables are, international 
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power relations, external threat perceptions and international economic 
interdependence. At the unit level, it is proposed that AKP Elite Ideology and 
Domestic Interest Groups are the two appropriate intervening variables for 
analysing TFP and completing the NcR analytical framework. 
 
3.2.1. The System Level – Independent Variables 
In a continuation of the above-developed NcR framework, the system 
level and the independent variables are first looked at before moving to the unit 
level and the two intervening variables which are employed for the analysis of 
TFP.  
International Power Changes. The first independent variable regards the 
power structure of the international system and the nature of the system itself. 
As Waltz argues, “A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. 
The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of 
the system as a whole.”134 The primary difference between a domestic and an 
international political system lies in the arrangement of its parts. Domestic 
political systems are centralised and hierarchical. In contrast, international 
political systems are decentralised and anarchic.135 As John Mearsheimer puts 
it, anarchy is “an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises 
independent states that have no central authority above them.”136 
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Within this framework, neorealism sees states as unitary actors that have 
the same functionality and are distinguished on the basis of their (material) 
power capabilities in relation to other states. That is, the distribution of power 
in the international system.137 By extension, structural changes come about 
when changes in the distribution of power occur. From this follows the balance-
of-power theory which is central to neorealism and NcR. Each state behaves 
according to its goals and capabilities. In turn, the actions and interactions of 
the units produce a system which gives rise to constraints and leads to balances 
of power.138 Due to systemic constraints it is easy to see how “motives and 
outcomes may well be disjoined” as “Structures cause actions to have 
consequences they were not intended to have.”139 
NcR accepts this fundamental premise of neorealism as an independent 
variable, that is, a variable that has a primary role in shaping a state’s foreign 
policy, albeit with the intervening role of domestic factors. In Waltz’s words, 
“The structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of 
capabilities across the system’s units. And changes in structure change 
expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the 
outcomes their interactions will produce.”140 With regards to the change in the 
distribution of power a synthesis of neorealist and NcR approaches is employed 
and is argued that it could be caused by: the increase or decrease of a state’s 
material (e.g. economic, military, demographic, natural resources) capabilities; 
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by the formation or dissolution of alliances; as well as by a state’s domestic 
problems that render it unable to mobilise or extract its resources so as to 
project its power.141 
When it comes to this thesis, Turkish foreign policy is examined within the 
framework of two different systemic power structures. The first is argued to be 
created by primarily by the 2003 Iraq war and everything that it entailed (see, 
chapter 4). The second one came about in 2011, primarily with the outbreak of 
the Arab Uprisings and the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq. It is argued 
that in the first instance, Turkey’s relative military and economic power 
position changed as it was outweighed by the US presence in Iraq; a state 
which, not insignificantly, pursued goals contradicting to those of Turkey and 
was supported by other regional states such as Israel. Among other things, this 
situation also gave rise to threat perceptions in Turkey (see below for the 
linkage between power changes and threat perceptions). To deal with the new 
power and security reality Turkey pursued the formation of alliances with Syria 
and Iran, the establishment of stronger economic ties with its Arab 
neighbourhood and the development of better diplomatic and cultural relations 
with the region. The goal was to upgrade its overall relative power status. 
When the Arab Uprisings broke-out and roughly coincided with the 
completion of the US withdrawal from Iraq, Turkey was again faced with a 
change regional power structure. Because of regime changes in the countries of 
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the Arab Uprisings Turkey lost – at least temporarily – many of its economic 
partners such as Libya, Egypt and Syria. At the same time it lost an important 
strategic ally, Syria, and had to deal with the fact that Iran gained momentum 
in Iraq. Turkey’s own power capabilities did not change per se but because its 
security and economic ties with the region were significantly damaged and 
once again was face with new security threats, it had to reconfigure its foreign 
policy improve its regional relative power position. This led it to better its 
relations with the US, support Libya, Tunisia and Egypt economically to re-
establish strong economic and political relations even as it harshened its stance 
towards Israel in order to consolidate its appeal to the new regimes of the Arab 
world (see, chapter 7).  
It should be kept in mind that Turkey’s movements were always aimed at 
the greater strategic goal which in accordance with its (revisionist) ideological 
vision was to attain the status of the regional power and leader (see intervening 
variable of the AKP ideology in this chapter). This is also the reason behind the 
change in Turkey’s Syria policy (2011) which shifted from amity to enmity, with 
Turkey pursuing regime change. Amity during the 2000s was convenient for 
the achievement of Turkey’s goals. But the outbreak of the Syrian civil war 
challenged Turkey’s security and foreign policy goals thus prompting it to 
adopt hard power, as opposed to the soft power of the previous decade, in 
order to fulfil its ambitions (see, chapter 7). 
Lastly, given the existence of three independent variables in the NcR 
framework, it is maintained that international power changes is primary and that 
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it has a vertical relationship with the two others: external threat perceptions and 
economic interdependence. This means that changes in the international 
distribution of power impact a state’s external threat perceptions and economic 
interdependencies, not the other way around. However, it is maintained that 
economic interdependencies can remain unaffected by international power 
changes or altered threat perceptions. This is mainly due to the fact that state 
economies are largely privatised, driven by private interests and 
business/economic elites and, therefore, to a great extent dissociated from 
political realities. 
External Threat Perceptions. The second independent variable has to do 
with a state’s external threat perceptions. These are not limited to threat 
perceptions of states alone but include all exogenous (security) threat 
perceptions that affect foreign policy-making; and thus the usage of “external 
threat perceptions” rather than “international” threat perceptions. 
Fear of others and perceptions of threat are an important part of the 
discipline of IR and realism more specifically. Hans Morgenthau, for example, 
makes the case that the fear of hostile alliances, the fear of the dissolution of 
alliances, and the fear of alliance intentions led to the formation of other 
alliances and changes in bilateral relations in the years prior to WWI.142 Later, 
Waltz argued that “fear of other states” is usually the common interest among 
                                                          
142 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: 79. 
62 
 
states that form alliances; in other words, the “Perception of a common 
threat.”143 
With specific regard to alliance formation Waltz’s neorealism and balance-
of-power theory focuses on power capabilities. Although, for example, he sees 
fear of others as a common interest between allying states, he maintains that 
balancing and bandwagoning behaviour are based on a state’s selection 
between the weaker and the stronger, respectively. Stephen Walt goes beyond 
this narrow understanding and adds that threat perceptions, in addition to 
power, are also central to alliance decisions. He suggests that “It is more 
accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that 
poses the greatest threat. For example, states may balance by allying with other 
strong states if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons.”144  
Moreover, Walt proposes four factors that give rise to threat perceptions 
and determine their intensity level: the aggregate power of state poses a threat 
depending on its level – the greater the power the bigger the posed threat; 
geographic proximity – the closer a state is to another the bigger the threat, 
given that power projection “declines with distance;” a state’s offensive 
power/capabilities – geographic proximity or aggregate power do not 
necessarily entail offensive capabilities; and the aggressive intensions of a state. 
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That is, either a state’s obvious aggressiveness and expansionism or its 
perceived aggressive intensions by other states play a role in alliance choices.145 
An important addition to Walt’s theory is the inclusion of ideology in 
these calculations; an element which fits well with the NcR framework. Walt 
acknowledges that such an approach strays from mainstream realist scholarship 
but he substantiates, as does Morgenthau,146 that ideology has indeed a role to 
play for a number of reasons. For example the role of ideology could be seen in 
a state’s protection of principles, in the existence of less fear because of similar 
ideologies and values between states, in the increase of a regime’s legitimacy 
through its participation in a larger group/movement, and in the mere 
prescription of alignment by ideology. In the same way, however, ideologies 
may cause “conflict and dissension” as well.147 
The suggestion to take into account here is that ideology plays a role in a 
state’s threat perceptions, in addition to power relations, geographic proximity, 
etc. Similar arguments, albeit more identity-based, have been made by other 
theories and disciplines such as constructivism and political psychology, 
arguing that “shared identity decreases threat perception” as well as “increases 
cooperation in economic policy areas.”148 Although the relationship between 
identity and ideology are explored later on in the context of the intervening 
variables, it is seen here how threat perceptions are a point where systemic 
pressures and domestic factors meet. This, of course, is not unlike the 
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relationship between international economic interdependencies and domestic 
economic interests, or international power changes and security concerns. 
Nonetheless, this thesis is firstly concerned with the systemic role of threat 
perceptions; that is, with threat perceptions as a product of the power system 
and the other factors that Walt listed that constrain foreign policy behaviour. At 
the same time ideology is not neglected but examined as an intervening 
variable between independent and dependent variables which is affected by 
and filters these systemic constrains. In that sense, and according to NcR, the 
system is seen as the primary cause of threat perceptions which are, however, 
exacerbated or dealt with in certain ways depending on the dominant ideology 
of the state executive. 
Economic Interdependence. The third and last independent variable concerns 
a state’s foreign economic policies and more specifically its economic 
interdependencies. The employment of such an independent variable in the 
framework is important for three reasons: the need to go beyond the 
examination of security policies and concerns by including economic issues in 
the analysis; the increasing decentralisation of states in the midst of an 
increasingly globalised world; and the incorporation of issues with which other 
political economic of neoliberal approaches deal in terms of the analysis of TFP. 
The notion of economic interdependence and its importance for the 
international system and power became especially popularised towards the end 
of the 1970s with Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s book Power and 
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Interdependence.149 The two authors did not challenge the realist premise of 
anarchy and neither did they suggest that the state has become obsolete. Rather, 
they argue that systemic reasons such as the fear of nuclear war, popular 
resistance to wars in poor or weak countries, the negative impact of wars on 
economic aims, and domestic opposition to the human cost of such endeavours, 
led countries to more cooperation than conflict. Thus they disagreed with 
realism in terms of the system’s impact on the behaviour of its units – i.e. state 
behaviour.150 
In this neoliberal vain, Keohane and Nye argue that interdependence 
entails that the actions of state or non-state actors have costs for other units of 
the system which, in turn, will respond in an effort to avoid a new reality forced 
upon them. And they add that,  
  
From the perspective of the international system, the problem is how 
to generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation 
in the face of competing efforts by governments (and 
nongovernmental actors) to manipulate the system for their own 
benefit.151 
  
Also important is the fact that they do not maintain that interdependence leads 
necessarily to cooperation or that “its consequences would automatically be 
benign in other respects.” Instead, they argue “that patterns of interdependence 
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and patterns of potential power resources in a given issue-area are closely 
related-indeed, two sides of a single coin.” And thus they tried to link realist 
and liberal perspectives together “in an integrated analysis.”152  
From that perspective, the examination of a state’s economic 
interdependencies fits well with this thesis’ NcR theoretical framework both in 
terms of its broader focus that includes security and economic foreign policy-
making factors as well as in terms of the different goals that a state may pursue, 
as elaborated below. More specifically, the main focus is on the (international) 
trade aspect of (Turkey’s) economic interdependence as it is “one of the most 
important forms of international economic interdependence between 
countries.”153 Further this thesis is mainly concerned not with Turkey’s 
economic interdependencies within the framework of international (financial) 
institutions, but rather with its economic interdependencies with other 
countries or groups of countries (e.g. EU) and their relationship with Turkish 
domestic economic interests and foreign policy-making. 
Since economic interdependence is seen as an important component of the 
international system and the distribution of power, in line with Keohane and 
Nye, it is here understood as being a systemic independent variable as well. 
However, as explained earlier, a state’s economic interdependencies are not 
necessarily influenced by changes in the other two intervening variables, nor do 
they necessarily affect external threat perceptions, as the current global 
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economic system has led economic dynamics into private hands and therefore 
to a relative independence from state policies. In the words of Jennifer Sterling-
Folker, 
 
 …states can perceive each other as security threats despite increased 
economic interdependence between them, because nationalism and 
capitalism are not behavioral, analytical, or practical contradictions. 
Global capitalism has always functioned and will continue to 
function in a context of national collectives with internal competitive 
dynamics that make the “interdependent-peace-dividend” a 
phenomenon in name only.154 
 
From that perspective, economic interdependence can be parallel to but not 
related with national threat perceptions or political and security inter-state 
relations. The analysis proceeds with the unit level and the employed 
intervening variables.  
 
3.2.2. The Unit Level - Intervening Variables 
The method of selecting one or more intervening variables is one of NcR’s 
weaknesses. Certain intervening variables have been explored and it has been 
argued that “Neoclassical realism... favours the ‘cookie-cutter’ approach, 
especially in its selection of intervening variables, whereby appropriate 
explanatory factors are selected from a ‘tool-box’ solely on the basis of the needs 
of a given case.” However, there is not a specific “list” of intervening 
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variables.155 Gideon Rose argues that this is a problem that needs to be 
addressed while he maintains that it would be helpful to further explore “how 
various psychological, ideational, and cultural factors may affect how political 
actors perceive their own and others’ capabilities and how such perceptions are 
translated into foreign policy.”156 Yet Thomas Juneau holds that while it is 
important to be able to identify the most important intervening variables for 
each case, NcR’s “ambitions at this level are limited: it is willing to accept here a 
relatively high degree of fluidity and indeterminacy, which must be dealt with 
empirically.”157 
NcR in its effort to be flexible and adaptable by introducing variables at 
the unit level has been criticised for been reductionist.158 This follows a logic 
similar to that of Waltz who argues that, “Essential to the reductionist 
approach... is that the whole shall be known through the study of its parts” 
adding that, “the reductionist finds himself using the methods of other 
disciplines in order to apprehend his own subject matter” while it cannot be 
known “whether reduction will suffice.”159 It is important to note that Waltz, 
once again, speaks of explaining “international-political events” and thus not 
foreign policy as such. In this spirit he wrote that “The third image [system 
level] describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and 
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second images [man/individual, and the state] there can be no knowledge of 
the forces that determine policy.”160 
Contrary to Waltz, Fearon, in his comparison of systemic IR and foreign 
policy theories, argues that systemic IR theories are at least in some ways 
foreign policy theories. Interpreting Waltz he writes that, as opposed to the 
explanation of general tendencies that IR theories make, “a theory of foreign 
policy is a theory of why particular states make particular foreign policy moves 
at particular times.” He then challenges this by arguing that, “It could not be 
the case that the predicted general tendency obtained, but no individual state 
ever took an action that contributed to making up the general tendency.”161 
Even if theoretically and in absolute terms Fearon is right (and Waltz is 
wrong), which is to say that generally it is difficult to separate international 
politics from states’ foreign policies, practically it is indeed difficult – if not 
impossible – to find out “why state X made a certain move last Tuesday”162 
unless one goes beyond structural analysis. Thus NcR is willing to pay the price 
of not having grand explanations and being reductionist, to the end of 
providing theoretically informed policy-relevant analyses, since (systemic) 
theories of international relations or international politics – even if Fearon’s 
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argument is valid – “do not attempt and by no means claim, to provide all the 
knowledge needed for the conduct of foreign policy.”163  
Some of the intervening variables used by or proposed in the NcR 
literature include, among others, the perceptions of the decision-makers; a 
country’s state apparatus/power, “defined as the relative ability of the state to 
extract or mobilize resources as determined by the institutions of the state, 
nationalism, and ideology;” domestic politics; the political system; political 
culture, etc.164 Moreover, several other Innepolitik approaches have been 
suggested from time to time as variables for analysing the unit level such as 
belief systems, bureaucratic politics, political psychology, ideological 
differences, etc.165  
Within an NcR framework, multiple intervening variables could be 
employed although the more variables are employed the more reductionist the 
analysis. Because flexibility, specificity and policy-relevant analysis is sought 
rather than a great degree of generalizability and parsimony, this study 
employs two intervening variables – AKP Elite Ideology and Domestic Interest 
Groups – rather than one, thus being closer to specificity.  
The selection of the intervening variables for the analysis of TFP has to be 
based on the existing literature on TFP that was already reviewed, and on the 
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aims that this study pursues. From that perspective one cannot just pick a 
variable from the above list and apply it to the case of Turkey. Going back to 
the review of the literature, it can be seen that one of the most salient features of 
the debate about TFP under the AKP is whether Turkish policies are driven by 
ideological or material (economic or relative power) incentives. 
A different way to frame this debate would be to say that TFP, as far as the 
unit level is concerned, is defined either by domestic institutional 
transformations of liberalisation or by the ideology and culture of policy-
makers. However, in this absolute form, the debate may lead one to believe that 
the above two possibilities are mutually exclusive, which may not be the case. 
After all, it has been argued that under certain conditions and political systems 
partial liberal democratic transformation, as in the case of Turkey, may lead to 
nationalism and crisis prone attitudes.166 Therefore, democratisation and 
liberalisation do not necessarily exclude the role of ideology or hostile foreign 
policy behaviour. 
In order for this research to not merely fit into the broader debate but also 
give answers to questions that arise from it, the intervening variables have to 
take into account ideational elements, such as ideology, as well as look at the 
interaction between the various social and political domestic interests groups. 
Studies, for example, that focus too much on the profile of the Foreign Minister, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, and his worldview constitute individual level analyses and 
while they could complement the unit level analysis, they cannot by themselves 
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delineate sufficiently the domestic situation in Turkey. This thesis is not 
concerned with the individual level per se but policy-making elites are seen as a 
group of individuals, the (world)views of which influence policies and thus 
could help in the decoding of TFP. 
Similarly, a variable that looks at the perceptions of the policy-makers 
misses other domestic dynamics. In this context, the extractive and mobilisation 
capacity of the state (state power) variable would probably be a good option. It 
examines how state power “shapes the types of internal balancing strategies 
countries are likely to pursue” and how it is affected and determined by the 
state’s institutions, nationalism and ideology.167 However, this particular 
variable assumes that “states do not suffer from various types of internal 
fragmentation, such as elite dissensus and fragmentation, lack of social or 
ethno-nationalist cohesion, or regime vulnerability.”168 In a country like Turkey, 
it would be a crucial mistake to assume that such problems and fragmentations 
do not exist. 
From that perspective an intervening variable that would examine the role 
of domestic interest groups seems appropriate. Moreover, in the age of mass 
politics, and in a period where the Turkish political scene has been gradually 
influenced by an intensive Europeanization and democratisation process169 it is 
                                                          
167 Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," 
38. 
168 Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War," 214. 
169 See, e.g., Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP: 55-
68, 80-99; Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization. 
73 
 
important for the role of domestic actors in Turkish foreign policy-making to be 
examined. 
Nonetheless, despite the rapidly increasing role of domestic groups, not 
all groups from all levels of society can be examined, not least because they are 
not as important. A domestic interest groups approach would deal with the 
different elites, public opinion, and different state and non-state groups, such as 
business groups, political parties and the military;170 though it would not go so 
far as to take into account civil society actors, as their influence over foreign 
policy is very limited, while something like that would be beyond the scope of 
this research (see below). 
But this approach, according to Norrin Ripsman, does not consider 
ideology as a domestic factor.171 Yet given that other (neoclassical) realists see 
great importance in ideology as a domestic factor,172 and, more importantly, 
taking under consideration the debate in the literature about the role of 
ideology in TFP, this study also looks at (AKP) Elite Ideology as one of the 
intervening variables. Thus it is suggested that AKP Elite Ideology and Domestic 
Interest Groups are the two intervening variables that better fit a neoclassical 
realist analysis of TFP. 
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3.2.2.1. AKP Elite Ideology – 1st Intervening Variable 
 
It is true that an analysis which would not take into consideration 
ideational, in this case ideological, factors could lead to limited and even 
inaccurate conclusions. For example Ripsman, who focuses only on domestic 
interest groups, argues that the policies of “regimes that lack institutionalized 
democratic stability” could be limited by their need to be “attentive to groups, 
such as the military, that have the capability to lead a coup or organized 
revolt.” To further underpin this point he uses Turkey’s “Islamist government” 
that “has shied away from moves such as outright termination of Turkey’s 
cooperative relationship with Israel.”173 
However, since Ripsman’s essay was published in 2009, the relations 
between Israel and Turkey have deteriorated dramatically although the 
domestic institutional order has not changed significantly.174 This of course 
might well be the result of Turkey’s response to changes in its external 
environment; but had a certain ideology not been dominant among the state 
elites to translate these changes in a certain way, then the response might have 
been different. Therefore, while it is important to look at interest groups and 
public opinion as domestic factors in the analysis of the unit level, the role of 
ideology cannot be downplayed as a domestic factor that determines foreign 
policy, especially in the case of Turkey. 
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In order to examine the role of AKP elite ideology in TFP, ideology, and 
its impact on policy outcomes needs to be defined first. Since the purpose is not 
necessarily to find how ideologies came about but how and if they affect TFP, 
emphasis is given to the approach of Goldstein and Keohane who suggest the 
identification of ideology rather than its historical roots. 
Moreover, Goldstein and Keohane identify three types of beliefs: world 
views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.175 According to the authors, ideas 
as world views have the “broadest impact on human action” as they are 
“entwined with people’s conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions 
and loyalties.” On the other hand, principled beliefs have a more ethical 
character as they are responsible for the distinction between right and wrong, 
as well as just and unjust.176 Causal beliefs regard the “cause-effect 
relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized 
elites.” They “imply strategies for the attainment of goals, themselves valued 
because of shared principled beliefs, and understandable only within the 
context of broader world views.”177 In this study, the primary focus with 
regard to the type of beliefs will be on the world views of the AKP elites, 
although not limited to that, as these are the ones underlined in the 
literature.178 
According to Goldstein and Keohane, these ideas and beliefs could 
influence policy outcomes through three causal pathways: 1) ideas as a road 
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map; 2) ideas as focal points and glue; and 3) institutionalization.179 In the 
instance of the first causal pathway, ideas impact policy outcomes when actors 
believe in and are influenced by them “or the normative principles that they 
reflect.”180 In the second causal pathway, ideas can work as problem solvers 
when hard decisions need to be made and “no ‘objective’ criteria” are available, 
thus leading to cooperation or collective action and as the “coalitional glue to 
facilitate the cohesion of particular groups.”181 The third causal pathway 
(institutionalisation), suggests that ideas can impact policies once “they have 
influenced organizational design” since they will be expressed by the 
organization and reflected in the people “whose interests are served by it.”182 
Even though all three causal pathways are relevant to the analysis, the 
first one will be at work more often. That is because the “ideas as roadmaps” 
pathway relates more to the ways policy-makers can adopt “new policies 
because their ideas had changed,” to how beliefs can lead different states to 
handle similar situations differently,183 and to how “ideas serve the purpose of 
guiding behaviour under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal 
patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for 
actions.”184 
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As far as the AKP is concerned, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, argue 
that its ideology is conservative democracy. However, their findings are based 
on “the stature, programme, and other official documents” of the party and 
they do therefore acknowledge that one might argue against them. The authors 
go further to say that critiques that argue that the AKP is working towards 
establishing a Sharia-based Islamic Republic are not substantiated by “The 
AKP government’s performance.”185 Importantly, Hale and Özbudun refer to 
the ideology of the AKP as a whole and as noted they only look at the official 
documents and declarations of the party, while their analysis about the party’s 
ideology and its historical roots focuses on domestic politics. Yet, when it 
comes to the analysis of TFP under the AKP the mention of Foreign Minister, 
Ahmet Davutoǧlu, as well as of the President and Prime Minister becomes 
inevitable.186 
The specific reference to Davutoǧlu’s ideas and world views in the book 
resembles texts that have been reviewed in the previous chapter, such as 
Cornell’s and Çağaptay‘s, that examine writings and speeches to identify the 
ideology and then base their analysis of foreign policy on it. Admittedly, Hale 
and Özbudun come from a more critical perspective without simply basing 
their sayings on Davutoǧlu or adopting an East-West distinction in their 
analysis. In short, although the authors make clear that Davutoǧlu’s ideas 
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exaggerate Turkey’s role, they admit that they “had influence over the practice 
of foreign policy under the AKP.”187 
In this light, if the declared ideology of a party is not necessarily the only 
one within it, or if certain world views of elite, policy-making, personalities of a 
(ruling) party can influence (foreign) policy outcomes, then it can be said that 
the ideology of the policy-making elites can be studied separately from the 
ideology of the party as a whole. Thus it is suggested that one of the employed 
intervening variables is “the AKP elite ideology,” rather than “the AKP 
ideology;” meaning particularly the ideology of the foreign policy-making 
elite.188 As such, the identification of the AKP elite ideology, and more 
specifically its world view (see below), is a necessary task that would enable 
the exploration of different pathways through which these beliefs influence 
policy outcomes. 
Talking particularly about fascist ideology, Randall Scheweller argues 
that “in the age of mass politics, ideology plays an instrumental and necessary 
role in helping leaders extract resources and mobilize domestic support for 
novel and expensive grand strategies.” He illustratively writes that “the hubris 
of fascist leaders set in motion recklessness in foreign policy that resulted in 
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total disaster for themselves, their nations, and the rest of the world.”189 From 
that perspective it seems that the identification of an ideology cannot be 
something abstract or be done in a scattered way but rather that a coherent set 
of ideas needs to somehow be identified. 
Provided that when one makes judgements and talks about beliefs and 
ideas always does so as an external observer, then the findings should be 
considered not as absolute conclusions but rather as hypotheses.190 According 
to Goldstein and Keohane, to identify ideas and beliefs one has to first engage 
in “evidentiary evidence” where various, though probably limited, documents 
are examined, and then engage in “descriptive inference” where systematic 
and random “aspects of behavior” are distinguished as well as the extent to 
which “self-reported and observed behaviour reflect beliefs” are assessed.191 
In the case of this thesis, such documents constitute the basis of the 
research for the first intervening variable. Although elite interviews for the 
identification of patterns of beliefs could not be conducted due to foreseen and 
unforeseen objective reasons,192 the gap has been compensated with the 
examination of media interviews or speeches of the elites in question as well as 
personal expert interviews. The purpose remains the identification of the 
impact of ideas on policy. It is important to note that, according to Goldstein 
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and Keohane, if it is discovered that the connection between ideas and policy 
outcomes has been constrained by external forces like power or interests then 
the connection “would be spurious.”193 But given that the role of elite ideology 
in policy-making is seen as intervening, not independent, ideology is expected 
to be constrained by systemic forces. Therefore, it is acknowledged that the 
conclusions cannot be absolute, having, however, in mind that the goal of this 
thesis in terms of the first intervening variable is to identify the causal role of 
elite ideology as one of many factors that shape foreign policy behaviour. 
Moving to the subject of interest, the ideology of the AKP elites needs to 
be identified. Among other things, in the literature it has been called “Muslim 
nationalism,” “democratic conservatism,” “Islamism,” “democratic Islamism,” 
etc. Based on the above-developed methodology with regard to ideas and 
beliefs, a first analysis and definition of the AKP elite ideology follows, which 
as has been argued is rooted in Turkish political Islam – i.e. political Islamism. 
More evidence of the AKP elite ideology along with the causal connection – 
where there is one – between this ideology and policy outcomes is found later 
on, in the case studies and the comparative analysis. 
 
AKP Elite Ideology: Political Islamism 
  
Islam in Turkey and its political role are deeply rooted in the country’s 
history and especially in the Ottoman period where religion played a central 
role on both the political and societal level. During that period a number of 
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Islamic religious orders (tarikats), which were established in the 10th century 
AD, operated. The purpose of these small brotherhood groups of mysticists 
was to keep Islam alive in the form of a secret and merciful faith, and to 
prevent it from becoming a “cold and typical doctrine.” They also promoted a 
“new Islam” instead of the orthodox Islam of the state and were an important 
source of spiritual support and welfare within society.194 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923 tarikats were banned, in part because they posed a 
threat to Kemal Atatürk’s secular top-down social engineering project. 
However they maintained a secret and underground role up to 1950 and the 
beginning of the multi-party period with the election of the Menderes’ 
Democratic Party (DP) to power. DP loosened religious restrictions and 
therefore tarikats operated more freely thus being able to establish strong ties 
with centre-right (conservative) parties, which they saw as protectors from the 
Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment.195 
In the years that followed tarikats became more powerful and influential 
as well as strong opponents of secular policies and actors. It is particularly 
important that tarikats, and especially the Nakşibendi order, “established ties to 
political parties and educated party activists for the purpose of undermining 
the strict secularism of the Turkish political order.” Such party activists 
include, among others, prominent conservative (or pro-Islamic) politicians in 
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Turkish politics and history like, Necmetin Erbakan, Turgut Özal, and Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan.196 The National View or National Outlook Organization (Milli 
Görüş), out of which emerged the AKP in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was 
precisely a product of these processes. It was established by Necmetin Erbakan 
in the 1970s in Switzerland, it initially operated in Europe seeking support 
from Turkish expatriates and it provided educational services based on Islamic 
Nakşibendi teachings before acquiring a political role in Turkey.197 Thus the 
National Outlook movement became the first coherent and salient political 
Islamic movement which also reflected the by then underground ties between 
tarikats and political actors. 
The ideology of the movement became the basis for Erbakan’s first 
political party, the National Order Party (MNP), which was closed down by the 
military on the grounds that it was against secularism. It was succeeded by the 
National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972 which one year later won 48 seats in the 
Grand National Assembly and formed a collation government with the CHP 
between 1973 and 1974.198 
The rise of political Islam in Turkey was also favoured by a number of 
political changes throughout the course of the 20th century. A particularly 
significant period for political Islam was the 1980s and the governance of 
Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (ANAP). During that period the 
Kemalist military elites, paradoxically, favoured the inclusion of political Islam 
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in politics as they saw it as a means of combating the threat of the communist 
ideology within the country; and thus was developed the so called “Turkish-
Islamic” synthesis, a complicated mixture of nationalism and political 
Islamism.199 
Within this political environment, Özal managed to strengthen the role of 
political Islam while his reforms liberalized the economy to a great extent thus 
allowing capitalists from cities of the Anatolian periphery – also known as 
Anatolian Tigers – to enter the picture and play a decisive role in Turkey’s 
economic development and capital accumulation.200 In the 1990s, after many 
Islamic parties had been banned and new ones were formed, Erbakan’s Islamist 
Welfare Party (RP), which succeeded the MSP, made a strong return and after 
the 1995 national elections it formed a coalition government together with the 
Truth Path Party (DYP), with Erbakan as Prime Minister. 
According to Ali Bulaç’s categorisation, Erbakan belongs to the second 
generation (1950-2000) of Islamists which succeeded the first one (1850-1924) 
after the latter’s elimination by Kemal’s single-party rule. Bulaç, who identifies 
himself as a second generation Islamist as well, suggests that the second 
generation were real Islamists who, however, passed their weaknesses to the 
third generation due to lack of self-criticism. Within this framework, the 
ideological features of second generation Islamists, such as Erbakan and 
Erdoğan, fit Bulaç’s definition of (political) Islamism: “an intellectual, moral, 
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societal, economic political and inter-state movement that is based on Islam as 
the main reference point and aims for a ‘new’ conception of the person, society, 
politics/state and thus a new model of social organization and universal 
Islamic Union.”201 
From that perspective, identifying the ideological features of National 
Outlook would help in the better understanding of the ideology of AKP elites 
as former members and followers of Erbakan.202 The Islamist movement made 
its goals and beliefs very clear through its party programs and Erbakan’s 
speeches. They were characterised by nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, 
support for a Turkish state based on Muslim moral principles, opposition to 
religious oppression and birth control, anti-Semitism, and a strong opposition 
to the Turkey-European Economic Community (EEC, later EU) relationship; 
Erbakan argued that Turkey’s accession to the EEC would make it part of 
Israel.203 Furthermore, National Outlook was against secularism, globalization, 
and Westernism; it also thought of East and West as inherently incompatible 
and saw “Turkey’s identity and future closely linked with the Muslim world, 
rather than with the West.”204 
These ideological characteristics sit well with Samir Amin’s observation 
that, political Islam does not accept the separation between state and religion 
                                                          
201 Ali Bulaç, "On Islamism: Its Roots, Development and Future," Insight Turkey 14, no. 4 (2012): 67-71. 
202 A recent biography of former President and Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, makes the case that Gül 
was a more rational and cool-headed person than other AKP leaders and that he never liked how 
Erbakan or the AKP after him flirted with Islamism despite him being a devout Muslim. See, Gerald 
MacLean, Abdullah Gül & the Making of the New Turkey  (Cornwall: Oneworld Publications, 2014).  
203 Jenkins, Political Islam in Turkey: 131-32; Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoğlu, "The Political Uses of 
Islam in Turkey," Middle East Report 18(1988). 
204 Rabasa and Larrabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey: 40-41. 
85 
 
while it also “disapproves of the very principle of democracy – the right of 
society to build its own future through its freedom to legislate.”205 Moreover, 
they fit with Bulaç’s definition of Islamism as well as with at least three of his 
notions. First, that religion can “be brought into politics, economic life, inter-
state relations, societal and public policies within the autonomous borders that 
they draw,” and that religion can be taken as a reference point for the 
organization of areas of life; those who deny these, Bulaç says, “are those whom 
the Qur’an clearly describes as ‘people who accept part of the Sacred Book and 
reject the rest’.” Second, that (political) Islamism is “a response and challenge to 
modernism” without, however, being “a similar, offshoot, or legitimizing 
framework to the hegemonic rhetoric and systems with modern roots;” and, 
third, that Islam is “the ontological, epistemological, and the moral reference 
point in a socio-political framework” which could also lead to a “new regional 
integration.”206 
This salient Islamist agenda of Erbakan, especially as it was expressed 
during his 1996-1997 governance through his domestic and foreign policies, 
brought him at odds with the military establishment; a fact that led to his 
overthrow via the so called “post-modern coup” after the military issued a 
memorandum in February, 1997. Thereafter, the military initiated a campaign 
against everything Islamic. At the same time, the “post-modern coup” became a 
reference point through which the Islamist movement learned how to adapt to 
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the political reality and how to adopt a more indirect approach to politics, one 
that could save it from another confrontation with the Kemalist 
establishment.207 
The latter realization created a politico-ideological schism within the 
Islamic movement: on the one hand, led by Necmettin Erbakan, there were the 
“traditionalists” who did not favour a change in the movement’s political 
orientation; the ones who remained faithful to what Bulaç calls second 
generation Islamism. On the other hand, the “reformists”, led by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoǧan and Abdullah Gül (later, the AKP’s leaders), advocated “that the party 
needed to rethink its approach to a number of fundamental issues, particularly 
democracy, human rights, and relations with the West.”208 These were Bulaç’s 
third generation Islamists who, as Bulaç argues, did not “stay fully loyal to 
sources and aims within their own tradition” but were rather consumed by 
power struggle considerations. In Bulaç’s words: “The unexpected success 
brought power, but because ideas regarding the nature and modern structures 
of power could not be developed accordingly, the principle of ‘power for the 
sake of power’, was adopted.”209 By extension, these new political Islamists, lost 
their way and strayed away from the essence of their ideology and tradition. 
These ideological developments and shifts were first expressed within the 
RP’s successor, the Virtue Party (FP), which in turn was banned in 2001. After 
that, the movement formally split up and two new parties emerged: the Justice 
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and Development Party (AKP) of the reformists and the Felicity Party (SP) of 
the traditionalists. Although stemming from the same movement and the same 
ideological background as the SP, the AKP employed a more moderate stance. 
It abolished the label “Islamic” and branded itself as a conservative-democratic 
party. It adopted a positive approach to democratic and Western values, thus 
transforming its public image and discourse, while it shifted its rhetoric and 
policies in favour of the EU and openly supported Turkey’s accession into it. 
But this is where the paradox becomes salient. How does an elite with 
traditionalist background, with a history of activism within and educated by a 
second generation movement (National Outlook), and with ideological ties to 
Islamist orders such as the Nakşibendi, conduct politics in a “reformist” way 
and get criticized by scholars such as Bulaç as not genuinely Islamist? The first 
thing that needs to be addressed here are the circumstances under which this 
ideological transformation occurred. Then the continuity and change in the 
worldview of AKP elites should be looked at. 
Beginning with the first issue, it is important to keep in mind the turning 
point in the AKP’s ideological transformation, that is, the 1997 “post-modern 
coup,” for it bears great significance as to why these changes emerged. 
Admittedly, these are issues hard to determine with certainty but, in retrospect, 
it seems that it was a rational political act of tactical and strategic importance 
by the AKP; a manoeuvre, similar to the one that led to the “Turkish-Islamic” 
synthesis of the 1980s, as it stemmed from political anxieties akin, yet opposite, 
to the ones that the Kemalist establishment faced back then. 
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In other words, the AKP’s reformist and modernist orientation towards 
political Islam integrated Kemalist ideological features into the party’s ideology 
due to its necessity to defeat the dominant Kemalist establishment, survive in 
the political conditions of the time, and ultimately ascend to and consolidate its 
own power. In this context, for example, the reform and democratization EU-
backed packages were seen by the AKP as a means of weakening the power 
and state control of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment, while the 
maintenance of a pro-Western rhetoric could be seen as populism, directed 
both domestically and abroad, as that would appeal to the pro-Kemalist masses 
and the Western allies alike. 
These processes of ideological transformation are directly related to pre-
conditions that increase the importance of the role of ideas, as suggested by the 
pathway of ideas as roadmaps. Therefore, as Goldstein and Keohane put it, 
“Depressions, wars, the decline of a political party, and the overthrow of a 
government may all cause ideas to become important because all constitute 
exogenous shocks that undermine the existing order,” just like the 1997 coup in 
Turkey. In turn, “radical shifts in the political agenda may occur because of the 
common acceptance of some new normative or causal set of beliefs.”210 
It can thus be suggested that a new political agenda was introduced as 
expressed through the reformist wave of National Outlook, namely, the AKP. 
But to what extent are AKP elite statements and (reformist) proclamations 
consistent? Also, have Erbakan-like rhetoric and (domestic and foreign) policies 
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become more prominent? By admitting the latter as being the case the first 
question is essentially answered as well. That is, the AKP has not been 
consistent in maintaining its modernizing stand. It rather returned to its 
traditional roots and, as it will be seen throughout the empirical analysis, it has 
done so in two main steps, in 2007 and 2010. 
In 2007 the Turkish parliament was to elect the new president. The 
Kemalist establishment was against the election of the AKP’s Abdullah Gül, as 
they were suspicious of the political aims of the party, and thus the military 
issued an ultimatum on its website warning secular civilian forces about the 
potential threat posed by Gül’s election. The ultimatum, labelled “e-coup”, also 
accused the AKP of anti-secularism, of being enemies of the Turkish Republic as 
well as against the legacy of Kemal Atatürk. The AKP did not back down and 
Gül was eventually elected as president, effectively marking the beginning of 
the end for the dominance of Kemalists over the state. Thereafter a number of 
court cases against military coup plans were initiated leading to “the 
prosecution and detainment of over three hundred military officers, including 
sixty active duty generals and admirals.”211 Thereby, the AKP managed to 
replace the Kemalist-military rule with its own civic governance, and the 
military’s ability to intervene in politics was minimized.212 
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The next step came with a referendum for constitutional reforms on 
September 12th 2010, a date with symbolic importance as it marked the 30th 
anniversary of the 1980 coup. The AKP’s proposed constitutional reforms 
passed with 58% of the votes. As soon as three days after the referendum, Halil 
Karaveli analysed the results and argued that Turkey was “moving toward 
authoritarianism.”213 Describing the importance of the referendum for the AKP 
he wrote, 
 
The crucial amendments in the constitutional package are those who 
are designed to solve the AKP’s problem with the high judiciary, 
which to all intents and purposes had become the last vestige of the 
old system of state tutelage over the executive. Only the high courts 
were still in the position of being able to throw up hurdles in the way 
of the AKP government.  The changes that have now been adopted 
will alter the composition of the Constitutional court and of the High 
board of judges and prosecutors. They basically put an end to the 
independence that the high judiciary has enjoyed in the selection of 
the members of the Constitutional court and the High board of 
judges and prosecutors. That was what Erdoğan had in mind when 
he celebrated that “the caste system” in the high judiciary had come 
to an end.214 
 
In these two steps the AKP managed, among other things, to 
institutionalise its ideas which could now be associated with Goldstein and 
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Keohane’s third causal pathway through which ideas influence policy – 
institutionalisation. In their words, “Once ideas have influenced organizational 
design, their influence will be reflected in the incentives of those in the 
organization and those whose interests are served by it.”215 The consolidation of 
the AKP’s power was more often than not paralleled by the more vocal 
expression of Erbakan-like ideologically-driven rhetoric and policies. This 
means two things: that the worldviews of AKP elites became more able to 
influence policy – not least because of the marginalisation of the Kemalist 
establishment; and, by implication, that their expressed ideological convictions 
re-shifted from reformist to traditionalist. Within this framework, the only thing 
that remains is to identify expressions of this ideological transformation. Thus, 
in what follows, expressed ideas of key AKP officials, indicative of its elite’s 
ideological orientation are cited. 
In 1996, during his time as Istanbul’s mayor (1994-1998), Erdoğan 
famously stated that, “Democracy is like a train. We shall get out when we 
arrive at the station we want;” in addition to his statements that he was a 
“servant of Sharia” and the “imam of Istanbul.”216 Erdoğan’s worldview and 
goals could not get any clearer; and although he has disavowed his extreme 
views, it seems that they remained largely the same after the AKP’s election to 
power. To this testifies, for example, a 2013 interview of Abdullatif Şener, one 
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of the founding members of the AKP and, among other titles, the party’s 
deputy (2002-2007). According to Şener, “The AK Party’s party programme 
was a democratic programme. The Prime Minister [Erdoğan] has never 
adopted the party programme.” And he went on to say that, “The Prime 
Minister is not a person that internalized the idea of democracy… He thinks 
that since he won the elections he can do whatever he wants.”217 
Other public statements of Erdoğan also correspond to the ideological 
features of National Outlook that have been identified. For example, he has 
repeatedly been accused of anti-Semitism. The criticism peaked when the PM, 
during anti-government protests in Soma due to a mine disaster with many 
casualties, said to a protester, “Why are you running away, Israeli spawn?”218 
Moreover, his anti-Semitic (not merely anti-Israeli) and anti-Western tendencies 
have manifested several times, especially when he accuses “foreign dark 
forces” and Jews for crises in Turkey, such as the 2013 massive anti-
government Gezi protests.219 These examples are particularly important as they 
demonstrate anti-Semitic tendencies outside the context of a crisis between 
Turkey and Israel and thus they cannot be merely interpreted as populist 
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outbursts; rather, it can be suggested that they are reflective of more systematic 
attitudes.220  
Erdoğan’s religion-driven ideology is also demonstrated in his approach 
to state-society relations. In addition to his efforts to control the state’s powers 
– e.g. the Judiciary – he also referred to Caesarean births and abortion as 
crimes, passed a law of restrictions against alcohol, and lifted the decades-old 
ban on women’s headscarves.221 
All the above-mentioned statements and policies suggest at least some 
continuity in Erdoğan’s ideas and point to his adherence to more traditionalist 
ideas. A suggestion which is in agreement with Hakan Yavuz’s conclusion that, 
“His primary identity is Islam, and he sees the world from a religious 
perspective.”222 Similarly, Vaggelis Papadopoulos, a biographer of Erdoğan 
argues that “In the case of Tayyip Erdoğan we have a pious Muslim. And this 
faith is not only expressed substantially in personal and family behaviour, nor 
only symbolically. He does not care, for example, nor does he put effort to 
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show at any time, even in painless small details, his faith in Islam and the 
homeland.”223 
But the AKP elite is not limited to Erdoğan, while it can be suggested that 
these ideas are at least to a certain extent prevalent among other AKP officials 
as well. One of the AKP elite beliefs which is central to this analysis, is their 
view of the Middle East, especially vis-à-vis Turkey. An important expresser of 
ideas on this subject is Ahmet Davutoğlu. While he denied that the term “neo-
Ottomanism” is appropriate to describe Turkey’s foreign policy, he repeatedly 
emphasised the significance of the Middle East for Turkey in cultural and 
ideological terms. In one instance he said that, “Ottoman history, and also our 
Republican history, the former bi-polar world, these are permanent parameters 
that cannot be changed. They are an essential part of Turkish identity.”224 
Indeed, Turkey’s foreign and particularly regional foreign policy after the 
rise of the AKP to power was very much influenced by Davutoğlu’s opinions, 
perceptions, planning and geopolitical analyses. This “new” orientation of TFP, 
often called “Davutoğlu doctrine,” has as a starting point the fact that Turkey 
has historical and geographic depth. According to Davutoğlu’s understanding, 
the “historical depth” of the Ottoman Empire and heritage provides Turkey 
with “geographic depth.” Historical and geographic depth are necessary for 
Turkey’s “strategic depth” which enables it to have influence over multiple 
(geo)political regions. As such, the formation of a strategy, that is, finding a 
“strategic orientation,” according to Davutoğlu, needs to be done by examining 
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the “geo-cultural, geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions of strategic 
depth.”225 
It can be suggested that a sense of ownership of the former Ottoman space 
can be traced in Davutoğlu’s approach alongside geostrategic concerns that see 
the “Balkan-Middle East axis” as necessary for former Ottoman Empire (and 
thus Turkey) to become a great power.226 Yet the Islamic element is found 
throughout his work, intertwined with his geopolitical approach. Talking about 
the 1980s and 1990s Balkans he writes, “every temple that gets demolished in 
the Balkans, every Islamic institution that gets extinct, every customary 
element that vanquishes from a cultural perspective also constitutes a 
cornerstone that gets removed from the influence Turkey could exercise in this 
region beyond its borders.” And he goes on to add that Turkey needs to come 
up with alternative policies on the basis of which “inevitably there will be the 
effort of keeping the Balkan and Ottoman-Islamic civilization alive.”227 
Similar is his understanding about the Middle East, as noted throughout 
the following chapters, which ultimately points to the fact that strategic 
calculations and external systemic realities are filtered through a worldview of 
political Islamic and Ottoman notions, while they are consistent with a more 
assertive and revisionist foreign policy approach. 
Gül has expressed similar, if more moderate, ideas as well when as 
Davutoğlu he drew parallels between the regional “peace and harmony during 
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the Ottoman centuries” and Turkey’s ability to transform the Middle East “into 
a new area of cooperation.”228 Moreover, for Gül, Turkey’s responsibility for 
the Middle East’s “bright future… goes beyond short-term economic and 
political interests. This is a mission with humanitarian and moral aspects.”229 
According to London, this goes for Erdoğan as well since he: 
 
regards Turkey as primus inter pares [first among equals] among 
Muslim nations. Moreover, this desire for Muslim leadership has 
been accompanied with a distinctly anti-Western attitude. In part this 
attitude is understandable given Europe’s rejection of Turkey as an 
EU member in 2001.230 But this policy shift goes beyond petty 
retaliation. He has noted that his dream is the restoration of the 
Ottoman caliphate.231 
 
Yavuz makes a similar case, arguing that the AKP government has “pan-
Islamic concerns” which also played a role in the divergence between Turkish 
and American policies over the 2003 Iraq war.232 Importantly, this can be 
associated with the overall approach of the AKP to the region, as expressed in 
the party’s undisclosed report, “The Turkey Project.” In the report it is stated 
that, 
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Our party believes that Turkey should fill the power vacuum in the 
Middle East created by the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey has to 
become a major intervening actor in the Middle East and the 
surrounding area. We believe that Turkey cannot solve its bilateral 
and domestic problems without becoming an imperial power in the 
Middle East. There is also no other way to bring peace and stability 
to the region.233 
 
From this perspective, AKP (elite) ideology strays significantly from the status 
quo foreign policy approach of the traditional Kemalist establishment. As 
Turkey’s Deputy PM, Bülent Arınç, put it: “Leaving the status quo-oriented and 
static mentality of the past behind, Turkey has undergone a process of open and 
dynamic change under the AK Party.”234 As such, the foreign policy outlook of 
the AKP elite ideology is different to that of the Kemalists, for it is more 
outward and prone to mingle or intervene in the region; it sees Turkey as an 
aspiring leading Muslim power, an Islamic hegemon.235 Whilst Arınç denies 
Turkey’s leadership aspirations, despite evidence of this, he does acknowledge 
the appeal of the country’s “different role” to the Arab world.236 Within this 
framework, AKP elite ideology can be characterized as revisionist, at least in 
terms of official written and verbal expressions by AKP leaders. Based on this, 
as noted later on as well, it can be proposed that when AKP elite ideology 
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predominates over other domestic drivers, TFP behaviour will most likely 
demonstrate revisionist tendencies. 
Lastly, it is important to look at how these elites see their own ideology, 
the place of their country within it, and its relationship to the region and the 
West. One of the best examples comes again from Ahmet Davutoğlu, who apart 
from being a strategist and a foreign policy-maker appears to have the role of 
an Islamic intellectual as well. In one of his most important works – his Ph.D. 
thesis which was later published as a book – he examines the ontological, 
epistemological, and axiological relationship between Islamic and Western 
worlds. According to him, the main argument of the book is that institutional 
and historical differences are not the main source of clashes and antitheses 
between Islamic and Western political thought but rather their “philosophical, 
methodological, and theoretical background.”237  
While Davutoğlu claims to be against the West-Islam or West-Rest 
categorizations because of their confrontational character,238 he seems to be 
undertaking a post-Orientalist239 task whereby he essentialises Islam in his 
effort to deconstruct Western narratives of and policies towards it. He argues, 
for example, that: 
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The principle difference between Islamic and Western weltenshauungs 
[worldviews] is related to the contrast between the ‘ontologically 
determined epistemology’ of Islam and the ‘epistemologically 
determined ontology’ of the Western philosophical traditions. This 
difference is especially significant in understanding the axiological 
basis of political legitimacy and the process of justification.240 
 
In this light, (political) Islam for Davutoğlu, and other AKP elites, is not merely 
seen as just another ideology, but one that can be an alternative to and replace 
the Western worldview, culture, and hegemony. As İştar Gözaydın puts it, 
Davutoğlu understands that “Islamic and Western paradigms are 
incompatible” and “fundamentally different.”241 
After having examined the roots, content and features of the AKP elite 
ideology, namely, political Islamism, it must be made clear that this was neither 
an attempt to present a monolithic view of (political) Islam nor to generalize 
these findings with regard to Islam or its role in the politics and society of other 
countries. It is, however, maintained that the presented version of political 
Islam is one that characterises the (foreign) policy-making elites of AKP since 
2002. Moreover, as explained, it is argued that during the course of the AKP’s 
governance the expression and influence of this ideology on policy-making and 
rhetoric has become more salient. 
What has not been seen, and remains to be analysed in the next chapters, 
is the extent to which political Islamism drives and influences Turkish foreign 
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policy-making. That is, while it is accepted that political Islamism is prevalent 
among AKP elites, it is maintained that it is very often constrained by external 
pressures and other pragmatic – economic and security – interests.  This is also 
one of the reasons why the NcR approach is important; it is not limited to 
arguing that TFP is merely driven by ideological or pragmatic concerns (or 
both),242 but it rather identifies when ideology plays a role, and when other 
considerations are more important. 
Part of these considerations are reflected in the second intervening 
variable – i.e. domestic interest groups – and its relationship with the system-
level, independent variables, which is elaborated next. 
 
3.2.2.2. Domestic Interest Groups – 2nd Intervening Variable 
 
The role of domestic interest groups – or pressure groups – is the second 
intervening variable that is employed for the analysis of the unit level (state). 
Interest groups have long been acknowledged as a domestic factor that 
influences foreign policy. Specifically it has been argued that “The domestic 
sources of foreign policy are widely recognized, and include interest groups, 
mass public opinion, and the printed and electronic media.”243 Robert Putnam 
writes that “At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by 
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pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek 
power by constructing coalitions among those groups.”244 
While domestic actors and their influence on foreign policy can be studied 
separately, in the same way that public opinion for example is often looked at 
as different from interest groups, Ripsman argues that these and other domestic 
actors “share common aspects that make it appropriate to treat them together in 
a comprehensive theory of domestic political actors.” In what he calls domestic 
political actors he includes public opinion, the military, organized interest 
groups, the media, economic elites, etc., noting, importantly, that “democratic 
and non-democratic [or semi-democratic] governments will differ in the 
manner in which they interact with domestic actors.”245  
Following Ripsman’s logic, domestic interest groups are seen in the 
broader sense. Emphasis is given to different political parties, public opinion, 
the military elites, and the business/economic elites (see Table I). The logic 
behind the selection of these groups is their different character (i.e. political, 
economic, and military). In this way, two goals can be achieved: the 
consideration of material interests in conjunction with ideas in foreign policy-
making, as well as the different aspects of TFP (e.g. economic), rather than 
merely security considerations, as the NcR framework allows. 
Other domestic actors could be included in the analysis, such as the media 
or other civil society actors. However, this would render the analysis too 
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reductionist with the danger of positioning it among Innepolitik approaches 
rather than integrated ones. Further, it is maintained that, based on the existing 
literature, the domestic actors under examination are the most important ones. 
That is not to say that, for example, civil society actors are completely irrelevant 
but to state that this study focuses on the most substantive ones according to 
the existing research. 
The case is similar when it comes to the media. Specifically, it has been 
argued that since 1980 the “ownership and control [of media companies] passed 
to the hands of businesspersons, namely to some business groups” while at the 
same time “government incentives were also another important source of 
revenue for some media companies.” As a result, Bahattin Karademir and Ali 
Danışman write, “Media companies… were somewhat inclined to change their 
coverage for the interest and sake of related political actors and 
businesspersons.”246 Having this in mind along with recent reports about the 
suppressed media freedom in Turkey, the examination of the business groups’ 
interests as well as the interests of the ruling party should be enough to indicate 
the domestic situation in Turkey and its impact on foreign policy, without 
having to take into account the media and additional civil society actors as well. 
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Political 
Parties 
(Opposition) 
Military Elites 
Public 
Opinion 
Economic/Business 
Groups 
Republican 
People’s Party 
(CHP) 
Kemalist (secular) 
Officers/ Generals 
 
(their opposition 
and 
marginalisation) 
Opinion polls 
Independent 
Industrialists and 
Businessmen 
Association 
(MÜSIAD) (secular 
capital) 
National 
Movement Party 
(MHP) 
 
Electoral 
polls 
Turkish Industry & 
Businessmen 
Association 
(TÜSIAD) (Islamic 
capital) 
Peace and 
Democracy 
Party (BDP) 
   
 
  It is important to note that not all domestic interest groups are involved 
in all foreign policy decision-making processes, while there is significant 
overlap between the interests of some of them. For example the interests of 
business groups and the economic elites may be divided along the lines of 
“Islamic” (e.g. MÜSIAD) and “secular” (e.g. TÜSIAD) capital which would 
overlap with the respective (political) Islamic (AKP) or secular powers (e.g. 
CHP). Similarly the interests of the (secular) military elites for example are 
usually consistent with the ones of the secular parties. This is to say that not all 
the listed groups are considered to have a role in foreign policy-making 
throughout – not to mention that there are many, yet smaller, groups that have 
not been listed. Their role will be highlighted or de-emphasised accordingly. 
Business groups in particular, have had an increasingly important role in 
the last twenty years and more so in the last ten years in Turkey. Given the 
Table I: Domestic Interest Groups 
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growing economic relations of Turkey with the Arab/Muslim countries but also 
the significantly developed trade relations with Europe, economic elites do 
have a role in the policy-making of Ankara, and that needs to be taken into 
account specifically when one talks about Turkey’s liberal foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the interests of the Kurds (which are politically expressed through 
the BDP), for example, do play a more significant role when it comes to the 
relations of Turkey with Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Public opinion is always a 
constant but it becomes more important when it comes to issues of national 
significance and matters like Turkey’s relations with Israel and the Arab World 
or Muslim nations. 
All these social and political actors (which often constitute domestic 
fragmentation), along with the external international changes in relative power, 
are always managed and filtered by the policy-making elite (the AKP in this 
instance) that expresses – at least at the rhetoric level – a certain ideology. This 
is not to say that ideas play the most important role, but to “suggest that ideas 
as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action” as 
suggested in the previous intervening variable.247 In other words, just as policy-
making elites could be constrained by the systemic environment, their ability to 
respond to systemic changes could potentially be enhanced or detracted by 
domestic interest groups. Whether and when domestic interest groups have an 
enhancing or detracting impact on policy-making is not straight-forward and, 
as laid out in the methodology section below, very much depends on the 
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domestic balance of power between the AKP and the opposition as well as the 
policy at hand in conjunction with the security and economic realities the 
country is faced with.  
The result of this process between the independent and intervening 
variables is the dependent variable – i.e. the foreign policy outcome, the foreign 
policy behaviour. Thus the thesis now moves to elaborating on the dependent 
variable and the variability in TFP between revisionism and status quo. 
 
3.2.3. Dependent Variable – Foreign Policy Behaviour 
The dependent variable is defined as the various responses, behaviour, or 
strategies of a state vis-à-vis its external environment. Taliaferro wrote that for 
his study the dependent variable was “the variation in the types of intensity of 
the adaptive strategies the state will pursue: emulation, innovation, or 
persistence in existing strategies.”248 Here, the dependent variable is the 
variation in TFP behaviour in terms of revisionism and status quo, along with the 
subcategories of followed strategies that these two entail.249 
Foreign policy behaviour can also be found in the literature as state 
behaviour. Waltz for example writes that “States may alter their behavior 
because of the structure they form through interaction with other states.”250 In 
this context state behaviour is the result of the structure of the international 
system and the inter-state relations (interaction) within it. Foreign policy is the 
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means through which a state behaves within the international system and 
therefore state behaviour and foreign policy behaviour are considered to be the 
same.  
A number of motivations have been considered over the years as foreign 
policy behaviour changers. More often than not, especially in the realism 
literature, these motivations are defined by changes in the structure of the 
international system. Such realist motivations include survival, national 
security, and more recently in NcR, for example, economic profits. According to 
Mearsheimer, survival, as the “primary goal” of a state, and other features of 
the international system (e.g. anarchy, states’ offensive capabilities), lead to 
three patterns of state behaviour: fear, self-help, and power-maximization.251 
Power-maximization is ultimately the product of the two former behaviours; 
fear leads to self-help behaviour which, in turn, leads to power-maximization 
through various means, as a way of ensuring their survival. 
As the father of offensive realism, Mearsheimer essentially maintains that 
all states seek to maximize their power to turn the structure of the international 
system in their favour while the ultimate goal of great powers is to become 
global hegemons. Therefore, all states are revisionist. From this perspective it 
can be argued that revisionism is itself a form of state behaviour. Revisionism 
and status quo is also the variability in state behaviour that Catherine Combers 
is concerned with when assessing China’s foreign policy in terms of 
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international regimes.252 Given the debate about TFP and the conflicting views 
in the literature about whether Turkey under the AKP has been following a 
peaceful and win-win foreign policy of cooperation or an offensive foreign 
policy of aggression and expansion, this thesis has chosen to look at the 
variability in TFP outcomes along the lines of revisionist and status quo 
behaviour. 
This approach fits the NcR theoretical framework of this thesis. Contrary 
to neorealism, NcR borrows classical realist assumptions on foreign policy 
outcomes. Neorealist approaches are divided into two main strands: defensive 
realism and offensive realism. As already explained offensive realism sees all 
states as being power-maximizing and revisionist. On the other hand, defensive 
realists like Waltz, argue that security is the primary aim of states and power is 
a means of achieving it rather than a goal of its own. As such, according to 
Waltz, “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain 
their position in the system.”253 In that sense, defensive realism sees all states as 
status quo powers.254 
Recent efforts to revive classical realism argue that the status quo and 
revisionism bias of offensive and defensive realism is inadequate to 
understanding change in state behaviour. Classical realism maintains that states 
may pursue different goals. Specifically, Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose 
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write that “Survival is merely one out of several possible state interests that 
may result in a strategy of either revisionism or the status quo.”255 This 
understanding of state motivations and behaviour is in line with NcR’s 
expanded list of state goals and its greater explanatory power as opposed to 
mere parsimony and grand theorization. What remain to be defined are the 
concepts of revisionist and status quo foreign policy behaviour. 
As early as 1948, Morgenthau writes about imperialism referring to what 
others call revisionism (these terms are elaborated more below).256 According to 
Morgenthau imperialism, and thus revisionism, is “a policy which aims at the 
overthrow of the status quo, at the reversal of the power relations between two 
or more nations.” On the contrary, he writes, “A policy seeking only 
adjustment, leaving the essence of these power relations intact, still operates 
within the general framework of a policy of the status quo.” 257 The goals of 
imperialism are: i) world domination/empire, ii) empire/hegemony of 
continental dimensions, and iii) localised preponderance of power.258 Moreover, 
Morgenthau cites three methods of imperialism which can be used either 
individually or in combination: i) military, ii) economic, and iii) cultural 
imperialism.259 Other definitions of revisionism are in general agreement with 
that of Morgenthau. Catherine Combes sees revisionism as the remodelling of 
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the international system and order “for its own benefit and in its own 
interests”260 while Mearsheimer, referring to revisionist China, considers the 
ability to “dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring 
countries” as revisionism that stems from power-maximization policies.261  
Taking these definitions into account, and by accepting Morgenthau’s 
parameters, revisionism is defined as the policy which tries to change regional 
or international power relations for its own benefit and/or be able to dictate the 
behaviour of other (regional) states, as Mearsheimer suggests. It has been 
already seen that Turkey aspires to both of the above at least at the regional 
level. In addition, the means of revisionist policies suggested by Morgenthau 
and Mearsheimer are adopted; that is, military, economic, diplomatic and 
cultural means may be employed for the accomplishment of the above-
mentioned revisionist goals. Lastly, the above-mentioned definition is 
compatible with that of Schweller’s which suggests that “revisionist states value 
what they covet more than what they currently possess” and that “they will 
employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their values. For 
revisionist states, the gains from nonsecurity expansion exceed the costs of 
war.”262 This corresponds to a number of revisionist strategies as listed below. 
A status quo foreign policy behaviour on the other hand would be 
reluctant to follow policies that would disturb or disrupt the balance of power. 
Instead of trying to increase the state’s power, it would try to preserve it. In 
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Waltz’s words, “The first concern of [status quo] states is not to maximize 
power but to maintain their positions in the system.”263 Further it is suggested 
that although a state might have revisionist tendencies driven by a revisionist 
ideology, its foreign policy behaviour is not necessarily revisionist due to 
external and internal constrains it may be facing. 
As mentioned earlier, this kind of variation between revisionist and status 
quo foreign policy behaviour is attributed to the power of domestic variables 
that play an intervening role between international structural drivers and 
foreign policy outcomes.264 The intervening role of ideology and domestic 
interest groups employed in this thesis falls within the framework of other 
approaches that try to include the unit level in their foreign policy analysis and 
account for or “explain phenomena that are puzzling from the perspective of” 
mainstream IR theories, especially the ones that do not take into consideration 
ideational factors.265 
A number of strategies have been explored in the literature that correlate 
with either revisionist or status quo foreign policy behaviour. Drawing largely 
upon Peter Trubowitz’s categorisation,266 revisionist and status quo strategies 
are listed and briefly explained in order to be more easily identifiable later, in 
the comparative analysis chapter; thus the determination of Turkey’s revisionist 
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and status quo tendencies becomes possible.267 It should be noted that the 
following list is not exhaustive but rather a compilation of strategies that are 
considered to be relevant to this thesis. 
 
Revisionist Strategies 
 
 Offensive War: Those wars that are fought with the aim of maximizing a 
state’s power or improving its position in the international system through 
conquest, expansionism and exploitation of foreign resources, are revisionist.  
 Expansionism: One of the older strategies for the improvement of a nation’s 
position and power through the expansion of boarders and control (sphere of 
influence). It may involve war but it could also be accomplished through 
other strategies such as blackmail and intimidation, that is, without the use 
of military force. Expansionism is also found in the forms of classic 
imperialism and colonialism or annexation, protectorates, and military 
bases.268 
 Blackmail: In the literature of strategic studies this strategy has also been 
associated with the concepts of strategic coercion, coercive diplomacy or 
compellence.269 In short, and in the context of expansionism, blackmail 
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employs coercion, that is, threats of war, to the end of bringing the balance of 
power to a nation’s favour. 
 Divide and Rule: This strategy relates to Mearsheimer’s suggested strategies 
of “bait and bleed” and “bloodletting”. The former aims to provoke “a long 
and costly war” between its rivals in order to weaken them. The latter tries to 
make sure that wars in which adversarial actors are involved in are 
“protracted and deadly.”270 Both blackmail and divide and rule are cheaper 
than the previously mentioned strategies. 
 Subversion: Subversion can refer both to the tactical (battlefield) and 
(national) strategic level. It is inexpensive and comprised by “espionage and 
covert operations.” This involves intelligence gathering and the “weakening 
of the enemy by subversion, that is, induced transfer of loyalties.” In other 
words, it aims at rewarding, recruiting or subverting enemy chiefs to the 
benefit of the subversive nation.271 In addition, subversion – or subversive 
propaganda – could be employed to generate agitation, civil unrest, strikes, 
and protests. The end goal would be to discredit and demoralise a state thus 
undermining its government.272 It is here argued that propaganda and 
political communication tools could be used as subversive strategies to 
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directly discredit and demoralise a state either for domestic or external 
consumption that would improve the subversive state’s position.  
 Bandwagoning for Profit: While bandwagoning is generally considered to be 
a status quo or defensive strategy (see below), Schweller has made a good 
case for the “bandwagoning for profit” variant which he sees as revisionist. 
In a nutshell, Schweller argues that states may not only bandwagon for 
security, as goes the mainstream understanding, but also for profit. This is 
the “opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning” since its goal “is usually self-
extension.” In other words, bandwagoning for profit is to ride “free on the 
offensive efforts of others to gain unearned spoils.”273  
 Balance of Interests: Although the balance-of-interests theory provides 
criteria for both status quo and revisionist states, this thesis is more concerned 
with how it applies to the latter. According to Schweller, it has a dual 
meaning. “At the unit level, it refers to the costs a state is willing to pay to 
defend its values relative to the costs it is willing to pay to extend its values.” 
Within this framework, there are two kinds of revisionist states – referred to 
by Schweller as “jackals” and “wolves” respectively. Jackals will pay high 
costs to defend their possessions but even greater costs to extend their 
values,” while they are “risk averse and opportunistic.” Wolves, are 
predatory states that “value what they covet far more than what they 
possess” and they are willing to take great risks, often to the extent that they 
become reckless. In terms of the balance of interests at the systemic level, 
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relevant to this study may be the fact that “When a revisionist state or 
coalition is stronger than the defenders of the status quo, the system will 
undergo change” sooner or later in one way or another.274 
 Regime Change: A state’s efforts to pursue change of the regime of other 
states is similar to and associated with efforts for the territorial alteration of 
the status quo. Yet in this case the gains are not territorial per se, as in the case 
of offensive war or expansionism, but mainly ideological. That is, the change 
of a country’s regime may be followed by the rise of an ideologically 
different government which would be either in favour or under the (direct or 
indirect) control of the undertaking state.275 
 
Status Quo Strategies 
 
 Defensive War: Contrary to offensive wars, defensive wars are those that try 
to maintain the status quo. They are, more often than not, initiated to deal 
with external aggression and prevent changes in the distribution of power. 
Pre-emptive wars fall under this category as well. 
 Balancing (internal and external): Balancing is one of the most often 
mentioned strategies. Analysts and IR theorists often refer to it as the most 
commonly followed strategy, albeit Schweller, among others, argues that it is 
as common as bandwagoning.276 The aim of balancing is to prevent other 
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states from changing the status quo at the expense of the defender. This can 
involve internal (balancing) efforts, namely, leadership decisions to increase 
the state’s (military) capabilities and extract the state’s resources to the end of 
deterring an aggressor or defending itself from it. On the other hand, 
external balancing refers to defence and deterrence of aggressors through 
formation of alliances.277 These alliances may be formed to either strike a 
balance in unfavourable regional or international power relations, as Waltz 
argued, or balance against threats as Walt later added.278 Both utilities of 
external balancing are accepted and Walt’s explanation of alliance formation, 
that pays attention to the role of external (common) threats in internal 
balancing of the formation of an alliance, is adopted. 
 Bandwagoning: As per the defensive variant of bandwagoning, it refers to 
the “strategy by which leaders willingly subordinate their states and 
themselves to the stronger power, seeing little hope of diffusing the threat 
posed by the foreign challenger.”279 It is, therefore, a security-seeking 
strategy. 
 Soft Balancing: Soft Balancing is a “light” version of the traditional military- 
or material capabilities-based strategy of balancing. It is a concept which 
emerged in the context of a unipolar world, with the US being the sole 
superpower. It refers primarily to efforts by second-tier or second-ranked 
powers to deal with or constrain the US power. However, these balancing 
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efforts are “limited, tacit, or indirect” and are pursuit “through coalition 
building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions, short or 
formal bilateral and multilateral military alliances.”280 Robert Pape’s 
approach is compatible with this and adds means of soft balancing such as 
economic statecraft and “strict interpretations of neutrality.” Moreover, 
according to Pape the aim of soft balancing is not to “directly challenge a 
unipolar leader’s military preponderance, but they can delay, complicate, or 
increase the costs of using that extraordinary power.”281  
 Isolationism: Isolationism does not mean diplomatic inactivity but is rather 
defined as a strategy of “nonexpansion or nonengagement.” Such was the 
traditional foreign policy orientation of Kemalist Turkey.282 
 Buck-passing: According to Schweller, buck-passing is an under-reaction to 
threats and a state’s effort to “ride free on the balancing efforts of others.” It 
involves the formation of loose, or the avoidance of, alliances; limited efforts 
to “coordinate war plans and to establish a coherent Allied grand strategy;” 
little military spending in relation to aggressor states; and, the adoption of 
defensive strategies “with little or no capability to project military power.”283 
 
These strategies may or may not be found in the AKP’s TFP towards Syria 
and Israel. Their articulation and explanation sets the criteria based on which it 
will be later decided which policies of Turkey are revisionist or status quo; when 
                                                          
280 T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 58-59. 
281 Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 17. 
282 Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: 14. 
283 Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power: 7. 
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they are so; and which causal chains result (or which factors are at play) in a 
revisionist or a status quo foreign policy. The next sections consider the interplay 
of the different variables and explain the methods and ways in which they are 
employed and operationalised in this thesis. 
3.2.4. Operationalising the Variables & Propositions 
 
The theoretical framework provides certain guidelines for the research and 
analysis of the system and unit level. In line with NcR methodology this study 
“calls for problem-driven research,” but, although it has been argued that 
deductive analysis is more appropriate for NcR,284 it will be positioned between 
induction and deduction. In terms of methodology, Andrew Bennett and Colin 
Elman argue that “Inductive examination may reveal potentially causal 
processes that the researcher had not theorized a priori.”285 Moreover in 
induction, “characterization of variance of the dependent and independent 
variables” should be avoided since it should occur through the analysis and 
explanation of the cases.286 On the other hand, deduction requires the prior 
definition of variables “and the types all these variables constitute through all 
their mathematically possible configurations.”287 
As such, and based on the above elaboration of the different variables, it is 
clarified that this thesis makes limited hypotheses in terms of variance of the 
independent and dependent variables and the role of domestic variables. 
                                                          
284 Juneau, "Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: A Statement," 4, 13. 
285 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 
Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007). 
286 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 241. 
287 Ibid., 244. 
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Rather, it makes a number of propositions according to the theoretical 
framework, with regard to the operationalisation of the variables and driver 
causality and hierarchy, as summarised by the following points – categorised 
under system and unit-level propositions. These propositions are set forth to 
clarify from the outset the significance and role of each domestic or system-level 
variable as well as, lay out the drivers’ importance and impact on TFP under 
certain circumstances. Lastly, they break down in more detail the interplay 
between the different variables and the foreign policy outcomes as outlined in 
figures I and II. 
 
System-Level Propositions 
 
   
 TFP drivers (variables) are categorised in three types of hierarchy (see, 
Figure III, Chapter 8). The first two mainly concern the system-level: 
  the overall hierarchy, in which systemic drivers are primary over 
domestic drivers; 
 the hierarchy within the category of independent variables where 
International Power Changes are first, External Threat Perceptions 
second, and International Economic Interdependency third – as 
elaborated in the theoretical framework; 
 According to the NcR theoretical framework which sets the independent 
variables as primary to foreign policy-making, it is suggested that change in 
TFP is induced by changes in the system; specifically, by international 
power changes (first independent variable). 
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 As put forth in the analysis of the independent variables, it is expected that 
the third independent variable (International Economic Interdependence) 
will not always be affected by changes in the first and second independent 
variables. As explained, this proposition is based on the fact that Turkish 
economy has become largely liberalised and decentralised and is therefore 
less affected by political or security considerations; much like most of the 
countries of the developed capitalist world. 
Unit-Level Propositions 
 
 The third type of the drivers hierarchy concerns the domestic variables: 
 it is maintained that AKP elite ideology will prove to be the domestic 
driver/variable with the most influence on foreign policy-making 
because of its position of power (in government) as well as the 
increasing authoritarian tendencies that the AKP displayed between 
2002 and 2013. 
 In addition, it is suggested that public opinion has the potential of 
being the most influential domestic group (and driver) mainly because 
Turkey maintains an electoral democracy and thus AKP is not without 
electoral concerns insofar as it wants to stay in power. 
 Business groups are next in importance because of the AKP’s great 
emphasis on economy. 
 Opposition parties and military elites remain at the bottom of the 
hierarchy as their role has been largely surpassed by the AKP’s great 
electoral victories and gradual dominance over the state mechanism. 
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 The AKP elite ideology can be considered as a factor of foreign policy change 
only in conjunction with systemic changes. In other words, it is maintained 
that AKP in itself cannot produce change; though the possibility is not 
explicitly excluded. It is suggested that it can do so only after systemic 
changes occur which in turn it filters and responds according to 
understanding and perception of the situation (based on its ideology). 
 Taking into account that AKP elite ideology is the most influential 
intervening variable, it is likely that whenever Turkey is prompted to take a 
foreign policy decision due to changes in the system-level variables (e.g. 
international power changes or external threat perceptions), domestic 
interest groups become either neutralised or supportive of government 
intensions. 
 Given the largely independent role of the third independent role variable 
(International Economic Interdependence), it is proposed that the absence of 
political support to business interests (economic interdependencies) does not 
necessarily hinder them. Similarly, a mismatch in business interests and 
security considerations may lead the AKP to favour the latter over the former 
thus ignoring pressures from business elites. 
  
Based on the developed theoretical framework and the above-mentioned 
propositions, this thesis seeks to analyse each case study in depth, conduct the 
comparative analysis, and identify the causal pathways between the variables 
that lead to foreign policy outcomes. This will be instrumental in generating 
tables that summarize the relationship between the variables. This would also 
121 
 
allow for (limited) generalisations and predictions. In addition, the causal 
pathways depicted in these tables will also be juxtaposed to counterfactuals. 
Namely, the foreign policy outcome produced under the AKP period and the 
causal chains leading to it will be compared to a counterfactual version of what 
the foreign policy outcome would have looked like under the previous 
Kemalist-dominated establishment (see, chapter 8). Thereby, change in foreign 
policy and the drivers prompting it, become clearer. 
Figures I and II present the causal relationship between the variables as 
well as the way they are operationalized. Based on these schemes TFP towards 
Syria and Israel is analysed, respectively. Then the two cases and the causal 
pathways that have been identified in Turkish foreign policy-making towards 
them are compared. This reveals the patterns in Turkish foreign policy-making 
and ultimately clarifies the importance of each factor and variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System-Level 
(Independent Variables) 
 
 (International) 
Relative Power 
Changes (primary) 
 
 External Threat 
Perceptions 
 
 International 
Economic 
Interdependence 
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- Economic Elites 
- Military Elites 
- Public Opinion 
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Figure I 
Neoclassical Realist Framework & Turkish Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
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In particular, Figure I illustrates the general idea behind an NcR 
framework as well as the specific variables employed in this thesis and the 
relationship between them. As already highlighted, the external structural 
environment (system level), and more specifically the anarchy of the 
international system and relative power changes, has an independent role in 
influencing foreign policy. It is maintained that these changes have direct 
impact on, and are sometimes parallel to, the international economic relations 
of a state and its security threat perceptions towards other states of the system. 
Therefore these three variables are treated as interlinked and independent – i.e. 
they affect the intervening variables and ultimately the dependent variable, but 
are not affected by the intervening variables. 
The intervening variables, as elaborated above, are AKP elite Ideology and 
Domestic Interest Groups. Regarding the latter, the role of political parties, public 
opinion, economic elites (in the form of business associations), and military 
elites are taken into account. In terms of the former, political Islam is considered 
as the prevalent ideology among the AKP (foreign) policy-making elites. These 
intervening variables influence foreign policy-making in conjunction with the 
independent variables. External environment changes may be filtered, 
translated or interpreted in different ways depending on these domestic 
pressures, constraints or drivers. Eventually, the relationship between the 
variables leads to a certain foreign policy behaviour and the adoption of certain 
policies – the dependent variable. This study is interested in assessing the 
impact of this process on TFP and the variation in TFP behaviour along the lines 
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of revisionist and status quo; that is, the causal pathways that lead to revisionist 
or to status quo behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure II presents once again, in two alternative ways, the way the 
independent variables impact foreign policy outcomes, as well as how the 
intervening variables – i.e. the added value of NcR – have a role to play in the 
making of the final foreign policy outcome. It should be noted that the causality 
identified will not always be definitive given that the causal role of some 
drivers can only be corroborated, for example, by the very elites that took the 
Figure II 
Two Models of Causal Relationships between Variables 
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Intervening Variables – Unit 
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Domestic Interest Groups) 
Dependent Variable – Turkish 
Foreign Policy Outcomes 
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Constraining 
Relationship 
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decision under examination.288 As mentioned below, acquiring such interviews 
proved very difficult and thus some of the presented chains may be closer to 
correlation between drivers and policy outcomes rather than direct causation. 
Apart from the theoretical framework and the operationalization of its 
variables, additional methods need to be employed both for the selection of the 
case studies and their comparative analysis. The employed methodology is 
dealt with below in detail. 
 
3.3. Case Studies and Comparative Methods 
 
Three types of methods will be used in conjunction with the theoretical 
framework in order for the research objectives to be reached: 1) case study 
method (as part of the “structured, focused comparison method”),289 2) process-
tracing, and 3) a combination of cross-time and cross-case comparison.290 A 
(qualitative) case study has been defined as “an approach to research that 
facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of 
data sources”291 as well as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical 
episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to 
                                                          
288 For example, the claim that the AKP has given in to or has taken into account domestic group 
pressures can be deduced by analysing various factors but can only be confirmed by AKP decision-
makers or by first-hand accounts from leaders of the domestic group in question. Although primary and 
secondary material have allowed for insights especially in terms of domestic interest groups, it has not 
been possible for AKP elite interviews to be conducted.  
289 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 67-72. 
290 Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 176. 
291 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, "Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and 
Implementation for Novice Researchers," The Qualitative Report 13, no. 4 (December 2008): 544; see 
also, John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?," American Political Science Review 
98, no. 2 (May 2004): 341-54. 
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other events.”292 Both definitions are acceptable as they rather complement each 
other instead of being mutually exclusive. 
Process-tracing is a “within case study” method that is often used by 
Neoclassical Realists as it “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – 
the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”293 In this case, process-
tracing is not utilized for “uncovering traces of a hypothesized causal 
mechanism” but seeks the inductive examination of causal processes that have 
not been theorised a priori.294 This is desirable, as the research is situated 
between induction and deduction, as well as feasible since process-tracing “can 
involve both inductive and deductive study of events and sequences within a 
case.”295 
As regards the comparative method, Arend Lijphart defined it broadly as 
“one of the basic scientific methods, not the scientific method,” which is 
responsible for “discovering empirical relationships among variables.”296 The same 
author maintained that the two methods – case study and comparative method 
– should be closely connected while asserting that “certain types of case studies 
can even be considered implicit parts of the comparative method.”297 George 
and Bennet refer to “controlled comparison” – defined as “the study of two or 
                                                          
292 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 5. 
293 Ibid., 206. 
294 Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 183. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," The American Political Science 
Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682;  see also, Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative 
Research," Comparative Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1975): 158-77. 
297 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 691. 
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more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that resembles each other in 
every respect but one” – as “the best known and still dominant variant of 
comparative methods.”298 
Case studies that are part of a comparative analysis are often chosen based 
on the dependent variable. This, according to Douglas Dion, is a three step 
process: 1) the selection of phenomenon to be examined; 2) “gathering data on 
occurrences of the phenomenon;” and 3) tracing the commonalities between the 
occurrences.299 Within this framework there are three main comparative 
research designs that could be followed: 1) the already mentioned “controlled 
comparison” that refers to the comparison of “most similar” cases studies; 2) 
the “least similar” comparative design and 3) deviant cases. 
The former entails the comparison of cases that are comparable in all 
respects but the independent variable – which means that the cases may have 
different outcomes on the dependent variable. The “least similar” design 
suggests similarity in the outcome of the compared cases, and differentiation in 
all other respects except for one independent variable.300 The third research 
design (i.e. “deviant cases”) entails choosing the case studies according to their 
(common) independent variable while having similar outcomes. Thus the case 
studies would be deviant if they had different outcomes. Should that happen, 
argue George and Bennet, “the researcher can perform full studies of these 
                                                          
298 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 151. 
299 Douglas Dion, "Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study," Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 
(January 1998): 127. 
300 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 81-82. 252-53. 
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cases to assess whether and why one of them deviates from the expected 
outcome;” this could also highlight the need of using additional variables.301 
However, provided that this is neither a traditional comparative politics 
analysis nor a comparative foreign policy study – i.e. the comparison of the 
foreign policies of two or more states – the criteria for the comparison of the 
cases studies – which in this instance is TFP towards two Middle East states – 
do not apply. This is because the cases do not refer to the countries themselves 
but to TFP towards them. As TFP has not been characterised by a stable 
continuity towards Israel and Syria over the past ten years, it is very difficult to 
be definitive as to whether Turkey has treated these countries “differently” or 
“similarly”. Therefore, one of the above comparative methods (i.e. “most 
similar”) will be used for the cross-time – or, before and after – comparison of 
each case study, but not for cross-case study analysis.302 A limitation with regard 
to the “after” part of the cases studies (post-2011) is that it is not possible for 
this thesis to examine “the values of the observed variables…well after [the 
event],” as the research and most available data are limited to prior to 2013.  
By utilising the “before-after” design each case study is practically divided 
into two sub-case studies which would account for changes in foreign policy 
outcomes over time. As “only one variable can change at the moment that 
divides the longitudinal case[s] neatly in two” that variable should be the 
power-related independent one.303 That would capture the systemic relative 
                                                          
301 Ibid., 252. 
302 Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 176. 
303 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 166. 
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power changes in the regional environment of the Middle East that came about 
with the “Arab Spring”304 (2011). 
This means the (geo)political changes of the “Arab Spring” are considered 
to have altered the international systemic environment.305 Given that, according 
to the theoretical framework, changes in the international environment 
constitute an independent variable, then, the “Arab Spring” has also affected 
the domestic variables thus impacting TFP. These particular changes and their 
relation with Turkey’s domestic political scene and foreign policy are 
elaborated upon in the examination of the case studies. After each case has been 
examined through process-tracing and “before-after” analysis, cross-case 
analysis follows as already mentioned. As regards the comparison of cases, 
Bennett and Elman, drawing upon Walt’s study “Revolution and War,” present 
how cross-case analysis can be flexible by variance both in the independent and 
dependent variables; this design, as the authors argue, can generate 
considerable inferential leverage.306 In this instance the cases are based on their 
empirical value, as seen below. 
The following necessary task is for the case studies to be selected. First and 
foremost the case studies should be relevant “to the research objective of the 
                                                          
304 The term is used in quotation marks because it is not considered to be valid; yet it is used because it 
is the most popular one. 
305 Sinan Ülgen et al., "Emerging Order in the Middle East," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Policy Outlook(May 2012); Mohammed Ayoob, "The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance," Middle 
East Policy XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2012); Katerina Dalacoura, "The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: 
Political Change and Geopolitical Implications," International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012); Moshe Ma'oz, "The 
"Arab Spring" and the New Geo-Strategic Environment in the Middle East," Insight Turkey 14, no. 4 
(2012); Richard Youngs, "Living with the Middle East's old-new Security Paradigm," FRIDE Policy Brief, 
no. 152 (March 2013). 
306 Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," 176. 
129 
 
study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic 
purposes” while opportunism could play a role in the researcher’s selection.307 
For this thesis the case studies have to be countries that are part of Turkey’s 
Middle East foreign policy. The relative power changes in the international 
system (primary independent variable) to be examined, both regionally and 
internationally, are the same for both case studies as – geographically – the 
referent object of this study remains the Turkish state while the timeline of 
analysis is the same for both case studies (2002-2013). 
According to the research design the case studies should help this thesis 
examine variation in foreign policy outcomes through identifying foreign 
policy-making drivers. At the same time the theoretical framework will be 
refined. Provided that two main types of foreign policy outcomes are to be 
evaluated – revisionism and status quo – the case studies should allow for 
examining this kind of variation in foreign policy behaviour.  In this regard the 
selected case studies, Syria and Israel, provide the opportunity of not only 
analysing a wide spectrum of foreign policy outcomes that fall under the 
categories of “revisionism” and “status quo,” but also observing “before-after” 
changes within cases over the period of time in question. 
Syria, for example, has gone from being a national security threat to 
Turkey in the late 1990s, to becoming a great economic and trade partner in the 
2000s only to go back again into being a security threat with the break-out of the 
                                                          
307 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 83. 
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Arab Uprisings.308 On the other hand the close military and diplomatic ties 
Turkey had with Israel have seriously deteriorated over the 2000s, although 
their trade relations increased. Israel has always been a Western ally in the 
region and Turkish-Israeli close relations were an indication of Turkey’s pro-
Western commitment.309 However, Turkey’s unfriendly stance towards Israel 
could – at least according to some scholars – be a reflection of its stance towards 
the West or Western interests in the region; at the same time it could be an 
indication of its efforts to establish good relations with its Arab/Muslim 
neighbours, or even of its hegemonic expectations.  
Likewise, the shift in Ankara’s policy towards Syria in the early 2000s and 
the strengthened relations of the two countries throughout the last decade have 
been, for many, an important reflection of the eastward shift in TFP. It should 
be noted, again, that in terms of comparative methodology Syria and Israel are 
not classified as “most similar” or “most different” case studies. Their 
comparison is based on the aforementioned flexible cross-case analysis 
proposed by Bennett and Elman, and is therefore, empirically selected 
according to their inferential value. Yet each of the cases remains individually 
divided into “most similar” cross-time subcases; in this instance “most similar” 
refers to the country itself, though in different periods. It is also important that 
                                                          
308 Raymond Hinnebusch, "Introduction: The Study of Turkey-Syria Relations," in Turkey-Syria Relations: 
Between Enmity and Amity, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 
2013). 
309 For an account of Israel’s importance for US foreign policy see, Raymond Hinnebusch, "The US 
Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications," Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 3 
(2007): 210-26; Troubled Triangle: The United States, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East,   
(Charlottesville, Virginia: Just World Books, 2011). 
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the periodization used here (2002-2011, 2011-2013) which is based on the events 
of the “Arab Spring,” may not reveal the same changes in TFP towards both 
cases, but that would be something to be examined and explained. 
The research has been mainly based on empirical evidence gathered from 
pre-existing academic research (secondary sources), official documents 
government documents and data, speeches, media and civil society sources, 
surveys, elite interviews found in the press, as well as personal expert and elite 
interviews by the author (primary sources). Secondary sources have been 
mostly used for the historical background, the system level analysis (based on 
different scholarly accounts of regional and international systemic changes), 
and as a means of triangulating or enriching primary sources. 
Most of the data is used as self-evident – of possibly unknown or not well-
known – facts to the end of providing a factual basis for analysis. However, as 
mentioned above, the data would also need to be triangulated. Therefore, 
information gathered, for example, from the press, would have to be confirmed 
and triangulated with other sources such as official documents, different press 
sources, interviews or secondary sources. At the same time evidence from 
personal interviews is used as complimentary to other primary and secondary 
sources. These interviews provide insights on issues related to all variables with 
regard to both case studies. 
Two key obstacles were the (Turkish) language as well as the socio-
political situation in the country. The first obstacle has been largely overcome 
by the large number of English language academic journals on Turkish politics 
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and the region, important literature in English by Turkish authors, and 
extensive Greek literature (original or translated form Turkish) on Turkish 
politics. Lastly, a small number of Turkish sources were translated where 
needed. 
 
Summary of Part I 
 
Overall, Part I has presented an examination of existing works on TFP and 
identified some empirical and theoretical gaps which it then proposed to solve 
to the extent possible through the development of an NcR theoretical 
framework. It explained how independent (system-level) and intervening (unit 
level) variables are employed and operationalised to the end of identifying 
variation in TFP outcomes (revisionism or status quo) and ultimately 
determining TFP behaviour under the AKP, which, this thesis argues, has been 
revisionist. 
Lastly, chapter 3 elaborated on the different methods that will be 
employed to complement the theoretical framework and provide more concrete 
findings. These include the case study method, process-tracing, and the cross-
case and cross-time comparative methodologies; at the same time, a 
combination of secondary and primary material together with elite and expert 
interviews are employed in the analysis. The thesis continues with Part II and 
Chapters 4 to 6 which provide an in depth analysis of the independent and 
intervening variables of TFP towards Syria and Israel, for the 2002-2011 period. 
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PART II 
In accordance with this thesis’ methodology and theoretical framework, 
this part (II) is concerned with the 2002-2011period while part III looks at the 
post-2011 period and includes the comparative analysis as well. The first 
period, as well as the decade under way, have been highly turbulent, especially 
for the Middle East. In this context, Turkey, which has been going through its 
own socio-political and ideological transformation, found itself faced with a 
variety of foreign policy challenges and opportunities. To analyse Turkey’s 
regional foreign policy, and identify its drivers and motivations, the cases of 
Syria and Israel are looked at through an NcR lens. The ultimate goal is to 
answer the primary and overarching question: “what are the foreign policy-
making dynamics under the AKP, with regard to the Middle East?” In this 
process other sub-questions will be answered such as “how are domestic 
developments linked to external developments in TFP?” And, “is Turkey 
turning away from its traditional Western allies?” 
Part II specifically is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter (4) 
analyses the independent variables for the first period: international relative 
power changes, economic interdependence, and threat perceptions. After 
providing the international structural context in which Turkey operated during 
that period, chapters 5 and 6 deal with the case of Syria and Israel respectively 
through the intervening variables. Thereby the intervening variables – AKP 
Ideology and domestic interest groups – are also factored into the analysis in 
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conjunction with the independent variables so as to lead to conclusions 
regarding the behaviour of TFP. 
The purpose of these chapters is to analyse the role of each variable for the 
case study in question and to find their role in shaping given foreign policy 
outcomes. The obvious argument throughout the thesis is that change in TFP is 
primarily induced by external structural changes. However, it is maintained 
that under AKP Turkey responds to external structural changes in a different 
way that it would have under the traditional Kemalist establishment. That is 
because of the AKP’s different ideology and the fact that domestic interests 
groups have acquired a bigger role in policy-making process as Turkey became 
more democratic and pluralistic. Yet the AKP’s second election to power (2007) 
and onwards gradually led to a form of authoritarianism as the party and PM 
Erdoğan consolidated their power. This resulted in a shift with regard to the 
impact of domestic factors on foreign policy-making; some domestic interest 
groups became less important while the AKP elite and especially Erdoğan 
acquired more prominence. 
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4. Independent Variables and Turkey’s Middle East 
Foreign Policy 2002-2011 
 
This chapter analyses the role of the three independent variables in the making 
of TFP, as well as their relationship. It starts with the primary independent 
variable which is international (and regional) power changes. The second 
section regards external threat perceptions while the third section deals with 
international economic interdependence. The final section concludes with an 
account of the role of the independent variables in TFP during the 2002-2011 
period. 
Four major external, systemic, developments have played a role in 
influencing TFP, related to international and regional power changes, economic 
interdependencies and shifting threat perceptions: the 9/11 events and the 
initiation of Global War on Terrorism with the Afghanistan war in 2001, the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the European Union’s stance towards Turkey’s EU 
accession progress,310 and the global economic crisis. The two wars were largely 
a product of the (unipolar) international power system that emerged after the 
                                                          
310 The change in the EU’s stance towards Turkey is not a systemic factor in the traditional sense (i.e. 
international power changes). Yet, it is often cited in the literature as an external reason of change in 
Turkish foreign policy, while it has also been mentioned as a factor by the majority of the interviewees. 
Here, its systemic role is specifically attributed to the traditionally central position that the EU held in 
Turkish (pro-Western) foreign policy. From that perspective, the EU reflects – at least partly – the 
dynamic between Turkey and the West as well as Turkey’s potential for further integration with the 
West. Therefore, the loss of EU membership potential, or the decline in EU-Turkey relations, is both 
external and systemic to Turkish foreign policy. The EU could also be examined as a domestic factor 
through the lens of “Europeanization”; something that this thesis does not do, and could be seen as a 
limitation. The notion of the Turkey-EU systemic dynamic has also been supported by academic Dr. 
Ahmet Sözen (interview with the author, Famagusta, Cyprus, 26 December 2013).  
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end of the Cold War. Yet the economic crisis could arguably be attributed to the 
predominance and systemic flaws of Capitalism as well. 
 
4.1. International and Regional Power Changes 
 
The shifting international balances of power after the Cold War became 
soon a subject of debate. There was some agreement that the post-Cold War 
order was unipolar, namely, dominated by the sole superpower of the US.311 
Yet some argued that the “unipolar moment” was merely a “moment” which 
would be followed by the emergence of other powers, the decline of American 
power, the rise of instability, and ultimately replaced by a multipolar world 
order.312 At least in terms of the 90s and the 2000s, what became evident was the 
US’s ability to exert its power on a global scale and set the rules of the 
geopolitical game without any other powers being able to keep it in check. 
This reality was clearly reflected in the role that the US and NATO played 
in the Gulf war of 1991 and the eruptions of conflict in the Balkans throughout 
the 90s. The Balkan conflicts and the NATO operations in particular revealed 
the EU’s lack of capacity for crisis and conflict management; a vacuum that 
NATO, under American leadership, rushed to fill.313 Similarly, with regard to 
the Gulf war, Charles Krauthammer vividly argued that without the United 
States, “Nothing would have been done: no embargo, no ‘Desert Shield,’ no 
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threat of force. The world would have written off Kuwait the way the last body 
pledged to collective security, the League of Nations, wrote off Abyssinia.”314 
In the wake of the twenty-first century the state of the world order was not 
much different. The same proponent of a sustained US “unipolar moment” 
emphasised that, regardless of the strengthening of Russia and China in the 90s, 
the US superiority in material and cultural capabilities was still a fact. The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, he argued, and the subsequent reactions of the US, 
highlighted American power supremacy in three ways: the war in Afghanistan 
demonstrated the exceptional military capabilities of the US both in operations 
and deployment; domestic economic and political order was recovered very 
fast; and the US showed the ability to mobilize international support and 
broaden its alliances.315 Not only that, but these examples also showed the face 
of a more coercive US empire, as opposed to its previous “hegemony based on 
consent and shared interests.”316 
Although ten years or so later these observations could be debated and 
disputed, it is true that, at the time, the US international position was 
instrumental in leading to the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and, 
therefore, instrumental in the geopolitical changes that followed. Thus, whether 
unipolar or uni-multipolar,317 the US-dominated international power system 
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had a crucial impact on the stability and balances of power of the Middle East 
and, by extension, on TFP. 
Bulent Aras and Şule Toktaş argue that “the impact of the new wave of 
international terrorism and the subsequent global war on terror have divided 
the world into two zones, the peace zone and the war zone.” The peace zone 
includes Western and pro-Western countries that are subject to terrorist attacks 
from actors in the war zone.318 This division319 along with the uses and abuses 
of Islam in Western discourse put most of the Muslim – and developing – world 
under the spotlight; both in terms of its negative politico-economic situation 
and its cultural identity. 
In this context, Turkey as a traditional pro-Western country became a 
target of Islamic fundamentalism while, as a Muslim-majority Western ally, it 
became a valuable asset in the US’s war on terror. As such, the “moderate 
interpretation of Islam and the development of secularism in Turkey” could 
play a role in limiting the emergence of extremist Islamic worldviews, by 
providing a West-friendly and more moderate alternative ideology and political 
system.320 
Within this framework, the distribution of power in the international 
system, which favoured the US, had an impact on world politics through the 
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elevation of Islamism and Islamic extremism to a global security threat, thereby 
strengthening the alliance between the West and Turkey, increasing the 
geostrategic significance of Turkey for the West, as well as rendering Islamic 
terrorism as a security threat to Turkey. Ultimately, this helped Turkey to 
retrieve the role it had for the West – which was lost after the end of the Cold 
War – while, as a consequence of the Iraq war and as seen below, many of its 
threat perceptions changed as well. 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 had an even greater impact on TFP. 
Apart from the difference of opinion among NATO and EU member-states 
regarding the invasion as it was not supported by the United Nations, the Iraq 
war revealed the divergence in regional interests between the US and Turkey 
while it unleashed competing geopolitical and sectarian dynamics.  
Among the important structural changes321 that the Iraq war brought 
about were, the transfer of regional power from Arab states to non-Arab states 
(i.e. Iran, Turkey, the US and Israel), the enabling of outside powers (e.g. Russia 
and China) to exert power over the region, the increase of Iran’s – and its Shiite 
networks – influence, the exacerbation of the Kurdish issue, the alteration of 
threat perceptions, and the re-configuration of regional alliances and economic 
cooperation. Most of these changes were the product of the destruction of the 
Iraqi state, one of the most powerful and historically pivotal states in the 
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international politics of the Middle East, and the object of the US’s “dual 
containment” strategy – along with Iran – since the early 90s.322 
More specifically, the US invasion empowered the Kurds of northern Iraq 
thus giving rise to a new regional power pole, one that Turkey was already 
concerned with. In terms of the regional power balance, this development 
enhanced the US-Israel relative power weight vis-à-vis Turkey’s position as the 
US filled the power vacuum in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 and became a “de 
facto regional power.”323 
Further, the instability within the country, and the US’s failure to pacify 
Iraq, allowed in due course for external powers such as Iran and Turkey to 
become involved in domestic politics claiming shares of the political influence 
over the new Iraq. The rise of a Shiite government in Baghdad gave a push to 
Iran’s plans in the country, upgraded its regional power position, and thus also 
changed the power balances with regard to the regional Shiite-Sunni axis. In 
short, the big winner of the Iraq war has been Iran, and by extension Lebanese 
Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas, especially after the withdrawal of American 
troops. 
Moreover, the strengthening of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
in Kurdish-dominated Northern Iraq had worried Turkey, Iran, as well as Syria, 
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due to its connection to the transnational Kurdish separatist threat.324 These 
power changes shaped Turkey’s Middle East policy in the 2000s to a large 
extent and had direct implications for the rise of and changes in regional threat 
perceptions, including Turkey’s. 
 
4.2. External Threat Perceptions 
 
According to remarks by Turkey’s Foreign Minister (FM), Ahmet 
Davutoǧlu, the 9/11 events were the second “geopolitical earthquake” of the 
post-Cold War era – the first being the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
third being the “Arab Spring.”325 As such, the Iraq war was a geopolitical 
aftershock that, according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, has affected Turkey 
“more than any other country in the region,” thus rendering the “restoration of 
security and stability in Iraq” one of the top “priorities of Turkish foreign 
Policy.”326   
Walt cites four factors that can affect the threat perceptions of states: 
aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive 
intentions. Turkey’s, as well as other states’ of the region, altered threat 
perceptions in the 2000s largely reaffirm Walt’s realist thesis.327 The situation in 
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Iraq was clearly threatening to Turkey, while the close geographical proximity 
and the Kurdish element328 were two of the reasons the Turkish parliament did 
not allow the US to open another front to the war by sending troops through 
Turkish territories into Iraq.329 The American stance made Turkey aware and 
suspicious of the US goals in the region which seemed to be incompatible with 
its own interests. Within this framework Turkey felt compelled to pursue a 
more active regional policy in order to deal with its insecurities and the broader 
instability. 
A basic pillar of this foreign policy was the deepening of relations with 
Iran and Syria, two states that “were listed by the US State Department as 
‘states sponsoring terrorism’.”330 Kurdish nationalism brought the three 
countries together while Turkey and Iran also had military cooperation to 
contain the operations of the PKK and the Iranian Free Life Party of Kurdistan 
(PJAK) in Northern Iraq and beyond. Specifically, Turkey and Iran signed a 
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security agreement during a visit of Turkish Prime Minister (PM), Recep Tayyip 
Erdoǧan, in 2004, which referred to the PKK as a terrorist organization.331 
Similarly Syria, which had its own Kurdish problem and dealt with a 
Kurdish uprising in 2004, supported Turkey’s operations against the PKK in 
Northern Iraq, in 2007.332 In addition to Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and 
Syria, it also developed better relations with non-state actors such as Hamas 
and Hezbollah, as it aimed at becoming a regional peace broker and mediator. 
Hamas’s leader, Khaled Meshaal, in particular, visited Ankara in February, 
2006, and had a meeting with then Turkish FM, Abdullah Gül. Although the 
visit was attributed to a request from Hamas and Turkey’s efforts to mediate 
between Israel and the Palestinians, the United States and Israel were obviously 
concerned.333 It is evident, and thus safe to argue, that Turkey’s threat 
perception of the US involvement in Iraq, as well as the transnational Kurdish 
security threat, led Syria, Iran and Turkey to the formation of an alliance that 
would balance against these threats. 
At the same time, other regional developments affected Turkish-Israeli 
relations as well. In 2004, Israeli military operations in Gaza caused the fury of 
Turkish PM who refused an invitation to visit Israel, at least seemingly for 
humanitarian and moral reasons. In an interview with an Israeli newspaper he 
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described Israel’s actions as “state terrorism,” and referred to Palestinians as 
“the victims” who “the people of Israel are treating …as they were treated 500 
years ago. Bombing people – civilians – from helicopters, killing people without 
any considerations – children, women, the elderly – razing their buildings using 
bulldozers.”334 Moreover, Israel’s wars in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/09) 
drove Ankara to perceive “Israeli policy as deepening instability in the region 
and thus threatening its vision and policies.”335 Israel had thus come to 
constitute a security threat for Turkey. 
Particularly after the Gaza war, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
2009, PM Erdoǧan walked out on Israeli President Shimon Peres, in protest at 
being allowed to speak for less time than him. He did so after having remarked: 
“I find it very sad that people applaud what you said. You killed people. And I 
think that it is very wrong.”336 At the end of the previous year, against the 
backdrop of Ankara’s efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel, the Turkish 
PM also said that Israel’s actions disrespected Turkey.337 The PM’s remarks and 
behaviour demonstrate the AKP elite perception of Israel as a hostile state; 
hostile and disrespectful to Turkey, to regional security and stability, as well as 
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to Turkey’s (Arab) neighbours which – as seen later – are seen by Turkey as 
“brothers.” 
Turkey’s threat perceptions of Israel were not eased by other actions or 
policies throughout the decade. For example, Israel’s developed relations with 
and support to the Iraqi Kurds after 2003 were unquestionably one of the 
central issues – as a product of the aforementioned external and systemic 
changes - that had set the foundations for the greater concerns of Ankara that 
followed.338 
A record low in the bilateral relations of the two countries was reached 
with the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, when Israeli commandos raided the 
“Gaza flotilla” which was trying to break the embargo and carry humanitarian 
aid to Gaza, and killed eight Turkish and one Turkish-American citizens. A 
little more than a year later the Turkish FM remarked: “There is an irreversible 
truth: And that is, the fact that attacking civilians in a ship part of an aid 
convoy, firing multiple times at unarmed people at the back of their neck is a 
crime against humanity.”339 In the meanwhile, the Turkish-Syrian military drill 
in 2009 showed that340 Turkey’s relations with its Arab neighbours had already 
improved. As a consequence, the Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance had already 
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lost much of its momentum.341 This – along with the developed threat 
perceptions – enabled Turkey to adopt a harsher stance towards Israel. 
Moreover, Turkey’s developing opposition to Israel’s policies and its 
support for the Palestinians was influenced by two more external dynamics: 
developments in the country’s EU accession process and the fact that Iran had 
become a prominent advocate of the Palestinians thus becoming attractive 
among Arab states. Regarding the latter, Iran’s support of the Palestinians was 
not new, but rather a trend since the 1979 revolution and the regime change in 
Iran. Yet, the Arab world, and its perceptions of Turkey, have become more 
important for Turkish elites since the election of the pro-Islamist AKP. Indeed, 
by 2010 Turkey’s policies bared fruit as Arab peoples saw Turkey more 
positively than Iran while, importantly enough, the Israel-Palestine conflict was 
seen by Arabs as the most urgent issue.342 
Although Turkey and Iran had developed strong relations in the 2000s, the 
balance between them remained fragile as the two countries have had a long 
history of regional hegemonic rivalry while Turkey’s efforts to mediate between 
Iran and the international community for the management of the former’s 
nuclear program, stems partly from its own insecurities about a regional 
nuclear arms race.343 In this context, Iran’s growing influence over Iraq and its 
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positive image in the Arab world regarding its support of the Palestinian issue 
through its alliance with Syria,344 have also been worrying for Turkey. As such, 
deeper relations had to be developed with the Arab states as it was a matter of 
successful regional policy for Turkey; the Palestinian cause was a means of 
accomplishing that.  In this respect, the Davos Forum incident and Erdoğan’s 
reaction could have been caused by both Turkey’s effort to increase its 
popularity in the Arab world as well as its growing threat perceptions of Israel. 
Moreover, the stalemate in Turkish-EU relations and Ankara’s 
disappointment over the decreasing possibilities for a full accession into the EU 
reinforced TFP orientation towards the Middle East. The open-ended 
framework for accession negotiations which was introduced by the EU after 
2004 discouraged Ankara, which saw its negotiations with the EU as never-
ending, and it quickly demonstrated unwillingness to further commit to the 
EU’s conditionality for accession. Consequently the EU officially expressed its 
own disappointment in 2006 thus hinting to its own low commitment to 
Turkey’s accession as well.345 
The result was a shift in Turkey’s relations with the EU and its 
neighbourhood as well. For example, while its trade and diplomatic movement 
vis-à-vis the Arab world was on the rise, the exact opposite was happening in 
these sectors vis-à-vis the EU.346 Moreover, Turkish leaders adopted a rather 
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hostile stance towards the EU especially with regard to the country’s European 
prospect. For example, in one of many such occasions Turkey’s then Minister of 
EU affairs, Egemen Bağış, known for his provocative remarks, stated that 
“Turkey doesn't need the EU, the EU needs Turkey. If we have to, we could tell 
them ‘Get lost, kid!’.”347 
Although the EU was never perceived as a security threat per se, and 
Turkey has not abandoned its efforts for full membership, the damaged 
dynamic of the country’s European prospect threatened Turkey’s pro-Western 
orientation, exacerbated its identity crisis,348 and thus played a role in its 
increased focus on the Middle East and the Muslim world more generally. 
Further, the perceptions about the transnational Kurdish threat, Israel, and the 
US’s role in Iraq, influenced Turkey’s Middle East policy greatly during the 
2000s. Lastly, Ankara’s need to keep the threat of the Iranian regional influence 
and nuclear program in check also had an impact on its foreign policy-making. 
It is important that these changes in international relative power and threat 
perceptions did not leave Turkey’s regional and international economic 
interdependencies unaffected. As demonstrated below, economy holds a central 
role in the AKP’s foreign policy and, therefore, international economic relations 
were another important – external – foreign policy driver. 
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4.3. International Economic Interdependence 
 
The geopolitical shifts in the Middle East after 2001, damaged Turkey-EU 
relations, while the global financial and economic crisis that broke out in 2007349 
played a role in the calculations of the AKP’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
East and beyond. A change in Turkey’s foreign economic relations with the 
Arab world became evident as early as 2003 when a significant increase both in 
exports and imports was witnessed in relation to previous years. Although at 
the same time Turkey’s global balance of trade deteriorated, it still maintained a 
surplus in its trade with the Arab world. Importantly, the Arab world shares of 
Turkish exports rose from 9% in 2002 to 20.7% in 2009; a rise was also noted in 
the shares of other Muslim-majority countries in Central Asia as well.350 This 
trend after the rise of the AKP to power highlights an increasing Turkish 
interest in growing economic relations with the region. 
The EU has not stopped being Turkey’s most important trade partner, but 
there has been a notable decline in its shares of Turkish exports since 2003, and 
particularly after 2008 when the EU economy took a hit from the global 
economic crisis.  However, as noted earlier, during the same years (2003 to 
2009) there was an increase in the Arab world’s shares of Turkey’s exports. 
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Overall, the Muslim neighbourhood’s share of exports rose to 26% by 2009 
while the EU’s dropped below 50%.351 
In terms of the countries that this thesis is concerned with, Turkey’s 
overall volume of trade with Syria went from 671,046 thousand dollars in 1998 
to 796,667 in 2006 and 2,297,098 in 2010. Turkish-Israeli economic relations have 
been excellent since the mid-90s, while under the AKP Turkey’s exports of 
goods to Israel reached 2.3 billion dollars in 2012, a 189% increase from 2001. 
Accordingly, the total bilateral trade went from 1.2 billion dollars in 2001 to 4.44 
billion dollars in 2011, despite the general deterioration of Turkish-Israeli 
relations.352 Another example, which is also important for Turkey’s relations 
with Syria and Israel, is that of Iran. The volume of bilateral trade between Iran 
and Turkey reached 10.6 billion dollars in 2010 from 1.2 billion in 2001. 
Moreover it is worth noting that “90% of Turkey’s imports from Iran is 
composed of petroleum, natural gas and its derivatives.”353 
With regard to the case of Syria, Tür notes that economic relations have 
not been limited to trade “but also manifest in increases in investment, 
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especially Turkish investment in Syria.”354 This is the case with most of the 
other countries of the region as well. In Israel, Turkish companies have invested 
great amounts while many Turkish contractor companies have undertaken big 
projects of large cumulative value. The downside of these relations between 
Turkey and Israel was the decline in Israeli tourist visits in Turkey, as a result of 
the “Mavi Marmara” incident (2010).355 In general, Turkish economic relations 
with the region, and their role in the country’s foreign policy, were made clear 
in an interview statement by the Foreign Minister:  
 
Our foreign policy is also shaped by our economic interests. Turkey 
has a big population, young people constituting half of it, and a 
vibrant economy… Additionally, the Turkish private sector is very 
active and has a strong entrepreneurial spirit. This requires us to 
widen the scope of our outreach as an economic actor. Increasing the 
level of economic cooperation with as many countries as possible 
becomes an important priority for Turkey. It compels us to reach out 
and enhance the scope of our relations on a global scale.356 
 
Turkey’s economic interdependencies that have developed or advanced 
during the 2000s357 reflect the impact of geopolitical changes in the Middle East, 
the extent to which Turkish policies are pragmatic, as well as the increased role 
of domestic business groups. On the one hand for example, because of the 
threat perceptions that emerged particularly after the Iraq war, Turkey ignored 
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US disapproval and opposition to its deepening relations with Syria, and then 
Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, visited Syria in 2005. 
In the second half of the 2000s, and especially in 2009, Turkish-Syrian 
relations boomed, with the establishment of the Turkish-Syrian Regional 
Cooperation Program, the signing of a Free Trade Agreement, a technical 
military cooperation agreement, the establishment of the Turkish-Syrian High 
Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and the lifting of visa requirements. 358 On 
the other hand, the fact that Turkey maintained good – and notably, increasing 
– economic relations with Israel, at the same time that their bilateral political 
and diplomatic relations were deteriorating, shows that the AKP’s foreign 
policy towards the Middle East is at least partly in agreement with domestic 
business and private economic interests as well as that it relies largely on 
pragmatism; yet, it is not limited to that. The complexity of this claim becomes 
clearer when one takes into account the intervening variables. The argument is 
that TFP is neither always nor only pragmatic (i.e. based on material interests). 
  
4.4. Independent Variables and AKP’s Middle East Foreign Policy  
 
This chapter analysed the three independent variables for the post-9/11 
period: international power changes, external threat perceptions, and 
international economic interdependence. A causal relationship has been 
identified between them with power changes affecting threat perceptions and, 
in turn, international economic interdependencies. It has been identified that 
                                                          
358 Özlem Tür, "Turkish-Syrian Relations - Where are we Going?," UNISCI Discussion Paper 23(May, 
2010): 169-75. 
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the events of 9/11 and especially the Iraq war that followed had a great impact 
on the regional balances of power and Turkey’s threat perceptions thus greatly 
influencing the AKP’s foreign policy. They led Turkey to give more emphasis 
on its relations with its immediate – and often anti-Western - neighbourhood 
(e.g. Syria and Iran) at the expense of relations with its traditional Western 
partners and the EU. 
A similar conclusion to those of this chapter was reached by Nader Habibi 
and Joshua Walker. Specifically, they argue that the AKP’s foreign policy 
towards the Arab world has been driven both by pragmatic interests and a 
“strong Islamic sentiment.”359 As the analysis of the independent variables 
shows, geopolitical shifts, changes in international and regional relative power 
relations, international threat perceptions, and economic interdependencies 
informed the foreign policy-making of the AKP during the 2000s. The “strong 
Islamic sentiment” Habibi and Walker refer to is seen below in the analysis of 
the domestic variables. Although all of these system-level variables have an 
independent impact on Turkey, a causal relationship can be identified among 
them; this contributes to the understanding of other works – such as that of 
Habibi and Walker – that merely identify pragmatic foreign policy drivers on 
the system level (e.g. economic relations). 
In other words, the state of the international power system in the wake of 
the twenty first century played a determining role in the West’s policies of 
intervention, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly the war in Iraq shifted 
                                                          
359 Habibi and Walker, "What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?," 6. 
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the regional balance of power within a very short time, by overthrowing the 
regime and, by extension, helping Iranian influence to grow, among other 
results. Moreover, the changing balance of power dictated the re-configuration 
of regional alliances in order for Turkey, and other countries, to balance against 
power changes and rising threats, not least of which was the Kurdish militia 
group, the PKK, and its affiliates. In turn, the changing alliances and the 
growing common interests between certain countries of the region, led to 
deeper economic integration and interdependency. 
Yet, as it occurs from the above, the external environment has not been the 
only driver of TFP under the AKP as certain paradoxes and questions stand out 
in the analysis of the independent variables: for example, why did regional 
power changes or threat perceptions not lead Turkey to bandwagon with the 
US, as has been the usual case? Why has the AKP reacted so aggressively and 
undiplomatically to the policies of Israel which was a valuable strategic 
partner? How has ideology contributed to these paradoxes? Why does 
Davutoğlu say that economy is so important, and how has that affected 
Turkey’s outlook? These are some of the issues to be addressed through the 
analysis of the intervening variables. 
As already seen, FM Davutoğlu pointed to domestic factors that drive 
foreign policy as well, and particularly Turkey’s foreign economic relations. In 
addition, in the case of Israel, for example, the economic interdependence was 
not paralleled by stable and positive diplomatic and security relations. This 
shows that, as proposed in the beginning and for reasons explored below, 
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economic interdependence is not necessarily affected by changes in power 
relations or external threat perceptions. 
At the same time, Turkey’s rapidly increasing relations with Syria since 
1998 and especially since the rise of the AKP to power, often at the expense of 
its relations with the West, cannot be solely explained based on regional 
geopolitics and power shifts. Therefore, the following – more detailed – analysis 
of TFP towards Syria and Israel, takes into account what has been already 
analysed and incorporates intervening variables to reach a more comprehensive 
conclusion on which causal chains lead to variation in the foreign policy 
behaviour of Turkey (dependent variable).  
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5. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria and Intervening 
Variables 
 
The first case study to be examined is Syria and TFP towards it. The objective is 
to identify the domestic factors that, in conjunction with the independent 
variables, drive the AKP’s foreign policy. Provided that NcR goes beyond 
security concerns, the focus is both on economic and security issues. The 
economic policies of the AKP towards Syria are examined first, followed by an 
analysis of Iran’s role in Turkey’s Syria policy between 2002 and 2011, as a 
matter of security policy. The analysis is broken down into two sections for each 
issue, according to the intervening variables: AKP elite ideology is first looked at 
and then the role of domestic interest groups. 
 
5.1. Domestic Drivers and Turkey’s Economic Policies towards  
Syria 
 
Two of the most remarkable achievements of Turkish-Syrian cooperation 
were the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (2004) and the abolishment of visa 
requirements for travel (2009). As demonstrated, this is largely a product of 
external developments in the Middle East, although the rapprochement of the 
two countries begun from 1998. These developments stemmed from the US 
invasion of Iraq, the empowerment of the Kurds and the exacerbation of the 
threat of Kurdish separatism in Turkey and beyond; also, the overall regional 
instability due to the war and the upgrading of Iran especially as the US troops 
started withdrawing. 
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To be sure, Turkey’s Syria economic policy was not an isolated reality. 
Rather, it was part of a greater economy-based foreign policy orientation in the 
region, which also included states like Lebanon and Jordan, aimed at 
establishing an economic zone of free trade.360 After all, in 2007 Davutoğlu did 
say that, “Turkey’s level of relations with Syria today stands as a model of 
progress for the rest of the region.”361 
This TFP behaviour is important, given that Turkey’s traditional ally, the 
US, has been maintaining a hard stance against Syria. In this light, Turkey’s 
indifference for American regional policies, and its unwillingness to 
bandwagon with the US at the crucial geopolitical juncture of the post-Iraq war 
period, as it would normally do, points to decision-making that may have also 
been informed by domestic realities. 
 
1st Intervening Variable: the AKP Elite Ideology 
 
It is widely acceptable that the rise of the AKP to power has been a factor 
with a serious impact on TFP. That is because of the party’s ideology, which 
differed from the traditional Kemalist one. However, not everyone agrees that 
ideology is driving the AKP’s foreign policy. In 2008, the Chief Advisor to 
Prime Minister Erdoǧan, İbrahim Kalın, wrote that,  
 
                                                          
360 "Turkey, Arab neighbors gear up for Mideast free trade zone,"  Today's Zaman (27/09/2010), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-222767-102-turkey-arab-neighbors-gear-up-for-mideast-free-
trade-zone.html. 
361 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 
(January, 2008): 80. 
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While ideological preferences have kept Turkey away from playing 
any significant role in Middle Eastern affairs for a long stretch, geo-
political considerations are inviting it back to the backyard of the 
Ottoman Empire. It is not so much ideology as geo-political necessity 
that drives Turkey today to engage with a multitude of regions from 
the Balkans to the Middle East.362 
 
Yet, one can also identify geopolitical necessities and regional challenges 
to Turkey’s security and economy throughout the twentieth century. If – 
Kemalist – ideology prevented Turkey from engaging these issues in the past – 
not without exceptions – it would only be logical to also assume that the 
ideological change which came about with the rise of the AKP, played a role in 
Turkey’s increasing focus on the Middle East. And although Davutoğlu rejected 
both a “neo-Ottoman” vision and an Islamic foreign policy,363 he argued, at the 
beginning of the millennium, that the increasing importance of the feeling of 
belonging to a civilization and culture will affect the whole Middle East region 
in coming years. 
In this light, he believed that Turkey should attempt a “cultural opening” 
both for the sake of the country itself and the whole region. Davutoğlu went on 
to say that this opening, which should be based on the country’s own “cultural 
experience,” could be “one of Turkey’s greatest contributions to global 
civilization” which would also protect it from a “geo-cultural rejection.”364 This 
notion, along with the FM’s perception that the Middle East is a geo-culturally 
                                                          
362 İbrahim Kalın, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-Politics?," PrivateView (2008). 
363 Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy [Speech]," 4, 9. 
364 Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth: 220-21. 
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integrated Islamic space, shows the importance Davutoǧlu ascribes to the 
region as well as to culture – not the least, religion – as a means of approaching 
it – at least before becoming a policy-maker.365 
Despite the occasional lack of communication or coordination at the elite 
level among Turkish officials,366 these perceptions about Turkey’s historical 
geo-cultural role in the region are largely common and prevalent in public 
expressions of ideas by other AKP officials as well. As political descendants of 
the traditional Islamist National Outlook movement, and therefore informed by 
a political Islamic ideology, the AKP elites have – and express – amplified 
feelings of a “religious solidarity” that transcends national identity and 
boundaries.367 When it comes to the case of Syria, such notions were frequently 
expressed. For example, in 2009 PM Erdoǧan, when talking about the booming 
Turkish-Syrian economic relations, referred to the Syrian Prime Minister as “my 
brother Otri,” adding that they will succeed in increasing the volume of 
bilateral trade, “God willing.”368 
The close relationship between the two countries, as perceived by Turkish 
elites, was again expressed by Erdoǧan in an earlier visit to Damascus where he 
remarked: “Is it possible to differentiate a Syrian and Turk among the people of 
enlightened faces in this hall? I want to call you not my friends but my 
                                                          
365 Ibid., 213. 
366 Chairman of the Scientific Committee at International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) Dr. 
İhsan Bal. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
367 M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, "Introduction," in The Qur'an, ed. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), xii-xiii; See also, Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey: 131. 
Academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. Interview with the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 August 2013. 
368 Erdoǧan quoted in, Tür, "The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s," 165. 
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brothers.”369 Importantly, Davutoğlu also invoked the concept of brotherhood 
when – referring to the Arab uprisings – he wrote that Turkey considers “all 
people of the region” as “eternal brothers irrespective of their background.”370 
As Nikos Moudouros argues, the idea of brotherhood is one of the basic 
principles of Islam while it is also encouraged by Prophet Mohammed. 
Moreover, the notion of brotherhood as a traditional religion-based institution 
responsible for economic activities as well, given that Islam “embodies all the 
principles related to politics, the economy, and administration,” it legitimises 
the contemporary conduct of business and entrepreneurship. In Turkey, these 
cultural elements, which have mingled with the neo-liberal and Capitalist 
development program of the AKP, inform Turkish political Islamic ideology 
and thus policy-making.371 
The existence of such beliefs among the Turkish elites is important as 
leadership has played a central role in Turkish-Syrian relations. According to 
Turkish officials interviewed by the International Crisis Group ( ICG) in 2008, 
“Erdoğan and Assad enjoy mutual trust. That may be the single most important 
aspect of their relationship.”372 If one accepts that the positive bilateral relations 
                                                          
369 Erdoǧan quoted in, Özlem Tür and Melia Benli Altunişik, "From Distant Neighbours to Partners? 
Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations," Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 (2006): 233. 
370 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," 
International Policy and Leadership Institute, Turkey Policy Brief Series, 3rd Edition(2012): 5. 
371 Nikos Moudouros, "The 'harmonization' of Islam with the Neoliberal Transformation. The Case of 
Turkey," Globalizations 11(2014): 4, 5-11; see also, Yildiz Atasoy, Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism: 
State Transformation in Turkey  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 133-34. Also interesting is the 
fact that Prophet Mohammed was also a merchant, and how that influenced the relation between Islam 
and the importance of trade/economy. Academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. Interview to the author, 
Nicosia, Cyprus, August 2013. 
372 Footnote no.89 in, ICG, "Reshuffling the Cards? (I): Syria's Evolving Strategy," Middle East Report 
92(2009): 13. 
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of the two countries were largely a result of good inter-personal relations at the 
leadership level, then the importance of the “cultural… sphere of national life 
[in] consolidating inter-state political relations,” becomes evident.373 But this 
does not regard Assad as such, given that he is the head of the secular-oriented 
Ba’ath party and an Alawite. Rather it refers to Assad as the president of a 
country which is largely Muslim.374 Therefore, in this instance cultural affinity 
stems from common religion, as elaborated in the AKP elite ideology 
intervening variable.  In turn, this provides the ideal context for elite ideas and 
beliefs to work as “roadmaps” and influence foreign policy.  
In this sense, AKP elite ideology played an instrumental role in the 
making of Turkey’s foreign – and particularly economic – policy towards Syria. 
The regional geopolitical realities of the 2000s were filtered by the particular set 
of its elite beliefs that led Turkey to develop – often anti-Western – regional 
alliances as a response to its external challenges and threats, instead of 
bandwagoning with its traditional and most powerful ally – the United States. 
Yet, the AKP’s foreign policy-making is not restricted to external material and 
domestic ideological considerations but it is also related to pressures by 
domestic interest groups and their own considerations, as analysed below. It is 
also worth noting that apart from the added value of the NcR theoretical 
                                                          
373 Philip Robins, "'Victory of Friendship'?: Asad, Erdoğan and Football Diplomacy in Aleppo," in Turkey-
Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Surrey and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 81, 93. 
374 After the Syrian civil war broke out, AKP elites made an often distinction between the Syrian 
president and the Syrian people; they opposed the former and supported the latter. See for example, 
Kochava Rozenbaum, "Erdogan: 'Syria's Assad is a Terrorist, not a Politician',"  Israel National 
News(10/08/2013), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/172624#.U6ctn_mSzy4. 
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framework and its focused and systematic analysis, considering power changes, 
threat perceptions, economic interests, as well as ideology and pressure groups, 
it has its own limitations. For example, other domestic – non-state – actors are 
excluded, while ideational factors could go beyond ideology. 
 
2nd Intervening Variable: Domestic Interest Groups 
 
The domestic interest groups under examination here include the business 
elites, as expressed through the two biggest business associations in Turkey 
(MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD), the political opposition (primarily, the CHP, BDP, 
MHP, and military elites), as well as public opinion. The different, yet 
sometimes overlapping,  interests that these groups represent have an impact 
on TFP depending on the issue at hand, especially as the country becomes more 
democratic and settles in an era of mass politics, thus becoming more 
accountable to various political and social forces within the country. 
Beginning with the role of business elites, it is worth noting that they have 
not always had a place in policy-making, due to the over-centralised nature of 
the state and its decision-making mechanisms. In the 1980s, Turgut Özal saw 
this as a problem and tried to change it. As a result, he initiated efforts to 
establish “a novel institutional framework, through which the state would 
maintain its central position but at the same time allow the business community 
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to play a role in Turkey’s foreign economic policy.”375 This is important in the 
context of domestic and ideological dynamics. 
By the 1980s political Islam had become more prominent in policy-
making, as showed earlier, and more emphasis was given to the economy, with 
a focus on exports and liberalisation. That is also how business elites, and 
private capital, became gradually more influential in foreign policy.376 
Eventually, the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK), which was 
affiliated with the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges 
(TOBB), was established and it was responsible for representing the interests of 
the business community in foreign economic policy. In general, the political and 
ideological orientation of political parties largely defined the relations between 
the government and business elites, while apart from a brief setback in the 
policy-making role of the business community in the 90s, the rise of the AKP 
gave new impetus to the relations between the state and business 
associations.377 
Today, business associations, and particularly MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD, do 
play a role in foreign policy-making through public support or opposition to 
state policies, international business events, and participation in official visits of 
Turkish leaders abroad.378 For example, former Turkish President, Abdullah 
Gül, used to make diplomatic trips to countries of the region often, 
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accompanied by dozens, sometimes up to two hundred, businessmen and 
officials.379 Altay Atlı notes that within the first years of Gül’s presidency he 
paid 70 visits to other countries, along with a total of 2,670 businessmen, which 
resulted in business relations of up to 20 billion dollars of worth.380 
This activism was directly linked with the AKP’s broader vision for the 
Middle East. As such, Turkey’s economic relations with Syria, and the Middle 
East more generally, had been influenced both by the AKP’s perspective on 
economic development and the region as well as its need to support the 
country’s recovering economy through the search for new markets.381 In this 
context, Syria, due to its membership in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area was 
seen as the gateway to the markets of the Arab world.382 
MÜSİAD’s close affiliation with the AKP, as an independent expresser of 
the interests of the Anatolian business elites – the so called Islamic capital – had 
an important role in Turkey’s particular economic and trade orientation 
towards the Middle East and Syria.383 As Hinnebusch and Tür note, “the AKP-
linked business association, MÜSİAD, searching for new markets and 
supportive of an economic opening to the Arab world, acquired a growing 
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voice which favoured an economic opening to Syria.”384 This is not to say that 
TÜSİAD was irrelevant in this process. Although MÜSİAD is deemed as 
politically oriented and closer to the government,385 TÜSİAD also claims to be 
in communication and have good relations with the government386 – despite its 
occasional criticism of it.387 
A TÜSİAD research associate said that the association also played a role, 
as it has been supportive of the AKP’s promotion of business relations with its 
neighbours, and that it continues to do so as a non-partisan actor with interests 
in economic development. It was added, though, that TÜSİAD would not be 
supportive of developing regional economic relations at the expense of 
Turkey’s relations with the EU and the West.388 That is both because of 
pragmatic reasons as well as because of TÜSİAD’s traditional pro-Westernism 
which informs its commitment to good relations with the EU and the US.389 
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389 Academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. Interview with the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 August 2013. 
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The interests of the business community were reflected on a number of 
occasions. During the third meeting of the Turkey-Syria Partnership Council, 
prior to signing the visa free agreement, the Turkish Minister of Economy, Zafer 
Çağlayan, himself a businessman, said that in the context of boosting bilateral 
economic relations, “investments of Turkish businessmen in Syria would be 
encouraged.”390 In continuation of Çağlayan remarks, Davutoğlu was 
accompanied by a delegation of businessmen when he travelled to Syria and 
signed the visa free agreement with his Syrian counterpart.391 
With the Free Trade Agreement already signed, the visa free agreement 
deepened even further the relations between the business communities of the 
two countries. An example of that was a visit that Syrian businessmen paid to 
Turkish President Gül. During the visit, Gül underlined once again the common 
bilateral investment and trade interests while noting that “Turkish firms could 
carry out infrastructure work in Syria.”392 Lastly, the great movement in the 
relations of the business communities of the two countries was also depicted in 
remarks of an Aleppo Chamber of Commerce officer, who said that, Syria was 
accepting numerous delegations of Turkish businessmen, at the same time that 
the tourist industries and bilateral investment was booming after the 
abolishment of visa requirements.393  
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The general sentiment regarding Turkey’s growing regional economic 
relations within the country was positive. The business elites and particularly 
MÜSİAD played their – mostly indirect and informal – role in these policies 
thus expressing their own interests which were favoured to a great extent by 
Turkey’s external security considerations. As the case of Israel later shows as 
well, this could mean that mismatch between business interests and security 
considerations could lead AKP policy-makers to ignore the former. This does 
not mean, however, that absence of political support to business activities or 
interests hinders them necessarily. 
In terms of other domestic interest groups, such as political parties of the 
opposition (e.g. the CHP, MHP, BDP), the booming economic relations were not 
perceived negatively as no party was opposed to economic integration. After 
all, the political programmes of all these parties advocate for “warm relations 
with neighboring countries” and international cooperation (BDP),394 regional 
peace and “regional cooperation with international purposes” (MHP),395 as well 
as “good neighbourly relations” and Kemal Ataturk’s motto “peace at home, 
peace in the world” (CHP).396 From that perspective domestic opposition did 
not play a role in driving Turkish economic policy toward Syria but it neither 
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opposed it. It could be argued that these parties silently endorsed the AKP’s 
foreign economic policies.397 
To be sure, these parties did not remain silent when it came to other 
governmental policies, such as the growing anti-EU and anti-Western stance, 
the treatment (imprisonment) of military personnel, democratic reforms, the 
handling of the Kurdish issue and the initiatives for its resolution.398 Moreover, 
the opposition, and particularly the main opposition party (CHP), have been 
mostly worried about two things: Turkey’s overall foreign policy orientation, 
and their own impact on decision-making. 
Apart from the notion that the AKP elite has gradually – and concurrently 
with the consolidation of its power – cut off communications with other 
domestic political and social powers (e.g. political allies, political opposition, 
and civil society actors),399 there is a strong disagreement with what is 
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perceived to be anti-Western behaviour and Middle Easternized foreign policy 
at the expense of relations with traditional Western allies.400 The same 
sentiment is shared by the Kemalist military elites as well. Given their 
ideological differences with the AKP, they supported a more cautious and 
inward foreign policy. Such an approach was not opposed to better economic 
relations with the Middle East and the Arab world insofar as it did not affect 
negatively the country’s ties with the US, the EU and Israel. In that sense, the 
Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment did not constitute an obstacle in 
the AKP’s economic foreign policy towards Syria. 
It is worth mentioning that the military’s stance in relation to the EU was 
at least to some extent populist given that while it supported Turkey’s EU 
membership, it had feared political reforms precisely because they would 
weaken its role in politics. After Turkey was granted the candidacy for EU 
accession the military took more sincere steps towards the EU.401 Yet, the AKP’s 
rise to power quickly brought back insecurity to the Kemalist Generals about 
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the possibility of losing their political role, and that was one of the reasons they 
attempted to stage an indirect coup in 2007. As Michael Gunter puts it, at the 
peak of this civil-military struggle in 2007, “the military felt strong enough to 
reassert itself before it had been politically reduced beyond reply.”402 It is a fact, 
after all, that while Kemalists believed that they were the best option for 
Turkey’s EU accession they were paradoxically reminding of the military’s role 
as the safeguard of the state and its institutions. According to one military 
officer, despite Ataturk’s belief that the military should not mingle into politics, 
this does not mean that governments could do whatever they want; “some 
important and sensitive issues, such as secularism and republicanism, are still 
monitored by the military, as is stipulated in the constitution.”403 
Eventually, the AKP has managed to significantly weaken the political 
role of the military elites, especially after 2007, and therefore its influence in 
foreign policy-making.404 EU-backed state restructurings implemented by the 
AKP have been undermining the military’s institutional role through 
constitutional and judicial reforms. As mentioned, the tension between the 
military and the AKP’s civic elites peaked in 2007 when the AKP launched a 
judicial campaign against military elites and their affiliates from academic, 
business, and other circles, accusing them of a coup plot against the 
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government. This led to a series of arrests of high-ranking military officials and, 
ultimately, to the predominance and consolidation of the AKP’s power over the 
state and its decision-making mechanisms.405 
From that perspective, as far as Turkey’s Syria economic policy is 
concerned, it occurs that the military had no role both because its own approach 
to foreign policy did not exclude better economic relations with neighbours and 
because by the time that Turkish-Syrian relations boomed in 2009 its role had 
been significantly severed. Further, this points to (ideological) convergence 
between the AKP and the Kemalist establishment but only to the extent that 
traditional tenets of the latter’s ideology or its own existence were not 
threatened, as seen in the case of the EU and the 2007 coup attempt. Lastly, the 
fact that by 2009 there was no serious Kemalist opposition to challenge the 
deepening Turkish-Syrian relations, suggest that TFP had gone through 
democratisation and became independent from the upper hand of Kemalist-
military elites. 
An additional result of the same reforms that diminished the military’s 
political influence was the further democratization of the country. This entailed 
that the political elites would need to abide by the will of the public opinion to a 
greater extent than before. In this context, the pulse of public opinion as regards 
different subjects of domestic and foreign policy cannot be neglected. In terms 
of Turkey’s Syria economic policies public opinion, as a pressure group, had a 
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detractive effect; that is, it affected TFP not necessarily by endorsing Turkish-
Syrian relations, but by developing increasingly negative perceptions of the 
West. 
Indeed, there is a general consensus that the US Middle East policy after 
9/11 and especially the Iraq war gave rise to anti-Americanism in the region 
and Turkey in particular.406 This has been supported by various opinion 
surveys that were conducted throughout the decade such as those by the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project. Specifically, a Pew 2006 survey showed that the 
favourable opinions of the US in Turkey dropped from 52% in 1999/2000 to 
12% in 2006 (it had an increase of only 2% by 2010).407 This was also the period 
during which the positive Turkish-Syrian relations deepened and the Free 
Trade Agreement was signed. Similar results were displayed earlier, in 2003, in 
an opinion survey with IR students which revealed the perception of an 
aggressive and interventionist US.408 
Moreover, a comparative analysis of different opinion survey’s regarding 
the AKP’s foreign policy, showed an overall tendency in Turkish society – 
regardless of political orientation – towards suspicion of all international actors 
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and “support for independent Turkish policies.”409 Within this framework, 
external developments also affected the perceptions of public opinion and 
exacerbated nationalistic feelings and threat perceptions which in turn favoured 
a foreign policy more independent from the US and, therefore, made 
“developing relations with Syria” seem “as logical.”410 What has to be added, is 
that “Turkey’s anti-Americanism often overlaps with anti-EU feelings” since the 
EU is linked with many domestic polarising issues such as the Kurdish issue. In 
Ömer Taşpinar’s words, “it is Brussels, not Washington, that is demanding 
Ankara accept the Kurds as a national minority with distinct cultural and 
linguistic rights.”411 
All in all, although anti-Americanism was not new to Turkey, it reached 
new high levels in the 2000s. Not only did this not challenge the AKP’s foreign 
policy, but instead it favoured its shift towards the Middle East and its close 
cooperation with Syria – and Iran – as a response to external power changes, 
threat perceptions, as well as domestic ideological preferences and economic 
pressures. This observation goes beyond polls about public opinion’s support 
for or opposition to governmental policies; it also goes beyond studies that 
draw parallels between anti-American or anti-Western sentiments and TFP 
decisions. Its additional value is that it explains how public opinion contributed 
to Turkey’s shift to the Middle East; even more important will be the results 
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about the relationship between AKP policies and public opinion when Turkey’s 
Syria policies are compared with Turkey’s Israel policies. Thus, this approach 
allows the thesis to explain the circumstances under which the AKP takes into 
account public opinion as well as the circumstances under which public opinion 
supports or opposes its policies. 
 
Intervening Variables and the AKP’s Economic Policies towards Syria 
 
As regards Turkey’s economic policies towards Syria under the AKP, 
between 2002 and 2011, there seems to be a convergence among the variables, 
both the independent and the intervening ones. That is, the geopolitical 
realities, which called for closer cooperation with regional actors, in order for 
Turkey to be able to deal with regional security threats, coincided with a host of 
other domestic factors: the rise of an elite ideology that favoured economic 
interdependence in geo-cultural terms, a public opinion which was receptive to 
this approach, growing domestic economic needs that the AKP saw through the 
lens of its close affiliation to “Islamic capital,” and a political opposition that 
had no reason to oppose economic development and interdependence, given 
that at least during the first years of the AKP’s governance it did not seem to 
threaten the country’s Western orientation. 
The causal role of each of these factors in TFP is identified in the 
comparative analysis chapter. What should be noted is that convergence in the 
variables is not the rule in TFP, especially when the systemic context (time 
period) is different. Moreover, in order to be able to identify the most important 
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drivers, at different and very specific points in time, a much narrower approach 
is needed, that would examine in detail each foreign policy event separately. 
That would also entail a shorter timeframe and more variables. This does not sit 
in contrast to the pursuit for specificity of this thesis as there are different 
degrees of specificities in NcR literature. While this study seeks some degree of 
specificity by examining relatively short time periods, it is not the same as a 
study that would, for example, look in detail at what Turkey did “last 
Tuesday.” Such great degree of specificity is not one of the strengths of this 
thesis’ approach.  
 
5.2. Domestic Drivers and the Role of Iran in Turkey’s Syria 
Security Policy 
 
As a part of TFP towards Syria, the analysis now turns to the role of Iran. 
The reason the role of Iran in Turkey’s Syria policy and broader regional 
security policy is examined, is threefold: Iran is a strategic and political ally of 
Syria; Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria was accompanied by deeper relations 
with Iran thus giving rise to a trilateral (quasi) alliance;412 and Iran constitutes a 
major regional and international security threat for Israel. 
This background will allow for the better identification of the connection 
between domestic variables and external security issues and policies, as well as 
provide a point of comparison and contrast between Turkey’s Syria and Israel 
security policies. The latter is important as the role of the intervening variables 
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will become clearer given the different role that Syria and Israel have in 
Turkey’s regional policy. Lastly, it is worth noting that Turkish-Iranian relations 
are very often analysed as part of Turkish Syria policy or vice versa.413 In this 
context, the question to be answered in this section, through the analysis of the 
intervening variables, is: Has Turkey’s relations with Iran played a role in 
bringing Turkey and Syria closer together? 
 
  1st Intervening Variable: the AKP Elite Ideology 
  
Ideology has played an important role in the history of Turkish-Iranian 
relations, though secondary to systemic changes. Up to 1979 and the theocratic 
revolution in Iran, both the Kemalist government in Turkey and the Shah 
regime in Iran were secular and maintained relatively good relations.414 The 
ideological change in Iran and the predominance of Shiite political Islam, as a 
result of the 1979 revolution, had a negative – albeit limited – impact on the 
relations of the two countries as well as on Iran’s relations with the West more 
generally. Although no significant problems occurred between Turkey and Iran, 
the end of the Cold War and Turkey’s nationalist foreign policy which sought 
to approach the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia led Iran to see 
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Turkey as a threat. Thereafter, Iran joined Syria in supporting the PKK as a 
proxy against Turkey.415 
From a Turkish point of view, Iran’s support to the PKK as well as its 
efforts to export its Islamic revolution to the region, were seen as threats by the 
Kemalist establishment. Further, the theocratic regime in Iran was seen as an 
obstacle to effective communication between Tehran and secular Turkey. 
Importantly, the banned Islamist predecessor of the AKP, the RP, was thought 
to be collaborating with Tehran for the establishment of a joint Islamic state 
consisting of Turkey and Iran.416 The fears of the Kemalist Generals were not 
entirely groundless given Iran’s “embrace of Turkish Islamists” as Turkish 
political Islam started to challenge Turkey’s secular establishment in the 
1990s.417 This closer affinity between Turkey’s Islamists and Iran’s theocratic 
regime later played a part in the betterment of bilateral relations. 
Within the above framework, in 2001 Aras argued that “Turkey’s policy 
towards Iran has become hostage to the worldview of Turkey’s governing elite 
[i.e. the Kemalists], one that has demonstrated itself to be increasingly unable to 
successfully cope with political change on domestic, regional, and international 
levels.”418 From that perspective, the rise of the AKP to power, as a bearer of a 
different – pro-Islamic – elite ideology, had to automatically have a positive 
effect on Turkish-Iranian relations. Such was indeed the case. As Elliot Hentov 
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argues, although the rapprochement between Turkey and Iran began in 2000, 
the rise of the AKP and its elite “diminished the military-bureaucratic influence 
and with it, the ideological differences between Turkey and Iran.”419 
The new era in the relationship of the two countries was ushered by the 
milestone visit of then Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, to Tehran in 
2002 despite the fact that the AKP had not yet been elected and that Sezer was 
part of the Kemalist establishment.420 That decision could be mainly explained 
by security concerns which dominated the agenda – a characteristic of Kemalist 
foreign policy – and economic needs or pressures that are examined as part of 
the next intervening variable. Consequently, the relations of the two countries 
boomed with the exports of Turkish goods to Iran having a 2652% increase in 
2012 in relation to 2001, and their overall bilateral trade volume rising from 
1.051.514 USD in 2000 to 10.687.739 USD in 2010.421 Not only that, but Turkey’s 
close relations with Iran became a concern in Western circles that feared 
Turkey’s (ideological) turning away from the West, especially given the parallel 
improvement in its relations with Syria – importantly, both Iran and Syria are 
part of the so called “axis of evil.”422 
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The AKP elite ideology that accompanied this significant rapprochement 
played an instrumental role. Once again, this can be suggested based on public 
expressions of opinion by AKP officials and leaders. In 2008, Murat Mercan, a 
founding member of the AKP, wrote that “Turkish and Iranian peoples enjoy 
deep historical and cultural rights.” Moreover, he said that “Iranians are not 
only our neighbors but also our friends and brothers. Not a single Turkish 
citizen can accept that his/her brothers/sisters suffer from unfair treatment by 
the international community.”423 Thus, the same notion of brotherhood and 
solidarity used in the case of Syria becomes evident in the AKP elite discourse 
regarding Iran as well. 
For his part, former FM Davutoğlu, acknowledges the historical tensions 
caused in Turkish-Iranian relations due to the different Islamic religious 
doctrines (i.e. Sunni and Shiite) but highlights the need for a pragmatic policy 
that would lead Turkey and Iran to a re-evaluation of their relations towards 
the establishment of “a harmonious relationship between the geographic and 
historic necessities and their particularities that stem from the conjunctures of 
the international system.”424 The need of initiating a dialogue with Iran was also 
expressed by President Gül who disagreed with the strategy of sanctions and 
coercion of the West and Israel towards Iran and its nuclear program.425 
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From this perspective it seems that political Islam as well as pragmatic 
considerations at the AKP elite level influenced TFP towards Iran. As far as the 
role of this set of elite ideas in Turkey’s Syria policy is concerned, one needs to 
initially acknowledge that there are conflicting views as to the correlation 
between the betterment of relations with Iran and Syria;426 at the same time, a 
number of other factors need to be taken into account to reach a clearer 
conclusion. 
First, it is important that Islamism became much more prominent in 
Turkish foreign policy-making after 2007 and the weakening of the Kemalist 
ideology, as demonstrated above.427 As such, the development of better 
relations between Turkey and Iran at the beginning had mainly to do with 
pragmatic/material – security and economic – considerations. Yet, the rise of 
the AKP to power and its gradual dominance of the state and decision-making 
mechanisms, gave a different and deeper character to bilateral relations. This 
change became obvious in 2010 when Turkey, together with Lebanon’s 
abstention and Brazil’s negative vote, voted against the imposition of further 
sanctions against Iran and its nuclear program.428 
The latter ideological and by extension political development falls well 
into and reaffirms the observation of Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Süleyman 
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Elik who argued that, “Turkey’s confident Islamic identity and its difficult EU 
membership application have dramatically increased scepticism surrounding 
the relationship between Turkey and Europe and drawn Turkey to look more 
seriously at engaging with the Middle East.”429 Being favoured by systemic 
reasons and its consolidated power and ideology domestically, the AKP had 
become more assertive. In this context, Turkey’s Syria policy, apart from 
systemic, economic, security and ideological reasons, was also favoured and 
sustained by the betterment of relations between Ankara and Tehran.  
Overall, the AKP elite ideology had a twofold role: on the one hand it 
provided the necessary ground for the improvement of relations both with 
Syria and Iran, while on the other hand it was instrumental in filtering systemic, 
external economic, security, and political developments – such as the 
deteriorating relations with the EU and the high risk regional security situation 
– in such a way that led to closer and deeper relations between the two 
countries. 
Despite the pragmatism that FM Davutoğlu often advocates with regard 
to this matter and TFP more generally, he also remarked that “Turkey and Iran 
share a very long common history” just as he said that Turkey and Syria have a 
“common destiny, history, and future.”430 From that perspective, the close 
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Turkey-Syria cooperation which stemmed both from pragmatic needs and the 
AKP ideology, was further cemented as Turkey came closer to Iran; the AKP 
elite ideology played an increasingly important part as it became stronger 
within Turkey. Eventually, by the end of the 2000s, Turkey, Iran and Syria 
would be called a trilateral – if “quasi” – alliance between two non- and often 
anti-Western countries, and a Turkey that rejected the Western “expression 
‘axis of evil’.”431 
 
2nd Intervening Variable: Domestic Interest Groups 
 
Apart from shifts in elite ideology, the period of rapprochement that 
Turkey and Iran entered especially after 2002, was to a great extent a product of 
changing threat perceptions (as seen in the independent variables) and 
domestic interests. As elaborated earlier in the sections on the AKP elite 
ideology and threat perceptions, external structural developments are seen as 
primary in altering threat perceptions. Indeed, different sets of ideas or beliefs 
contain certain predispositions. However, it is maintained that threat 
perceptions emerge when systemic changes trigger these predispositions.  
This section is primarily concerned with the role of domestic interest 
groups in the Turkey-Iran-Syria triangle. The question, then, that needs to be 
answered is, “which domestic group interests played a role in Turkey’s 
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relations with Iran and Syria, and how do they relate to Turkey’s security 
policies towards Syria?” 
After 2002, and a rapprochement period which began in 2000, a number of 
bilateral agreements and diplomatic successes between Turkey and Iran 
followed. By 2011 Turkey and Iran had signed economic, energy, construction, 
transportation and telecommunications agreements and projects of 
cooperation.432 In this growing relationship, the role of business groups was 
instrumental. As Davutoğlu wrote, in the AKP era business associations – and 
civil society – such as the Confederation of Businessman and Industrialists of 
Turkiye (TUSKON), TÜSİAD, and MÜSİAD, have an important place in TFP.433 
Habibi affirms that the role of the business community signified that the “main 
driving force of Turkish-Iranian relations” has been “trade and investment,”434 
while Gökhan Bacɪk referred to businessmen as having a more pragmatic 
approach to foreign (economic) policy as they are “desperately looking for new 
markets” in the region.435 
TÜSİAD itself noted that it backed and still backs all economic openings of 
Turkey to the region,436 while MÜSİAD made clear on multiple occasions that it 
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considers economic relations, and particularly trade, with Iran to be a priority. 
Not only that, but also in 2011 the then MÜSİAD chairman, Ömer Vardan Jihad, 
said that the already multiplied volume of trade between the two countries was 
not sufficient and should increase even more.437 In another meeting Jihad had 
with Iran's consul general, Mahmoud Heydari, the latter expressed its readiness 
to boost relations with the Turkish business community and particularly with 
MÜSİAD.438 These relations between MÜSİAD businessmen and Iran could be 
better understood within the context of statements from the next chairman of 
the association, Nail Olpak, who emphasised the need for increased trade 
volume between Turkey and Islamic states.439  
The attitude of the political opposition towards the Turkish-Iranian 
relationship was similar to the case of Turkish-Syrian relations. Specifically, the 
CHP’s deputy chairman, Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, said that his “party always 
supports good relations” with its neighbours and added that “Turkey’s 
relations with Iran are pivotal for the security and stability of the region” while 
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he maintained that Iran is important for Turkey’s relations with Syria as well.440 
Moreover, as the quiet consensus of the opposition has shown both in the case 
of Syria and Iran, insofar as the development of regional relations does not 
hinder Turkey’s national security or Western orientation, it is welcome. For its 
part, according to Bacɪk, Iran welcomes good relations between Turkey and 
Syria but does not want Turkey to dominate Syria.441 This dynamic becomes 
more salient after the break out of the “Arab Spring” and the Syrian civil war. 
Indeed, one could be puzzled, not only by the opposition’s support to 
Turkey’s relations with ideologically-different Iran, but also by the role that the 
Kemalist military establishment played in their improvement. Had the unit 
level, ideological and domestic interest issues, not been examined it would not 
have been possible to decode such paradoxes. It is important for this discussion 
to add that two days after then president Sezer’s visit to Iran, “The heads of the 
Turkish and Syrian armies” also signed “military cooperation agreements” 
(June 19th, 2002).442 This happened before the election of the AKP to power 
(November, 2002) but it shows the previous government’s primary reasons for 
approaching Iran. 
In this light, it is obvious that the improvement in Turkey’s relations with 
these two countries stemmed primarily from security concerns – i.e. the 
Kurdish issue – and economic and energy needs; pressures from domestic 
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business elites complemented the security policy imperatives.443 That also 
explains why the military and political opposition lent their support to the 
AKP. The understanding that led the Kemalists closer to Iran was very much in 
line with traditional tenets of Kemalist foreign policy orientation: prioritization 
of national security, suspicion of Western powers and maintenance of status quo 
– i.e. Turkey’s territorial integrity. It is within this framework that the MHP’s 
Member of Parliament, Oktay Vural, expressed concerns over (Kurdish) 
terrorism and separatism, which was exacerbated by the Iraq war (2003).444 The 
management of this threat would be welcome, from the CHP, the MHP as well 
as the Kemalist Generals. The only party opposed to Turkish government’s 
(cross-border) military operations against the PKK, was the pro-Kurdish BDP 
which voted against them in parliament as well.445 Yet the BDP’s opposition 
was not in itself enough to prevent or constrain the AKP’s policies. 
Among the military elites, the situation was similar. In 2002, then general 
secretary of Turkey’s National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinç, said 
that Turkey should consider improvement of relations with Iran and Russia as 
an alternative to the EU.446 The same General later asserted that Turkey should 
dissociate itself from the hegemonic and exploitive US and NATO; he added 
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that one of the Western targets is “to enlarge that state [Iraqi Kurdistan] against 
Turkey and other neigboring countries.”447 Clearly, the Kurdish threat was very 
important to the Kemalists who sought better relations with Syria and Iran to 
manage it. Therefore, despite their clash with the AKP, which created domestic 
tensions in civil-military relations,448 their foreign policy approaches on this 
matter coincided, while the AKP’s ideology further favoured the deepening of 
Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria, especially after it gradually consolidated 
its domestic institutional role, mostly after 2007.449 
In terms of public opinion, the main characteristics that played a role in 
Turkish-Iranian relations were again the anti-American and anti-Western 
feelings, which allowed Turkey to develop closer relations with its 
neighbourhood. Particularly, in 2004 a USAK survey found, among other 
things, that the number one threat to Turkey was perceived to be the US, while 
Iran was ranked ninth, notably after Greece, Armenia, Israel and Russia.450 
These public opinion perceptions, which are very similar to those cited for the 
case of Syria, did not pressure the AKP’s foreign policy to adopting a different 
stance from the one already followed on Iran and Syria; they rather 
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complemented the domestic and regional environment within which the 
government’s policy emerged. These might not seem as noteworthy findings 
but they do highlight the reasons why public opinion supported the AKP. As 
noted earlier, the particular value of this observation will become clearer later 
on, when compared to the reasons and results of public opinion opposition in 
Turkey’s post-2011 foreign policy.  
All in all, the pragmatic and material – security and economic – interests, 
that led the military-backed government of 2002 to improve its relations with 
Iran, remained largely the same in the AKP period. These were influenced by 
the business elites and supported silently or openly by the main opposition 
parties and public opinion. What is more, the shift in elite ideology that 
occurred with the coming of the AKP to power tore down the main ideological 
barriers between secular Turkey and theocratic Iran, despite the existence of 
historical intra-religious differences. Similarly, the consolidation of the AKP’s 
domestic power over the Kemalist establishment allowed for further integration 
between Iran as well as Syria. In this sense, domestic dynamics played an 
instrumental role in bringing Iran and Turkey closer together, and a 
complementary role in the AKP’s efforts to sustain and deepen the relationship. 
   
Intervening Variables and the Role of Iran in the AKP’s Syria Security Policy 
 
Generally, Iran’s role in Turkey’s Syria policy should not be seen 
independently from Turkey’s broader Middle East policy, and that is because in 
systemic and geopolitical terms Syria and Iran constituted a security axis which 
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Turkey had joined as a response to regional developments and power shifts. 
Given the close partnership between Syria and Iran, the betterment of Turkish-
Iranian relations has favoured the deepening of Turkish-Syrian relations. 
Ultimately, security cooperation between the two countries was founded 
on economic cooperation and interdependence, and that was paralleled with 
improvements in the same sectors between Turkey and Syria as the domestic 
interest groups variables showed. Moreover, as it has been argued, mutual 
economic and security concerns prevailed over – although they did not 
completely marginalise – ideological differences both between the Kemalists 
and the Iranian elites as well as between the AKP’s Sunni political Islamism and 
Iran’s Shiism.451 This contributes to the understanding of the primary and 
secondary drivers of TFP – with systemic, material drivers being the primary 
ones – and of Turkish-Iranian-Syrian relations. It clarifies the fact that this 
partnership has been mainly based on mutual material interests, but it also 
suggests the relationship could potentially be undermined by ideological 
differences or by different interests that stem from the parties’ particular 
ideological convictions – especially in the case of Turkey and Iran.  
Overall, Iran played a role in Turkey’s Syria security policies and vice 
versa – i.e. Turkish-Syrian relations played a role in Turkey’s Iran security 
policies. That was the case because of the crucial cooperation between Iran and 
Syria and because domestic actors maintained a similar stance towards 
Turkey’s relations with the two countries. In turn, therefore, if Turkey had 
                                                          
451 Bayram Sinkaya, "Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits," Insight Turkey 14, 
no. 2 (2012): 138. 
190 
 
hostile relations with either Iran or Syria, it would be very difficult to maintain 
overall good relations with one or the other party, respectively. This becomes 
clearer in the case of the Syrian civil war after 2011. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to analyse TFP towards Syria under the AKP, 
between 2002-2011, in the context of regional geopolitical changes and 
developments, as well as domestic dynamics. It focused on the two 
domestic/intervening variables, the AKP elite ideology, and domestic interest 
groups, while it examined both the economic and security policies of Turkey 
through two sub-case studies, respectively. The first looked at Turkey’s 
deepening economic and trade relations with Syria and thus the growing 
economic interdependence between the two countries. The second examined 
the role of Iran in Turkish-Syrian security relations. 
Economic interests and business elites played a significant role in Turkey’s 
turn to the Middle East and Syria in particular. However, security threats and 
concerns seem to have been more important for the initial rapprochement of 
Turkey with Syria as well as with Iran. This confirms that threat perceptions, as 
they develop after systemic power changes, are more important than economic 
relations, which again puts economic interdependence at the bottom of the 
independent variables hierarchy. Moreover, the strengthening of the AKP and 
its elite ideology within the country post-2007, allowed for even deeper 
relations between Turkey and Syria at the expense of Turkey-West relations 
despite objections from Kemalist elites and opposition parties; the support of 
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public opinion proved more important. Thus economic interdependence grew 
even more as well as security cooperation. Although these policy sectors and 
their relationship are further analysed in the final chapter of the thesis, an initial 
observation would be that among the domestic drivers – which are secondary 
to systemic ones – elite ideology and public opinion are the most important 
ones for TFP, in this order. 
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6. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel and Intervening 
Variables 
 
After the historic breakthrough in Turkish-Israeli relations in 1996, the AKP 
period was the one that saw the two countries going from amity to (relative) 
enmity. A number of reasons are often cited for this change, including the AKP 
ideology and by extension the changes in Turkey’s threat perceptions, the 
deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the developed friction 
between the West and regional countries after the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, 
the gradual decline in the US power and the emergence of a conflictual Turkey-
US relationship, as well as the emotional management of bilateral problems by 
the respective leaderships.452 
The changing threat perceptions and the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process are categorised as the main system-level factors that affected TFP 
towards Israel. In terms of the former, the shift in threat perceptions led to the 
rapprochement between Turkey, Syria and Iran. Taking into account that the 
threat perceptions Turkey and Israel shared regarding Syria and Iran played a 
central role in the formation of their alliance in 1996, it is easy to see how the 
alleviation of those threats dissolved the primary link between Turkey and 
Israel.453 On the other hand, Israel’s failure to resume peace talks with the 
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Palestinians at Camp David in 2000, and the second Palestinian Intifada that 
followed, increased Turkey’s negative perception of Israel.454 This was later 
coupled with the Iraq war, and everything that came with it as analysed in the 
independent variables (chapter 4), which created the need for Turkey to adopt a 
more regionalized foreign policy; in addition, the deterioration in Turkey-US 
relations was reflected in Turkish-Israeli relations as well, since the latter 
complemented the former and constituted a pillar of US foreign policy in the 
region. 
In this context, the role of domestic drivers in the gradual change of TFP 
towards Israel, and the gradual deterioration of bilateral relations are examined 
in two steps. First, by examining domestic dynamics (intervening variables) vis-
à-vis incidents such as the 2008/09 Gaza war, the 2009 Davos incident, and the 
2010 “Gaza flotilla” crisis, as the main referent points in the worsening 
trajectory of bilateral relations. Second, by looking at the role of Iran in the 
deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. This will place TFP within a broader 
regional and international context as well as provide an additional referent 
point of comparison between TFP towards Syria and Iran by revealing the 
dynamics of alliance formation (Turkey-Syria-Iran) and the negative changes in 
Turkish-Israeli relations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Ariel Centre for Policy Research ACPR Policy Paper no. 47(1998); Robins, Suits and Uniforms: 244-70; 
Efraim Inbar, "The Resilience of Israeli-Turkish Relations," Israel Affairs 11, no. 4 (2005): 591-607. 
454 Ofra Bengio, "Altercating Interests and Orientations betwen Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel," 
Insight Turkey 11, no. 2 (2009): 44-46. 
194 
 
6.1. Domestic Drivers and the Deterioration of Turkish-Israeli 
Relations 
 
The increasingly negative turn in TFP towards Israel may seem reasonable 
considering the changing regional power balances. Yet, in light of the ground-
breaking formation of the Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance in 1996 and their 
close military, security, diplomatic, economic and other cooperation, Turkey’s 
stance – in spite of Israel’s policies – may be more difficult to comprehend. Why 
would Turkey compromise its most important multileveled regional alliance? 
Did the Turkish-Israeli relationship and Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran, 
Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah – among other regional actors – have to be 
mutually exclusive? Looking at Turkey’s domestic dynamics through the two 
intervening variables, while keeping in mind the regional and international 
context, can give a more detailed insight about the AKP’s foreign policy-making 
vis-à-vis Israel.  
 
1st Intervening Variable: the AKP Elite Ideology 
 
As noted repeatedly thus far, the AKP – and its ideology – is widely 
considered to be one of the most important domestic factors of change in TFP 
during the 2000s, not only with regard to Israel but more generally as well. The 
role of AKP elite ideology is here looked at as one of the domestic variables that 
should be taken into account. In terms of the AKP’s Israel policy, Shlomo Brom 
specifically argues that the AKP has been at least partly driven by “Elements of 
Islamic political thinking and patterns of behaviour, and affinity with the 
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Islamic world.” This, he adds, brought Turkey closer to the Arabs and their 
perceptions vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli problems – most notably the Palestinian 
issue.455 If that is indeed the case then Turkey’s gradual dissociation from Israel 
could be interpreted as the result of the AKP’s particular (ideological) way of 
responding to international and regional changes. 
In a 2012 speech, Davutoğlu said, “we are siding with the people of Homs, 
like we sided with the people of Sarajevo, like we sided with the people of Gaza 
against Israel, or Sarajevo against Milosevic.” He made the case that Turkey 
does not favour or discriminate against religious beliefs since, as he said, each 
of these oppressors had a different religious background. He added, 
“Oppression is oppression, and Turkey will be against any oppression in our 
region.”456 Contrary to the initial argument that AKP elites are largely driven by 
political Islamic principles, the FM’s remarks suggest that Turkey’s stance 
towards Israel, as well as its foreign policy more broadly, is based on (non-
religious) moral principles. 
Yet this was not the case when Turkey decided to neglect the violent 
crackdown of the Iranian regime on people protesting against the questionable 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009 –Erdoğan said that such an action 
would constitute interference in Iran’s internal affairs.457 Nor did Turkey refrain 
from inviting the Sudanese President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who was at the 
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time indicted by the International Court of Justice for war crimes in Sudan's 
Darfur region.458 In this light, (non-religious) moral principles in TFP are 
employed in a selective manner and, therefore, they cannot justify Turkey’s 
stance against Israel.459 It is more likely that this behaviour is driven by other 
pragmatic interests and ideological forces. 
The AKP’s opposition to Israeli policies – particularly towards the 
Palestinians – is perhaps as important as the ideological rhetoric that frames it. 
For example, Davutoğlu noted repeatedly in his Strategic Depth that the post-
Cold War Turkish-Israeli alliance favoured Israel on multiple levels, while it 
generated widespread anti-Turkey feelings in the public opinion of the Arab 
peoples. Within this framework, he expressed the fear that the continuation of 
the close Turkish-Israeli relationship would result in the Arab and Islamic states 
distancing themselves from Turkey; therefore, he argues, Turkey’s Middle East 
policy needs to be re-evaluated and reconfigured.460 
Two things occur from this early approach of the FM: on the one hand, 
there is a pragmatic need for Turkey to improve relations with the Arab world, 
and Israel is an obstacle to that end. On the other hand, taking into account 
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other remarks about Turkey’s affinity with its geo-cultural near-abroad, Israel is 
seen as a non-Arab (non-Muslim) state and its value for Turkey is calculated as 
such. In other words, Davutoğlu relates more to Turkey’s Arab – not least, 
Muslim – neighbours rather than Israel and the Western camp – which 
reaffirms this thesis’ assumptions about the AKP elite ideology and their 
perception of the region. 
What is important in this discussion is that Turkey could have maintained 
a relative distance from and a critical stance towards Israel – for communicative 
purposes – without, however, endangering the alliance. The particularly harsh 
remarks of then Prime Minster Erdoğan did not make that possible. After the 
2008/09 Israeli military operation “Cast Lead” against Gaza, the Turkish PM 
said that the war crimes of Israeli President Shimon Peres were greater than the 
ones of the Sudanese President, Bashir. He said that he did not believe that 
Bashir had committed those crimes and that Israel was being favoured because 
of its relationship with the West. Importantly enough, he added that, contrary 
to Israel, Bashir could not have committed such crimes as “It is not possible for 
those who belong to the Muslim faith to carry out genocide.”461 The PM 
suggested a Western political bias towards Israel while at the same time he 
himself demonstrated religious (and also political) bias towards Bashir,462 and 
by extension, towards Israel – i.e. if Israel was Muslim it would not have 
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committed war crimes against the Palestinians. This is a clear ideological 
predisposition which is not limited to rhetoric but also correlates with Turkey’s 
later Israel policy. 
The PM’s straightforwardness became even more obvious in the instance 
of the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, as described in chapter 4. There, 
Erdoğan said to Israeli President, Peres: “When it comes to killing, you know 
well how to kill.”463 Next year, in the aftermath of the “Gaza flotilla” incident, 
Erdoğan accused Israel of state terrorism. Referring to one of the ten 
commandments of Jewish religious text, Torah,464 he remarked, “If you don't 
understand it in Turkish, I will say it in English: You shall not kill” – he then 
repeated the commandment in Hebrew.465 Equally provocative was the PM’s 
statement – contrary to the Western political line – that Hamas was not a terror 
group but rather an organization defending their lands; and Israel was being 
anti-democratic for not accepting its election to power.466 
Arguably, this was not diplomacy at its best. The principles on which 
Erdoğan’s remarks were based were maybe right – and that was perhaps the 
case. But, again, considering the strong relationship between Turkey and Israel, 
a more diplomatic Turkish reaction would have been expected; perhaps similar 
to reactions of the previous establishment, such as President Ahmet Sezer’s 
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2000 criticism of Israel for excessive use on Palestinians which, however, did 
not risk their strategic alliance.467 Erdoğan’s reaction, and his increasingly 
negative stance towards Israel during the 2000s, did not seem to be about 
balancing interests but rather about standing by the Palestinians and the Arab 
world and making Israel’s conduct of foreign policy difficult; the latter is more 
indicative of ideological incentives. In other words, it cannot simply be said that 
such remarks have strategic and communicative goals. 
The connection between rhetoric and elite ideas becomes clearer when 
juxtaposed with 2012 remarks of current Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu, who said that, Turkey “cannot turn a blind eye on what Israel has 
been doing in Gaza solely for the fact that we are strategic partners… We do not 
base our reactions on what other countries will think about them, instead we 
base our decision on whatever is right.”468 Çavuşoğlu’s remarks highlight the 
double-standards approach which was also identified earlier with regard to 
Turkey’s response to the genocide accusations against the Muslim Sudanese 
President. That is, AKP elite morality is confined within the boundaries of 
political Islamic ideas and cannot be said that is employed merely for domestic 
or external (public opinion) consumption. 
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It is exaggerated and sentimental remarks and attitude such as the ones of 
Erodğan that demonstrate ideologically driven behaviour.469 Of course, this 
kind of behaviour read against other remarks by Davutoğlu appears as 
materially driven as well. But while there are material incentives for distancing 
Turkey from Israel and bringing Turkey closer to the Arabs, as expressed 
through the analysis of the independent variables, the great degree of hostility 
against Israel seems unjustified and unnecessary. Thus, it renders ideological 
incentives primary among domestic variables but still secondary to systemic 
material pressures as it is propelled by them. The AKP’s particular and largely 
ideologically-informed way of dealing with regional developments works as 
the primary domestic variable that intervenes between systemic changes and 
foreign policy outcomes. 
A number of secondary sources affirm the this conclusion.470 In addition, 
according to researcher Osman Bahadir Dinçer, even if the AKP does not like 
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imperial-fantasy.html; Baskin Oran, "Turkey: Ideology in Foreign Policy,"  Al-Monitor(04/08/2014), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/politics/2013/08/turkey-arab-spring-foreign-policy-
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Israel – or any other country – it should still maintain a realistic behaviour 
towards it by taking into account the realities on the ground and its importance 
in the international system. From that perspective, he argued that, “the idea [of 
zero problems] was perfect… but now [Turkish foreign policy-makers] became 
more arrogant; they started to assume that Turkey is the voice of the Islamic 
world, that they are the leader of the Middle East, but they ignored the other 
realities of the region and,” therefore, Turkey became isolated and was led to 
many mistakes in foreign policy-making, such as the one with Israel.471 In 
addition to earlier-cited remarks that confirm this notion among the AKP elites, 
Erdoğan himself wrote:  
 
...Turkey is following a proactive foreign policy stretching from the 
Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus. This geography is 
Turkey’s natural historical and cultural hinterland. Turkey’s cultural 
and historical links with the peoples of these regions are deep and 
conducive to regional peace. 
 
Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this geography, for it stands at 
the center of it. History clearly shows that it is impossible to establish 
and sustain global peace without ensuring peace and stability in the 
Balkans and the Middle East. 472 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ideology.html#; Halil Karaveli, "Erdogan's Achilles Heel,"  Foreign Affairs(08/08/2014), 
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471 USAK researcher Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
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The rhetoric shows an AKP desire for a closer – historical and cultural – 
relationship between Turkey and the Arab and Muslim world at the expense of 
pragmatic and material relations with Israel as well as other Western allies. 
Erdoğan does not directly refer to religion but, considering that ethnicity and 
language are two of the cultural components that do not tie Turkey to the 
predominantly Arab region, religion is the most important feature that remains 
- which is also included in most definitions of culture.473 Relatedly, it should be 
remembered that Turkey’s Ottoman past – a largely Islamic past – is a big part 
of Erdoğan’s efforts to construct a basis for links with the Arab world. 
Moreover, according to former Turkish Ambassador Oktay Aksoy, it is not easy 
for a religious government in Turkey to neglect the Palestinian issue. This 
further supports the claim that AKP elite decisions have been at least partly 
ideologically-driven.474  
Indeed, there is an effort from AKP elites to mitigate these ideological 
manifestations by referring to principles of justice and morality or by noting 
that their attitude and policies have nothing to do with religion – of others or 
their own. Yet this is inconsistent with the overall picture and TFP behaviour. 
To better understand this point, and how the AKP elite ideology intervened 
between systemic realities and the foreign policy outcome, one should perhaps 
picture what Turkey’s “unfiltered” foreign policy behaviour, or the foreign 
policy behaviour of the previous establishment, would look like. Given what 
                                                          
473Fred E. Jandt, An Introduction to Intercultural Communication: Identities in a Global Community, 7th 
ed. (USA: SAGE, 2013). 4-33. 
474 Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Oktay Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 June 2013. 
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the features of Kemalist foreign policy such as isolationism, status quo, pro-
Westernism475 and non-involvement in the Middle East, one could safely argue 
that even if it attempted to approach the Arab world, it would not have done so 
by challenging its relations with Israel to such an extent. Not least because of 
the importance of the Turkish-Israeli axis for the US.  
From this perspective, AKP elite ideology in TFP towards Israel in the 
2000s and the deterioration of bilateral relations had a secondary yet important 
role. That is, external factors – changes in international power relations, external 
threat perceptions and international economic interdependencies - triggered the 
need for the reconfiguration of TFP. However, similar to the case of Syria, AKP 
elite ideology intervened as a filter and essentially shaped the content of the 
eventual foreign policy adjustment, which it is maintained would have been 
different had AKP not been in power: closer relations with Arabs and 
increasing distance from Israel to an unnecessarily great extent. This trend 
becomes more obvious later on in the midst of the geopolitical changes of the 
“Arab Spring” and the further worsening of the Turkey-Israel relationship. 
 
2nd Intervening Variable: Domestic Interest Groups 
 
At least some domestic interest groups played a role in preventing the 
negative Turkish elite anti-Israel sentiments from spreading to other sectors of 
cooperation between the two countries. At the same time, interest groups that 
                                                          
475 This is a somewhat paradoxical feature of Kemalist ideology considering that it also contains a strong 
suspicion towards Western countries as they played a role in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
which led to the highly unfavourable, for Turkey, Treaty of Serves (1920). Yet, whereas Kemal Ataturk 
was suspicious of Western aims in Turkey and the region, it still aspired to the West, its economic 
development and level of modernity and wanted to emulate these features in Turkey.  
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opposed the AKP’s Israel policy did not have enough power so as to effectively 
challenge the government. Yet, at times it seems that ostensibly unimportant 
groups contributed to domestic pressure against policies that would 
permanently damage Turkey’s relations with Israel. 
In the context of the 1996 breakthrough in Turkish-Israeli relations, the 
two countries also signed a Free Trade Agreement, and later on a double 
taxation prevention treaty and a bilateral investment treaty. Since then the 
economic relationship has been growing for the most part, with the volume of 
trade reaching 1.2 billion USD in 2002 from 449 million USD in 1996. The 
increase of the bilateral trade continued with an annual average of 14.6% 
between 2002 and 2008.476 As already mentioned, the military establishment 
was behind Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel both for security and 
ideological reasons, given that Israel was a close Western ally and Turkey’s 
alliance with it would thus lead to its further integration into the West, which 
was a traditional goal of Kemal Ataturk. 
At the time, MÜSİAD organised a meeting to discuss this development. 
The general sentiment vis-à-vis the rapprochement was negative. Indicative of 
MÜSİAD’s view were the keynote speeches given at the event. One of the 
keynote speakers was Ahmet Davutoğlu, then a university professor, who 
expressed the same views with the ones later written in his Strategic Depth. He 
                                                          
476 "Turkey-Israel Free Trade Agreement,"  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy, 
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta&country=IL&r; "Relations 
between Turkey and Israel,"  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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said, among other things: “Military agreement with Turkey is the best policy for 
Israel, which aims to be a leader in the region and cut Turkey's relations with 
Muslim countries,” adding that Turkey should adopt an independent foreign 
policy and improve its relations with other countries of the region – i.e. mainly 
the Arabs.477 
This understanding of MÜSİAD is very much in line with the AKP’s 
general approach towards the Middle East and Israel in particular. On the other 
hand, TÜSΙAD demonstrated a more pragmatic approach when in 2009 it 
praised the bilateral economic relations which grew since 1996, and encouraged 
investments as well as the establishment of an “Israel-Turkey CEO Forum” 
which would bring together CEOs from the two countries. Further, its president 
Osman Boyne stressed that “it is important to keep communication channels 
open for the improvement of our relations.”478 
Importantly, TÜSΙAD’s call for deeper and improved relations came after 
Israel’s attack on Gaza and the Davos incident. This demonstrates TÜSΙAD’s 
dissociation from politics and the pragmatism of businessmen – at least the 
ones of TÜSΙAD.479 It is worth noting that MÜSİAD’s stance somewhat changed 
                                                          
477 "Turkey-Israel cooperation is discussed by MUSIAD,"  Hürriyet Daily News(25/06/1996), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-israel-cooperation-is-discussed-by-
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478 Osman Boyner, "The Speech Delivered by Mr. Osman Boyner, TÜSİAD International President: Invest 
in Israel," TÜSİAD (23/11/2009): 3. 
479 This was also the case when in 2010 tensions arose between Turkey and the US regarding a US 
congressional committee resolution for the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman 
Empire. Despite the tensions, and its initial decision not to go through with a scheduled meeting to the 
US, TÜSΙAD eventually decided to realize the trip in order not to further strain the bilateral relations. 
This corresponds to previous observations that have been made regarding the pragmatism and interest-
based behaviour of business circles despite political tensions. See, "TÜSİAD to visit US despite tensions,"  
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over time and, as Dilek Yankaya argues, became more Europeanized – just like 
the AKP – especially between 2001 and 2004 although it was again followed by 
Euroscepticism.480 This justifies at least partly Ali Engin Oba’s claim that 
TÜSΙAD and MÜSİAD may have differences but they are not enemies and thus 
they also cooperate.481 
However, after the “Gaza flotilla” incident, although all actors in Turkey – 
apart, perhaps, from the PKK482 – condemned Israel’s actions, the rhetoric used 
was different. TÜSΙAD called the incident “one of the most tragic examples of 
the disproportionate and excessive use of military power against a civilian 
initiative” and called for UN action.483 MÜSİAD, which has been said to have 
“played a major role in funding the flotilla by ‘coordinating’ donations,”484 used 
harsher language, very similar to the AKP’s:  
 
…Israel has shown the entire world that it will not allow any 
peaceful attempt in the region and will not respect human rights. The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Today's Zaman (24/03/2010), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=205257.  
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Islamic Euroscepticism," European Journal of Turkish Studies 9(2009): 8-11. 
481 Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Ali Engin Oba. Interview with the author, Ankara, 12 June 2013. 
International Coordinator and EU Representative, TÜSİAD, Brussels Branch, Dr. Bahadır Kaleağasi. Phone 
interview with the author, 03 October 2013. Dr. Bahadır Kaleağasi of TÜSİAD also supported that there 
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that the AKP receives great support from Anatolian businessmen – many of which are reprsented by 
MÜSİAD. 
482 Mehmet Ali Birand, "PKK happy with Israel incident,"  Hürriyet Daily News(06/09/2010), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pkk-happy-with-israel-incident.aspx?pageID=438&n=pkk-happy-
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483 "TUSIAD: Terrorist Attack and Israeli Military Operation,"  TÜSIAD(01/06/2010), 
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attack cannot be approved or backed by any nation in the world. 
World leaders do not have the luxury to hide themselves behind 
mere statements. It is high time the world said ‘stop’ to the 
perpetrators of the bloody assault.485  
 
Despite these reactions, as noted earlier, the post-flotilla volume of trade 
between Turkey and Israel, in 2011, not only did not decline but reached a 
record high with a sum of 4.44 billion USD. In terms of the business associations 
this could mean three things, not necessarily mutually exclusive: at least in the 
case of Israel, business is indeed dissociated from politics mainly because of the 
liberalisation of Turkish economy,486 business associations managed to pressure 
the government to not cut off economic ties,487 and that the fact that MÜSİAD’s 
“constituent businesses represent [only] 15% of the Turkish national income”488 
does not allow it to greatly harm the economic relations between the two 
countries even if it decided to boycott Israel. 
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(31/05/2010), http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-211688-israeli-assault-on-gaza-flotilla-
draws-sharp-reaction-from-turkish-civil-society.html. 
486 This is point is underpinned by other evidence as well. See, for example, Atlı, "Businessmen as 
Diplomats."; Mustafa Kutlay, "Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign Policy’: A Political 
Economy Explanation," Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2001). Academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. Interview with 
the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 August 2013. 
487 Most interviewees agreed that business associations have at least some impact on foreign policy-
making. Yet there is a consensus that often PM Erdoğan’s decisions predominate over other domestic 
pressures. Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; 
academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. Interview with the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 August 2013; academic 
Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; Chairman of the Scientific 
Committee at International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) Dr. İhsan Bal. Interview with the 
author, Ankara, 25 September 2013; Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Ali Engin Oba. Interview with the author, 
Ankara, 12 June 2013; Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Oktay Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 
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Confirming at least the first one, Bahadır Kaleağasi, TÜSİAD’s 
International Coordinator and EU Representative in Brussels, said that TÜSİAD 
did not have a big and direct role in influencing the government towards the 
preservation of economic relations and yet its policy was to maintain good 
relations with Israel, independent of political problems, and to prevent the 
political crisis to spread to other sectors – such as the economy.489 This 
inconsistency between Turkey’s political and economic foreign relations 
becomes clearer in the post-“Arab Spring” period when the crisis between 
Turkey and Israel develops even more. 
When it came to the domestic political opposition, parties like the CHP, 
the MHP and the BDP united in condemnation of Israel regarding its policies 
towards the Palestinians and particularly the “Gaza flotilla” incident.490 In that 
sense they supported the AKP’s criticism and frustration as well. Yet later on, 
the opposition accused the AKP government of being silent about the Israeli 
raid on Gaza flotilla. Specifically, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu of the CHP characterized 
the AKP’s policies “two- faced” while he questioned its decision to allow the 
flotilla to travel to Gaza despite Israeli warnings.491  He also argued that PM 
Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric was not followed by actions. 
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At the same time, the CHP, as the biggest and most important opposition 
party, did not advocate for an anti-Israeli foreign policy. On the contrary, 
Kiliçdaroğlu argued in an interview that the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli 
relations harmed Turkey492 while CHP deputy chairman Osman Faruk Loğoğlu 
said that “the AKP is provoking anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli tendencies in 
Turkish society to expand its electoral constituency.” He added that, the “CHP 
favours setting up friendly ties and improved economic relations with Israel.”493 
Moreover, in agreement with officials of the CHP and BDP, Devlet Bahçeli of 
the MHP maintained that the AKP was putting up a “show” by exploiting the 
“Gaza flotilla” incident for populist reasons.494 For its part, the BDP’s 
spokesperson noted BDP “would not overlook the events in Palestine,” but 
highlighted Turkey’s double standards in that it supports the Palestinians but 
not the Kurds; a fact that will make it difficult for AKP “to preserve the sense of 
citizenship or to unite the country.”495 
From that perspective it is seen that although the verbal response of the 
Turkish government to the “Gaza flotilla” incident was ideologically driven, the 
practical aspect of the AKP’s reaction did not satisfy the opposition as they 
thought that AKP fell short in taking decisive actions against Israel. It can be 
suggested that opposition parties, too, tried to exploit the overall negative 
feelings about Israel at the time of the crisis for political reasons. However, 
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neither did the opposition want the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations 
nor the dissolution of the alliance.496 On the other hand, according to experts 
and as seen later on, the stance of the opposition parties seemed like a factor 
that prevented Turkey’s endorsement of the 2011 second “Gaza flotilla” which 
eventually failed, as well as the harsher response towards Israel after the release 
of the UN report regarding the first flotilla.497 These outcomes are further 
examined in Turkey’s post-“Arab Spring” foreign policy and are compared to 
previous policy-making processes. 
In terms of other domestic forces, such as the military and public opinion, 
they had a limited or endorsing role. As argued above, by the time Turkey and 
Israel had reached the lowest point of their relations in the 2000s, which was the 
crisis over the “Gaza flotilla,” the military establishment had lost most of its 
role. Given the part that the military had played in the formation of the 
Turkish-Israeli alliance by bypassing the Islamist PM Erbakan, and the post-
modern coup it staged against the same PM, partly due to his rapprochement 
with the Arab/Muslim world, one could have easily imagined a strong military 
opposition to the AKP’s aggressive Israel policy. Moreover, its severed and 
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silent role corresponds to its inability to influence foreign policy-making in 
other cases that have been examined as well, specifically after 2007 and the 
AKP’s second term, as argued in the analysis of the AKP elite ideology. 
Lastly, the public opinion expressed a strong opposition to Israel’s actions 
through massive protests while it has been noted that already from Israel’s 
attacks against Gaza (2008/09) anti-Semitic sentiments have been on the rise in 
Turkey.498 The term anti-Semitism is not accidental here. Further to previous 
elaboration in this thesis on anti-Semitism at the elite level, it has been widely 
argued499 that Turkish society is largely anti-Semitic and these feelings were 
enhanced after the “Gaza flotilla” incident.500 As Rifat Bali notes, “The 
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predictable result of such an extraordinarily hostile atmosphere was the 
demonization not only of the terms Zionism, but of Israel and Jew as well.”501 
What is more, this notion is confirmed by a recent survey that showed 
that, “Sixty-nine [69] percent of all adults in Turkey harbor anti-Semitic 
attitudes.”502 After all, the exploitation of these popular anti-Israeli and anti-
Semitic feelings, as stated earlier, was one of the criticisms of the political 
opposition to the AKP and PM Erdoğan. In this sense, the AKP’s anti-Israeli 
rhetoric was responding to public opinion as that would solidify and increase 
its electoral base thus contributing to a more secure third re-election. This 
populist behaviour is again evident in the wake of the next decade, and the 
greater deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
 
Intervening Variables and the Deterioration of Turkish-Israeli Relations 
 
There is an evident inconsistency in TFP towards Israel. Although the 
relations between the two countries declined significantly by the end of the 
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2000s, their economic relations increased. On the one hand, there was an 
ideological predisposition among the AKP elites towards Israel which became 
more salient against the backdrop of regional changes and rising Turkish threat 
perceptions of the West. On the other hand, until the end of 2010 this set of 
ideas was expressed mostly on a rhetorical level rather than in actual policies. 
The inaction of the AKP was highlighted by political parties of the opposition, 
while at the same time these parties questioned the AKP’s motives behind its 
decisions vis-à-vis Israel and blamed it to a large extent for the deterioration of 
the bilateral relationship. 
Business groups seem to have played a role in maintaining good trade 
relations by having a more pragmatic perspective. The military did not manage 
to play a role despite the fact that the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations 
would be against its foreign policy orientation. Lastly, public opinion very 
much shared the anti-Israeli sentiments expressed by the AKP. The pressuring 
or silent role of these domestic groups becomes clearer when the relations of 
Turkey and Israel hit a new low in 2011. 
Overall, an important conclusion that could be drawn from the above-
mentioned analysis, is that domestic interest groups, of which public opinion 
and business groups could be seen as being the most significant, are often able 
to influence policy-making or certain policy sectors (i.e. economy) insofar as 
substantial issues such as security are not at stake. This was demonstrated in 
the ability of business groups to maintain good trade relations, but their general 
inability to influence Turkish-Israeli political relations. Public opinion is also 
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important, given the AKP’s need to stay in power, but it seems that in this case 
AKP elite ideology corresponds well with public opinion sentiments. This is a 
quite complex conclusion regarding the role of domestic actors in the making of 
TFP, one that has not been found in other relevant works. Specifically, even 
domestic level analyses of TFP have not pointed out which domestic factors or 
groups are most important in policy-making, that is, the hierarchy of their 
importance; nor have they identified the foreign policy sectors these groups 
could influence or the extent to which they could do so.503 It is later seen that in 
the post-2011 case of Syria, the relationship between AKP elite ideology and 
public opinion in particular is different.  
 
6.2. Domestic Drivers and the Role of Iran in Turkey’s Israel 
Policy 
 
Analysing the role of Iran in Turkey’s Israel policy is something that will 
allow the comparison and contrast  of TFP towards an Arab state (Syria) and a 
non-Arab state (Israel) in the context of regional dynamics, alliances and 
domestic politics, through the examination of the third non-Arab state of the 
region (i.e. Iran). Again, as explained in the case of Syria, Iran and Syria reflect 
Turkey’s non-Western foreign policy orientation – since for the US and Western 
powers they were adversaries during this period – while Israel reflects Turkey’s 
                                                          
503 See for example, Tür and Altunişik, "From Distant Neighbours to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish 
Relations," 217-36; Tür, "Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP - Trade, Business 
Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones," 589-602; Başkan, "The Rising Islamic Business 
Elite and Democratization in Turkey."; Kutlay, "Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign 
Policy’: A Political Economy Explanation."; Erdoğan, "The Missing Element."; Altunişik and Martin, 
"Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," 569-87; Mufti, Daring and 
Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea. 
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Westward foreign policy, given that it is perhaps the most important American 
ally in the region. Therefore, this thesis looks at how – and if – Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Iran affected Turkish-Israeli relations or vice versa. 
Since the ideological relationship between Turkey and Iran, Syria and 
Israel has already been analysed, as well as the role of domestic groups in TFP 
towards Iran, Syria and Israel, these insights are used without repeating the 
analysis. Hence, the analysis of this case study will also be shorter than the 
previous ones. Moreover given the lack of adequate news reports and official 
documents on the subject, the analysis is more reliant on interviews.  
 
1st Intervening Variable: the AKP Elite Ideology 
 
In terms of the AKP elite ideology with regard to Iran and Israel a few 
observations stand out from the previous analysis. The emergence of political 
Islam in Turkey and particularly the AKP has contributed to the improvement 
of Turkish-Iranian relations. The AKP sees Iran as part of Turkey’s history and 
culture while AKP officials refer to Iranians as friends and brothers. Dinçer, 
talking about the pre-“Arab Spring” era, stated that: “Islamists in Turkey used 
to believe that Iran is an Islamic country, that they are our brothers and sisters 
and we should have close relations with Iran because they wouldn’t harm us, 
they are our friends and brothers.”504 
At the same time, among AKP elites, there is an awareness of Turkish-
Iranian historical and intra-religious differences (i.e. Sunni-Shia) which 
                                                          
504 USAK researcher Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
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increases the efforts to avoid a confrontation. In terms of Israel, AKP elites 
believe that it has been an obstacle to Turkey’s better relations with the Middle 
East. This is neither unrelated to the already mentioned ideological anti-Semitic 
and anti-Israeli predispositions of AKP elites, nor to Turkey’s disagreement 
with the Western and Israeli policy of sanctions and coercion towards Iran.  
However, a view shared by many holds that Turkey’s improved relations 
with Iran did not play a role in the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. In 
this sense, ideological predispositions worked separately in each case; that is, 
the worldviews of AKP elites played a role in bringing Turkey and Iran closer 
together as well as in driving Turkey and Israel further apart.505 But a 
connection between the development of the two relationships has not been 
suggested – as Tür said, “they were not mutually exclusive.”506  
Nevertheless, supporters of this argument agreed that after 2008 the closer 
relationship between Turkey and Iran played a role in the cooling of Turkish-
Israeli relations.507 Tür argued that this contributed especially to Israel’s view of 
                                                          
505 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, "Turkey & Iran: Islamic Brotherhood or Regional Rivalry," Al Jazeera Centre 
for Studies (June, 2013): 3-4; Brom, "The Israeli-Turkish Relationship," 60-61; Efraim Inbar, "The Strategic 
Implications for Israel," in The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International 
Ramifications, ed. Efraim Inbar (New York: Routledge, 2013), 155-56. 
506 Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; Turkish 
Ambassador (ret.) Oktay Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 June 2013; and conversation with 
Turkish Academic no. 1, Ankara, 13 June 2013. Turkey’s support of Iran’s nuclear program between 2009 
and 2011 also played a role. See, for example, Aaron Stein and Philipp C. Bleek, "Turkish-Iranina 
Relations: From "Friends with Benefits" to "It's Complicated"," Insight Turkey 14, no. 4 (2012): 142. 
507 Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; Turkish 
Ambassador (ret.) Oktay Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 June 2013. Even after the 
breakout of the “Arab Spring” and Syria’s civil war when Turkish-Iranian relations deteriorated, in 2012 
Turkey reportedly disclosed to Iran the identities of ten Iranians that travelled to Turkey to meet Israeli 
spies thus undermining Israeli intelligence gathering. The incident was cited as another case of Turkey’s 
effort to appeal to the Arab/Muslim world and proof of sustained Turkish-Iranian relations – as opposed 
to the deteriorated Turkish-Israeli ones. Although Turkey later rejected the claims, Israeli officials 
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Turkey and its relations with Iran. Right after the deadly incident on the “Mavi 
Marmara” ship in 2010, Tür said, most political circles and parties in Israel were 
talking about it and Turkey, as well as about how Erdoğan and then Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were “almost the same.” This notion was so 
prevalent that one official said that Ahmadinejad whispers something to 
Erdoğan’s ear and he would then go and say it to the public.508 Bacık argued 
that Turkey kept some distance from Israel in order to maintain or develop 
good relations with other actors – such as Arab states, Iran, Hamas, etc. – but 
from one point onwards – notably after 2008/09 – this distance increased 
greatly and, as argued earlier, unnecessarily.509 
As mentioned previously, the AKP had by 2008 consolidated most of its 
power over the military establishment which gave it more freedom in making 
                                                                                                                                                                          
criticised Turkey for anti-Israeli policies. See, Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, "Turkey's Spymaster Plots 
Own Course on Syria,"  The Wall Street Journal (10/10/2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579107373585228330; David 
Ignatius, "Turkey blows Israel’s cover for Iranian spy ring,"  The Washington Post(16/10/2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-turkey-blows-israels-cover-for-iranian-spy-
ring/2013/10/16/7d9c1eb2-3686-11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html; Ivan Watson and Gul Tuysuz, 
"Turkey rejects claims it blew Israeli agents' cover,"  CNN(17/10/2013), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/17/world/meast/turkey-israeli-intelligence-leak/; "Turkey revealed 
Israeli spy ring to Iran-report,"  Reuters (17/10/2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/israel-turkey-iran-idUSL6N0I71EK20131017. 
508 Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013 Tür also mentioned 
banners in Israeli demonstrations reading “Erdoğan = Ahmadinejad.” In support of this dynamic 
between Turkey, Iran and Israel see also, Carol Migdalovitz, "Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi 
Marmara Incident, and its Aftermath," Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress (June, 
2010): 13-14. For an Israeli comparison of Erdoğan and Ahmadinejad see, Douglas M. Bloomfield, 
"Washington Watch: Is Erdogan the new Ahmadinejad?,"  The Jerusalem Post(17/07/2013), 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Washington-Watch-Is-Erdogan-the-new-Ahmadinejad-
320171. 
509 Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013. See also, Moran 
Stern and Dennis Ross, "The Role of Syria in Israeli-Turkish Relations," Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs (Summer/Fall, 2013): 123-24; Nimrod Goren, "An Unfulfilled Opportunity for 
Reconciliation: Israel and Turkey During the Arab Spring," Insight Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012): 128. 
218 
 
policies and decisions. This widely acceptable observation, coupled with the 
party’s and Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism – which alienated various 
AKP partners and supporters – added a more ideological (political Islamic) 
character to the AKP elite rhetoric and policies.510 Thus, on the one hand it is 
accepted that there has been a domestic transformation with regard to the AKP 
and its ideology, as argued by others, but on the other hand it is clarified that 
change in TFP towards Israel cannot be attributed primarily or only to this 
transformation. Without systemic changes prompting a TFP response, the AKP 
elite ideology would not itself trigger a change in foreign policy reflective of the 
domestic ideological transformation in question. 
In sum, it can be seen that although structural and security issues played a 
role in the development of Turkey’s relations with Iran at first, up to 2002, the 
AKP elite ideology helped these relations grow, ultimately at the expense of the 
Turkey-West relations (see, for example, the 2010 Turkish support for the 
Iranian nuclear program).  In terms of Israel, the external structural realities of 
the 2000s were primary in calling for a foreign policy reconfiguration and a 
                                                          
510 Hugh Pope, "Erdoğan's Decade," The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 4 (Winter, 2012): 51-52; Ekin 
Ozbakkaloglu, "Turkey Attempts to Curtail Judicial Independece,"  Global Risk Insights(22/02/2014), 
http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/02/22/turkey-attempts-to-curtail-judicial-independence/; Tony 
Cross, "Erdogan defends Islamic AKP’s pro-business record in Turkey’s presidential election,"  Radio 
France International English(31/07/2014), http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20140731-erdogan-
defends-islamic-akp-s-pro-business-record-turkey-s-presidential-election; Yuksel Sezgin, "Erdogan's 
Presidency: A Risky Gamble?,"  Al Jazeera (03/08/2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/08/erdogan-presidency-risky-gamble-
20148284822695561.html; Halil M. Karaveli, "Reverting to His Roots: Erdoğan sees Himself as the 
"Imam" of Turkey, But is the AKP' New-Old Islamism a Recipe for Success?,"  Turkey Analyst 
(11/06/2012), http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120611a.html. Moreover, as 
Osman Bahadır Dinçer said, the tendency of Turkish political Islamist to assume that they possess all the 
power was also a dynamic that was favoured by a changing and more powerful AKP, thus leading to 
more ideologically driven behaviour. USAK researcher Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, 
Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
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better relationship with the region, but it was the AKP elite ideology that saw 
Turkey’s relations with Israel and Arab as mutually exclusive, at least to some 
extent. 
In that sense, external developments, such as the Gaza war and the “Gaza 
flotilla” incident were filtered by the AKP elite ideology and contributed to the 
worsening Turkish-Israeli relations. At the same time, for ideological and 
material reasons (with material being primary and ideological secondary), 
Turkey’s relations with Iran (and Syria) improved to a great extent with Turkey 
supporting the controversial election of Ahmadinejad in 2009 and later, in 2010, 
the Iranian nuclear programme at the United Nations. In turn, Israel’s 
perceptions of the Turkey-Iran relationship had a negative impact on Turkey-
Israel relations but on the other hand Turkey’s domestic politics played its own 
role, as elaborated in the next intervening variable. 
 
2nd Intervening Variable: Domestic Interest Groups 
 
The correlation between Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Israeli relations in 
the 2000s is also hard to identify in the policies of the different domestic interest 
groups. Their views of the AKP’s policies towards Israel and Iran could be 
helpful in this respect while insights on their stance towards Israel and Iran 
from previous case studies analysed can support the examination of Iran’s role 
in Turkey’s Israel policy. 
Evidence suggests so far that economic factors are very important in TFP, 
yet largely dependent on changes in the independent variables. As such, 
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business elites have their own place in the equation of TFP. As elaborated in the 
analysis of Iran’s role in Turkey’s Syria policy, business circles – particularly 
TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD – have had a pragmatic approach towards Turkey’s 
external economic relations although MÜSİAD was keen on the development of 
such relations especially with Turkey’s Muslim neighbourhood.511 The 
approach of business elites in the case of Israel meant that economic relations 
mostly improved throughout the 2000s. 
While it has been argued that business associations play an important role 
in shaping TFP preferences,512 this thesis has also suggested that business 
associations and other domestic groups had a greater role in the AKP’s early 
years of governance than in more recent years. That is because of the EU’s 
diminished role in TFP and the gradually “louder voice” of a narrow circle of 
AKP elites in policy-making as the party was growing more authoritarian after 
2007.513 
Regarding the case under examination, one could argue that an increasing 
communication gap between business and AKP elites is not evident – given 
Turkey’s good economic relations with the two countries. However, this thesis 
                                                          
511 In addition to previously cited sources on MÜSİAD’s preferences see also, "MÜSİAD says Turkey must 
issue long-term bonds,"  Today's Zaman (11/11/2010), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=33B9D7B760519E24530FAD
3672F32C93?newsId=226882.  
512 Academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. Interview with the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 August 2013; Turkish 
Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Ali Engin Oba. Interview with the author, Ankara, 12 June 2013; Turkish 
Ambassador (ret.) Reşat Arim. Interview with the author, Ankara,13 June 2013; academic Dr. Özlem Tür. 
Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013. 
513 Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; USAK researcher 
Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013; Chairman of the 
Scientific Committee at International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) Dr. İhsan Bal. Interview 
with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
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would argue that according to evidence presented so far, along with the 
growing communication gap also emerged a gap between political and 
economic relations. This has been at least partly attributed to the growing role 
of the private sector in foreign economic relations especially in the case of Israel. 
Contrary to the case of Israel, where diplomatic relations worsened, the 
preserved good relations with Iran have been supported – not undermined – by 
ideological factors. 
Similar to the changing role of business groups has been the role of 
opposition political parties.514 CHP deputy chairman, Loğoğlu, said: “Although 
we have presented various foreign policy alternatives, the AKP ignored and 
rejected almost all of our contributions.”515 This feeling is widespread among 
the opposition parties as their reactions about Turkey’s Israel stance 
demonstrated. The CHP also maintains a balance regarding Iran (a “valuable 
neighbour”) as it stresses its right to have a nuclear programme (for peaceful 
purposes) as well as its “obligation to be transparent about it.” At the same time 
the CHP, as a primarily pro-Western party, emphasises Turkey’s place in 
                                                          
514 In the past, opposition parties in Turkey and particularly CHP, whenever it found itself on the side of 
the opposition, were relatively more successful in influencing policy outcomes. The weakening of the 
Kemalist military and bureaucratic establishment and AKP’s empowerment had an impact on this 
dynamic. On the one hand, CHP was “no longer the party of the state” (Baskın Oran quoted in Sevgi 
Akarçeşme) and the public support of other opposition parties is too little to pose a serious challenge 
(electoral or otherwise) to AKP’s governance. See, Sevgi Akarçeşme, "Weak political opposition impedes 
further political development in Turkey,"  Today's Zaman(18/12/2012), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_weak-political-opposition-impedes-further-political-
development-in-turkey_301548.html. 
515 CHP Deputy Chairman Osman Faruk Loğoğlu Interview with the author, Ankara, 30 September 2013. 
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NATO not least because of the protection it provides to Turkey against regional 
threats – one of them being the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons.516 
The leader of the nationalist MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, despite his general 
opposition to the AKP, has supported its pro-Iran policies, saying that they 
have been “very consistent all along.” At the same time he accused Israel – 
together with other countries – of supporting the PKK.517 In the context of the 
party’s adversity towards Western powers, the MHP related more to Iran and 
its sovereign rights rather than the policies and interests of (Western) 
international actors. To be sure, the belief that Israel has supported the Kurds of 
Iraq in the past as well as the fears that it might be cooperating with the PKK 
while lobbying in the US for “the cause of Armenians, Kurds, Alevis,” creates 
insecurities in the MHP and the AKP.518 
As such, the MHP would prefer a closer relationship with Iran rather than 
with Israel. On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish BDP – as the so called political 
wing of the PKK – welcomes Israel’s direct or indirect support of the Kurds in 
Turkey or elsewhere,519 although more recently the Kurdish BDP and non-BDP 
politicians, such as Ahmet Türk, argued that countries like Israel and Iran do 
                                                          
516 Kılıçdaroğlu, "Interview with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu," 28. 
517 Selim Kuvel, "Bahçeli fires back at protestors who say they’ll hang Erdoğan,"  Today's Zaman 
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Kurdish problem which it would not like to see escalating. 
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not want a resolved Kurdish issue because then Turkey “would be the strongest 
country in the Middle East and become a model for the region.”520 
Overall there is an imbalance in domestic political opposition. A general 
tendency to support Iran can be identified, especially in MHP and CHP. The 
CHP also tried to strike a balance between its pro-Westernism and its support 
for Iran’s rights while it advocates for healthy relations with Israel. Given the 
reported developing relations between Israel and the PKK, the BDP would be 
also more inclined to support Israel and adopt a critical stance towards Iran, 
while the MHP sees Israel as a threat and an anchor of Western interests. 
Despite their positions, which one could argue are fairly balanced, 
political opposition parties throughout the 2000s have not demonstrated 
particularly strong support for Iran or opposition to Israel – with the notable 
exception of the crisis over the “Gaza flotilla” incident. Nor did they seek better 
relations with Iran at the expense of Israel. Moreover, as noted, the influence of 
political opposition over the AKP governance declined significantly by the end 
of the 2000s, that is, around the same time Turkey-Iran relations boomed and 
Turkey-Israel relations deteriorated unprecedentedly. 
The changing role of the Kemalist military establishment, as stressed in 
other cases, is also directly related to the gradually more salient and vocal 
expressions of the AKP elite ideology. The Kemalist Generals were supporters 
of strong relations with Israel and turned against the Erbakan government 
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(1996-97) which sought better relations with Iran. Yet in the early 2000s they 
tried to mend fences with Iran for reasons examined previously, mostly related 
with mutual security threats. Yet the simultaneous deterioration of Turkish-
Israeli relations and betterment of Turkey-Iran relations at the expense of 
Turkey’s Western orientation would politically or even militarily mobilize the 
military establishment against the government. As it occurs from the political 
absence of the military in these developments, it once again becomes evident 
that its historic role of political intervention belongs to the past, thus rendering 
the AKP the primary regulator of domestic politics. 
Within the framework of the Turkey-Iran-Israel dynamic in question, 
public opinion mostly played a role due to the anti-American sentiments that 
had developed after 9/11 and the Iraq war. The public opinion favouring Iran, 
the threatening perception of the West, as well as the increasingly negative anti-
Israeli and anti-Semitic popular feelings, as analysed above, reinforced and 
legitimised the AKP’s stance towards Israel and Iran, not least by indirectly 
calling for distance from Israel and closer relations with Iran, in opposition to 
the West.  In an age of mass politics the AKP’s assertive and ideologically-
informed foreign policy is important to be appealing to the majority of the 
public opinion – even if opposition parties disagree – as that, among other 
things, secures the AKP’s stay in power. This is especially true, and not 
particularly difficult for the AKP to achieve, given that the AKP’s electoral base 
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is primarily comprised by conservative Turks who maintain favourable 
attitudes towards the AKP’s expressed ideology.521 
 
Intervening Variables and the Role of Iran in the AKP’s Israel Policy 
 
As established, the independent variables played the primary role in 
driving Turkey to adopt a more Middle Easternized foreign policy, with the 
result of having better relations with Iran and Syria, among others, as well as 
worsening relations with Israel. Notably, the two relationships did not affect 
each other until the late 2000s. Turkey maintained good diplomatic, political, 
security and economic relations with both countries for the most part of the 
decade. As with other instances explored, and as noted in the very beginning, 
the second election of the AKP (2007) was a turning point which gave rise to a 
stronger AKP and thus more vocal in its ideological convictions, as well as a 
weakened military and political opposition. In turn, this led the AKP to limit 
the inclusion of other actors – like business associations – in foreign policy-
making. Thus, by 2010, the ever better relationship between Turkey and Iran, 
contributed to the former’s declining relations with Israel. 
AKP ideology played an assistive role (as an intervening filter between the 
independent and dependent variables) due to favourable predispositions 
towards Iran and negative predispositions towards Israel, while the perceptions 
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of the public underpinned and legitimized the AKP’s stance. For their part, 
opposition parties had an overall balanced approach which did not affect the 
AKP, mainly because of their inability to effectively influence the government’s 
policies. In terms of the business elites, it became evident that – at least in some 
cases – politics does not need to come first in order for economy to follow. Good 
and growing economic relations between Turkey and Israel have been a reality 
despite bad political relations. Moreover, the pragmatism of business circles 
would not prefer economic relations with one state rather than another, but it 
would aim at good ties with everyone. All in all, Iran did not have a central or 
determining role in Turkish-Israeli relations but it did have a part in the 
deepening of the gap between these two countries. 
 
6.3. Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the case of Israel in TFP during the 2002-2011 
period. The two sub-case studies focused on the trajectory of Turkish-Israeli 
deteriorating relations during the 2000s and Iran’s role in Turkey’s Israel policy. 
It was again suggested that the security sector is more important than the 
economic one in Ankara’s calculations given that the AKP was immune to 
domestic pressures with regard to its Israel security policy; it stuck to its own 
understanding of how Turkey should respond and manage the regional 
systemic realities. As such, and in agreement to this thesis’ initial propositions,  
it can be also seen that the AKP is the most significant domestic factor as it 
plays a primary role in filtering external structural realities and changes. 
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However, the role of business elites must not be neglected as they 
managed through pressures and their largely autonomous role to maintain 
their economic relations with Israel despite the deteriorating Turkish-Israeli 
relations. Moreover, it should be noted that public opinion is at least as 
important as business elites given that so far in the analysis Turkey has not 
been seen to follow any policies that go against public opinion. Such examples 
can be found in the post-2011 period only to prove that public opinion matters. 
These observations contribute to existing studies: first, by reaffirming the 
initial proposition that material and particularly systemic considerations are 
primary in Turkish foreign policy-making; and second, by identifying which 
policy sector has been most important in TFP. While these findings may agree 
with systemic approaches in terms of the material incentives of TFP,522 they also 
highlight the intervening role of AKP and its elite ideology;523 which is to say 
that accurate conclusions cannot be reached by overplaying one of the two 
approaches. Rather, and as this thesis argues, TFP can be decoded best when 
the causal relationship between foreign policy drivers is understood. In 
addition, the fact that the influence of business circles is more often than not 
limited to the economic sector – which is important nonetheless – clarifies the 
role of this group and contributes to the debate about the extent to which 
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Turkey’s overall foreign policy is based on economic interests. Thereby, it also 
contributes to analyses of Turkish external political and security relations which 
are overly reliant on economic factors.524  
Part III is the next and last part of the thesis. It is broken down into two 
main chapters and the conclusions. Chapter 7 analyses TFP towards Syria and 
Israel during the 2011-2013 period while chapter 8 focuses on the final Cross-
Case and Cross-Time comparative analyses. 
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PART III 
So far the analysis has allowed for a systematic and focused examination of 
TFP. It also provided the opportunity to analyse both the economic and security 
policies while taking into account ideational factors, like AKP elite ideology, 
and other domestic factors such as the role of opposition parties, business 
associations and public opinion. Preliminary conclusions were also drawn 
about issues such as the primary role of independent variables, the filtering role 
of ideology and the limited impact of domestic interest groups, apart from the 
importance of business groups during the AKP’s first term, and the significant 
public opinion support for governmental policies. 
The goal has not been to create a list or an abstract synthesis of factors. It 
has rather been to attribute a certain significance to each factor through each 
case study. Ultimately, the comparative analysis chapter ties these findings and 
insights together thereby generating causal chains and a hierarchy of foreign 
policy drivers that lead to specific foreign policy strategies and foreign policy 
behaviour, in accordance with the theoretical framework. 
What follows in the next chapter (7), is an analysis of the post-“Arab 
Spring” TFP towards Syria and Israel. This chronological division is based on 
the methodology set by the theoretical framework and is in accordance to 
changes to the primary independent variable, that is, the international power 
changes that came about with the “Arab Spring.” The same systematic way of 
analysis and variables is followed. As noted, the findings of the three previous 
chapters together with the findings of the next one are systematically analysed 
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from a comparative perspective in chapter 8, where patterns and differences in 
the drivers of TFP towards the Middle East are identified across cases and time. 
This leads to the establishment of the causal chains that produce TFP behaviour 
in each case and, by extension, highlight the relationship between different 
drivers and policy sectors in Turkey’s Middle East policy.  
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7.  Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria and Israel 2011-
2013 
Following on from the analysis of the AKP’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, with specific regard to Syria and Israel, the same phenomenon is looked at 
and analysed in a different systemic and domestic context. The period analysed 
in this chapter is the one starting in 2011 (late 2010, to be precise) with the 
outbreak of the Arab Uprisings (termed, “Arab Spring”) and finishing at the 
end of 2013. The “Arab Spring” brought about systemic geopolitical and power 
changes which affected Turkey’s regional policy, not least because of their 
impact on its threat perceptions and economic interdependencies. 
This external systemic change is also the theoretical and methodological 
criterion which determines the division of the timeframe, since international 
power changes are seen as the primary independent variable that affects foreign 
policy behaviour. The Arab Uprisings and their effects have not finished and 
their outcome is far from clear or certain. Yet, a specific timeframe had to be set 
for the facilitation of a systematic analysis of past – rather than ongoing – 
events. 
The logic upon which this chapter is based is the same as in the previous 
chapter in order to ensure consistency and coherence. The systemic-external 
level is examined first through three variables which are seen as independent in 
impacting foreign policy: International power changes, threat perceptions, and 
economic interdependence. Then, two domestic variables for the cases of Syria 
and Israel are looked at – i.e. AKP elite ideology, and domestic interest groups – 
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as intervening between the effects of the system level and TFP behaviour. The 
analysis focuses on Turkey’s security and economic policies towards Syria and 
Israel in the midst of the Syrian civil war and the further deterioration of 
Turkish-Israeli relations especially after the release of the UN “Palmer” report 
(2011) on the Gaza flotilla incident. 
 
7.1. Independent Variables and Turkey’s “Arab Spring” Foreign 
Policy 
Three external, systemic, developments affected TFP from 2011 onwards, in 
addition to the challenges of the previous decade: The breakout of the “Arab 
Spring,” the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq which started in 2009 
and finished in 2011, as well as the power shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean 
with the closer cooperation between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. According to 
the theoretical framework all of these contributed to changing the regional and 
international power relations and, by extension, to external threat perceptions 
and economic interdependence. Therefore, all three external developments had 
an impact on TFP. And though the framework does not allow for a hierarchy in 
terms of the significance of power related factors, the American withdrawal 
from Iraq is seen in conjunction with the Arab Uprisings as the primary 
systemic factors, mainly drawing upon the significance it has been given to 
these events in existing literature as laid out below. 
The completion of the American withdrawal from Iraq was a result of 
changes in the international system that the very invasion of Iraq in 2003 
brought about, namely the weakening of US influence, while it had its own 
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ramifications for the region. On the other hand, the “Arab Spring” which 
former FM Ahmet Davutoğlu named as the third “geopolitical earthquake” of 
the post-Cold War era,525 expressed a bottom-up challenge to the region; it had 
significant geopolitical effects, and reflected the realities of a shifting 
international system as well. Lastly, the discovery of large Israeli and Cypriot 
reserves of natural gas, as well as the cooperation between these countries and 
Greece because of that, provided a dynamic of increased relative power to each 
one of them separately and to all of them as a whole – i.e. as a strategic triangle. 
 
International and Regional Power Changes 
 
As a result of the war in Iraq, 2003 (and Afghanistan, 2001), US foreign 
policy and world influence followed a declining trajectory. In turn, its military 
withdrawal from the country essentially left a massive power vacuum which 
competing regional powers, like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, struggled to fill 
– Iran made the most of the advances.526 This gave rise to an indirect 
confrontation of ideological and sectarian character between those powers, 
namely, a Sunni-Shia rivalry.527 This tendency was further exacerbated by the 
“Arab Spring,” since moderate Islamist movements and political parties were 
empowered by the uprisings and their outcomes.528 
                                                          
525 Davutoğlu, "Address by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the 2nd Annual 
Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Istanbul". 
526 Ayoob, "The Arab Spring," 89-90. Also, Turkish academic no. 2. Conversation with the author, 
Istanbul, 13 October 2012.  
527 CHP Parliamentary Assistant Kıvanç Özcan. Interview with the author, Ankara, 24 September 2013. 
528 Katerina Dalacoura, "The Arab Uprisings Two Years On: Ideology, Sectarianism and the Changing 
Balance of Power in the Middle East," Insight Turkey 15, no. 1 (2013): 83. 
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Important powers like Turkey and Iran have been both favoured and 
challenged by this development which ultimately affected the regional balance 
of power. Iran read the uprisings as the re-Islamisation of the region and tried 
to capitalize on their ideological impetus for geopolitical benefits and the 
exportation of its own theocratic revolution. Turkey saw the rise of Sunni pro-
Islamic political parties, which were close to its own image, and imagined 
greater cooperation, better regional relations and potentially even more 
influence over the new governments through the promotion of its own model of 
democracy and political system.529 
In this instance, this thesis would agree with Mohammed Ayoob that, the 
regional balance of power has been concentrated in the Turkish and Iranian 
centres primarily, although Turkey’s “sphere of interest” is mostly in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Iran’s in the Gulf.530 Saudi Arabia and Israel remain 
important but with less influence while Egypt, the most important Arab state, is 
on the rise,531 albeit with significant domestic problems that undermine its 
overall relative international power.532 
                                                          
529 Ayoob, "The Arab Spring," 91-93. For a discussion about the Turkish Model, see, Ömer Taşpınar, "The 
Turkish Model and its Applicability," in Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign 
Policy From a Transatlantic Perspective, ed. Natalie Tocci, et al. (Washington: The German Marshal Fund 
of the United States, 2011), 9-13. 
530 Ayoob, "The Arab Spring," 94. 
531 Saudi Arabia has also had an important regional role which is, however, beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Moreover, it is important that Hamas, formerly a close ally of the Iran-Syria axis, changed its 
position and left Syria, in 2012, for Egypt and Qatar, due to the unrest in the country, thus contributing 
to the changing regional power relations. In this sense there is both a pragmatic and ideological element 
in its decision since the change came after the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is worth 
mentioning that Hamas still enjoys Iranian support and that its future outlook might largely depend on 
the relations between Egypt and Iran. "Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar,"  
BBC(28/02/2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278; Dalacoura, "The Arab 
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The civil war in Syria, as a product of the “Arab Spring,” played an 
important role in this power shift since Syria was part of the Turkey-Syria-Iran 
geopolitical triangle. It thus brought Turkish and Iranian interests at odds, at 
least to some extent, for Turkey followed a largely pro-Western policy towards 
the Syrian civil war while Iran maintained an anti-Western stance, supported by 
Russia and China.533 
It is argued here that, this last point also shows how global dynamics 
manifest at the regional level. The interrelationship between the regional and 
global level in balance-of-power or balance-of-threat terms was highlighted by 
Walt; observation that this thesis subscribes to. He specifically showed how the 
balancing of power and threats is still a major concern among states of the 
Middle East. At the same time he argued that regional states used foreign help – 
notably by the superpowers of the system – to deal with regional problems. 
Moreover, Walt made the case that great powers see regional issues through the 
lens of their own rivalry with other great powers (see the example of Cold War 
and US vs. USSR in the Middle East).534 Thus the regional and global levels are 
interconnected. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Uprisings Two Years On: Ideology, Sectarianism and the Changing Balance of Power in the Middle East," 
86.  
532 Marwa Hussein, "Egypt's Next Government Faces Major Economic Challenges,"  Ahram 
Online(04/07/2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/75742/Business/Economy/Egypts-
next-government-faces-major-economic-challe.aspx. 
533 Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; Academic Dr. 
Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Oktay 
Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 June 2013; Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Ali Engin Oba. Interview 
with the author, Ankara, 12 June 2013; USAK researcher Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the 
author, Ankara, 25 September 2013; Academic Dr. Ahmet Sözen. Interview with the author, Famagusta, 
Cyprus, 26 December 2013. See also, Kabalan, "Syria-Turkish Relations," 35-36. 
534 Walt, The Origins of Alliances: 269-73. 
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In this case, the US retreat from the Middle East, with the withdrawal 
from Iraq, the US taking the back seat in the Libya operations of NATO, and the 
inability to adopt a decisive approach to the Syrian crisis, arguably present a 
gradual decline in the US ability to exert its power globally, like in the past, as 
well as the rise of new actors535 on an inter-regional or global scale (e.g. Russia 
and China).536  
Fareed Zakaria’s take on this dynamic is that rising powers should no 
longer be seen as having to choose between integrating into or rejecting the 
Western order. On the contrary, he argues, rising powers today seem to be 
“entering the Western order but doing so on their own terms – thus reshaping 
the system itself.”537 Although Zakaria refers mostly to greater powers like the 
BRICS538 countries, Turkey has its own place in this framework as a rising 
                                                          
535 Within this framework one could talk about other actors as well, such as the Arab League or the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, which have indeed acquired some prominence in the midst of the Arab Uprisings. 
Specifically, the Arab League played a role when it asked the United Nations Security Council to impose 
a no-fly zone over Libya, or when it openly – yet symbolically – opposed Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 
Syria by handing Syria’s seat in the League to the Syrian rebels. However, despite their improved role, 
this thesis does not see these actors as having a substantial impact on regional or international politics 
and, therefore, they are not taken into account when looking at Turkish foreign policy towards Syria and 
Israel. The thesis is more concerned with inter-state relations, not the relations within organizations or 
between states and organizations. See for example, Ethan Bronner and David E. Sanger, "Arab League 
Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya,"  The New York Times(12/03/2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/middleeast/13libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; "Arab 
League hands Syrian seat to rebels,"  CBCNews(24/03/2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/arab-
league-hands-syrian-seat-to-rebels-1.1389660. 
536 Various scholars have made similar cases for the decentralization and regionalisation of the 
international system which is accompanied by the rise of regional powers and the increasing need to 
focus on the regional level. See, Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers; Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey: A 
Regional Power Facing a Changing International System," Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013): 637-60. 
537 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest  (London: Penguin Books, 2011, 
Release 2.0). 38. 
538 BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. 
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regional power with supra-regional potential.539 To be sure, the argument that 
US international power is declining is neither definitively proven nor easily 
accepted, not least because US power cannot be defined or debated in such a 
narrow way; there is a great debate about that and the changing nature of the 
international system which includes factors such as the economy, security, as 
well as cultural and hegemonic influence.540 
For example Vali Nasr, formerly a Senior Adviser to US Ambassador 
Richard Holbrooke under Obama, wrote that he does not believe that the US is 
declining. However he does note the failure of the US to understand global 
geopolitical changes, especially the rise of China and the fact that their 
competition will be played out not only in the Pacific but in the Middle East as 
well.541 In this context, Nasr argues that Turkey’s re-engagement with the 
Middle East was welcomed in Washington and that the US “should thank 
Europe for that.” Yet at the same time he says that “There is still reason to 
doubt that Turkey could or would serve as anchor for American policy;” a fact 
which demonstrates Turkey’s gradual tendency towards more autonomy.542 
                                                          
539 Gökhan Bacık makes a similar argument. See, Gökhan Bacık, "Turkey and the BRICS: Can Turkey Join 
BRICS?," Turkish Studies 15, no. 4 (2013): 758-73. 
540 The thesis does not deal with the complexity of the debate about power here. It is more interested in 
the material aspect of power and its projection. For more on this debate see, Gideon Rachman, Zero-
Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Thomas L. 
Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World it 
Invented and How We Can Come Back  (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Edward Luce, Time 
to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent  (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012); Robert J. 
Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Barry Buzan, "A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism," International Relations 25, 
no. 1 (2011); Layne, "The Unipoar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise." 
541 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat  (New York: Doubleday, 2013). 
251, 3. 
542 Ibid., 196-98. 
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Taking the above into account, it can be seen how the changes in the 
global balance of power increased the importance of the regional level and the 
regional balance of power, thus emphasising the changing role of regional 
actors, like Turkey, both for greater powers and the region itself. At the same 
time, the empowerment of such actors and their need to address their problems 
by themselves in absence of outside support or influence can also be seen. As 
such, the power changes on both the regional and the international levels have 
influenced the conduct of TFP not least through their impact on the country’s 
international threat perceptions and economic interdependencies, as observed 
below.  
 
External Threat Perceptions 
 
The implications of the systemic changes after 2011, as described above, 
for Turkey’s international threat perceptions were numerous. Turkish-Syrian 
relations moved again from amity to enmity partly due to the fact that Syria,543 
as well as the role of its civil war in the exacerbation of the Kurdish issue, was 
seen as a security threat. Turkey’s efforts to maintain a pro-democracy image 
also played a role in this change; in the words of Davutoğlu: “As the region was 
undergoing such a political earthquake, we aspired to position ourselves on the 
right side of the history and decided to make our humble contribution to this 
epic democratic struggle.”544 
                                                          
543 Hinnebusch, "The Study of Turkey-Syria Relations," 2-3. 
544 Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," 8. 
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At the same time, Tehran no longer held the position of Turkey’s close ally 
since Ankara’s Syria policy had become worrying for Iran. Yet the Kurdish 
issue remains central in the evolution of Turkey’s stance. As the crisis in Syria 
escalated, the possibilities for the dismemberment of the country increased and 
the creation of a Syrian Kurdistan had gradually become far from 
implausible.545 This in turn created fears in Turkey that the PKK would expand 
its territories, on the one hand, and that Turkey’s Kurdish minority would be 
encouraged to pursue similar demands for autonomy, on the other.546 From that 
perspective, there emerged the need to manage the Syrian crisis, topple the 
Bashar al-Assad regime as well as seek support from the West. 
In Iraq, a Sunni-Shia domestic confrontation, in 2012, led to a deterioration 
in the relations between Turkey and Iraq547 – the government of which was 
predominantly Shia and backed by Iran. This development, coupled with 
allegations about Iran-Iraq cooperation to smuggle weapons and personnel into 
Syria, increased Turkey’s threat perceptions towards Iraq and Iran.548 Contrary 
                                                          
545 The declaration of an autonomous government in one of the three cantons of Syrian Kurdistan came 
in early 2014 and was deemed by many as a game changer and a significant systemic development for 
the region. See, Namo Abdulla, "The Rise of Syria's Kurds,"  Al Jazeera(23/01/2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/rise-syria-kurds-201412353941189707.html. 
546 Othman Ali, "Western Kurdish autonomous region in Syria: the PKK's last card,"  Today's Zaman 
(30/06/2012), http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=288130. 
547 Sinem Cengiz, "Hashemi seeks Turkish support against Maliki’s Shiite dominance in Iraq,"  Today's 
Zaman (10/04/2012), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-277033-hashemi-seeks-turkish-support-
against-malikis-shiite-dominance-in-iraq.html; "Turkey refuses to extradite Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-
Hashemi,"  BBC(09/05/2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18009408. 
548 Louis Charbonneau, "Exclusive: Western report - Iran ships arms, personnel to Syria via Iraq,"  Reuters 
(19/09/2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/us-syria-crisis-iran-iraq-
idUSBRE88I17B20120919. It must be noted that the Iraqi PM, Nouri al-Maliki, dismissed those charges. 
See, "Maliki denies Iran uses Iraq airspace to send arms to Syria,"  Kurdpress (20/11/2013), 
http://kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=5953#Title=%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09%09
Maliki. 
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to Ankara-Baghdad relations, Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) of Northern Iraq (or Kurdistan) improved significantly thus 
alleviating the Iraqi Kurdish threat that influenced much of Turkey’s Middle 
East policies in the early 2000s.549 This also meant that Ankara developed a 
more positive outlook regarding the Kurds abroad as well as the US, which 
Turkey blamed for the instability in Iraq. 
Ankara’s change of heart was primarily a product of regional changes.  In 
the face of broken relations with Syria, increasingly problematic relations with 
Iran and a crisis between Baghdad and Ankara, left Turkey looking for a 
regional pole of stability which could also respond to the country’s energy and 
economic needs.550 Iraqi Kurdistan was that pole and its cooperation with 
Turkey grew to include many sectors with energy exports to Turkey being the 
most important.551 Although Iraq is beyond the scope of this analysis, it should 
be also noted that Turkey’s approach to the Kurds of Iraq was favoured by 
electoral considerations and by its ideology which, as mentioned before, 
transcends national identities and therefore perceives Kurds as less threatening 
to Turkey’s national homogeneity than in the past; especially in light of the 
                                                          
549 The rift that had developed between Ankara and Baghdad as well as between Baghdad and Erbil 
(Kurdistan), mainly over the management of Kurdistan’s oil, was instrumental in this rapprochement. 
See, Çağaptay and Evans, "Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq: Kurdistan Up, Baghdad Down." Also, 
academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013. 
550 Gallia Lindenstrauss and Furkan Aksoy, "Turkey and Northern Iraq: Tightening Relations in a Volatile 
Environment," Strategic Assesment 15, no. 3 (2012): 49-58. 
551 Dorian Jones, "Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan Seal 50-Year Energy Deal,"  Voice of America(05/06/2014), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-iraqi-kurdistan-seal-50-year-energy-deal/1930721.html. 
241 
 
economic, energy and security benefits that would occur from a Turkey-
Kurdistan cooperation.552 
As regards Israel, Turkey adopted an even more hostile stance than 
during the 2010 “Mavi Marmara” crisis, when the results of the Palmer report 
on the Gaza flotilla incident favoured Israel, at least in Ankara’s opinion.553 It 
was then that Turkey further downgraded its diplomatic and military ties with 
Israel, expelled the Israeli ambassador as well as threatened with sanctions and 
increasing naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.554 Later, in 2012, the 
tension between the two countries was further exacerbated when a Turkish 
                                                          
552 See also, Nikos Moudouros, "Initiatives for Solving the Kurdish Question: A Contradiction or 'an 
Ideological Conistency' of AKP," Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey) 2, no. 7 
(September, 2013); "Erdogan committed to solving Kurd crisis through ‘Islam’,"  Arab 
News(22/03/2013), http://www.arabnews.com/news/445581. Turkey’s unprecedented openness to 
Iraq’s Kurds under the AKP became evident once more in a public encounter between Turkish PM 
Erdoğan and Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani in late 2013 in Turkey’s Kurdish-dominated district 
Diyarbakir, when Erdoğan became the first leader in Turkey’s history to utter the word “Kurdistan”. To 
be sure, Erdoğan’s approach did not entail support for the autonomy of the Kurds in Turkey or 
elsewhere (i.e. Kurdistan, Syria, Iran) as Barzani himself had at the time criticized the Syrian Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party for seeking the establishment of an “autonomous administration” in Syria. It 
has, however, argued widely that Turkey’s support for Iraqi Kurdistan is also part of the AKP’s peace 
process with Turkey’s Kurds; a process which would also bring the Kurdish opposition closer to the 
government and also support its efforts for a new constitution in the Grand National Assembly. See, 
Cengız Çandar, "Erdogan-Barzani 'Diyarbakir encounter' milestone,"  Al-Monitor (20/11/2013), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/erdogan-barzani-kurdistan-diyarbakir-political-
decision.html#; Michael M. Gunter, "Turkey: The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution," Middle 
East Policy XIX, no. 2 (2012): 123-24; Kadri Gursel, "Erdogan Seeks Kurdish Allies for New Turkish 
Constitution,"  Al-Monitor (13/02/2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2013/02/kurds-
turkish-constitution-akp-chp-mhp-factions.html##ixzz3DkU5Sq6K; Yerevan Saeed, "Kurdish Question 
Litmus Test for Turkey's New Government, Experts Say,"  Rudaw (08/09/2014), 
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/08092014. 
553 Geoffrey Palmer et al., "Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 
Flotilla Incident " (United Nations, 2011). 
554 Today's Zaman, "PM: Turkey to impose more sanctions on Israel, boost presence in east Med," 
(2011), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-255903-pm-turkey-to-impose-more-sanctions-on-israel-
boost-presence-in-east-med.html; Arsu, "Amid Tensions With Israel, Turkey Threatens Increased Naval 
Presence." 
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court indicted four Israeli military leaders for their involvement in the “Gaza 
flotilla” raid.555 
As such, the already existing problems of Turkey and Israel worsened 
amidst the greater regional instability. In the meanwhile, Israel after the 2010 
crisis with Turkey initiated closer diplomatic, energy and military cooperation 
(some called it an “axis”)556 with Cyprus and Greece which was based on their 
shared energy interests. This had a salient impact on the balance of power since 
Greece, Cyprus and Israel were forming a strategic triangle that was also 
balancing against a perceived mutual threat to their efforts to exploit their 
energy resources. In this sense, Israel had also become a threat to Turkey and its 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of course, this reason was not primary 
in the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, but it contributed to the existing 
problematique which, as explained, stemmed mainly from systemic realities 
such as incompatible geopolitical goals, on the one hand, and ideological 
differences, on the other, and, by extension, mistrust.557 
                                                          
555 Isabel Kershner, "Turkish Court Indicts 4 Israeli Military Leaders,"  The New York Times(28/05/2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/middleeast/turkish-court-indicts-4-israeli-military-
leaders.html?_r=0. 
556 Daniela Huber and Nathalie Tocci, "Behind the Scenes of the Turkish-Israeli Breakthrough," Istituto 
Affari Internazionali IAI Working Papers, no. 1315 (2013): 7. 
557 President of Strategy International Dr. Marios Efthymiopoulos. Interview with the author, Nicosia, 
Cyprus, 26 January 2013; academic Dr. Louis Fishman. Skype interview with the author, 09 January 2014; 
Academic Dr. Ahmet Sözen. Interview with the author, Famagusta, Cyprus, 26 December 2013. See, 
Berna Uzun, "Turkish-Israeli Relations in the Shadow of AKP Populism ",  Tel Aviv Notes (24/12/2009), 
http://www.tau.ac.il/dayancenter/Turkish-Israeli_%20relations.pdf; Lale Kemal, "Turkish-Israeli Rift and 
US arms Trade,"  Al Arabiya (17/03/2011), http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/03/17/141948.html; 
Lale Kemal, "Turkish-Israeli Mistrust Deepens,"  Today's Zaman (25/03/2011), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail.action;jsessionid=+JO70z5qqvxUwf-
IHl2m6MA8?newsId=238223&columnistId=0; Yigal Schleifer, "Turkey: Two Years After Flotilla Incident, 
Relations with Israel Still Sinking,"  EurasiaNet.org (31/03/2012), 
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As noted in the previous chapter, the “Arab Spring” should have brought 
Turkey and Israel closer together as it did with Turkey and the US. One could 
argue that they should have balanced against their common threats in the 
“new” Middle East and specifically Syria – the Syrian threat was largely what 
led to the formation of their alliance in 1996. However, the complexity of TFP 
and the regional geopolitics made things more complicated. In addition to the 
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, as far as the system level is concerned, 
two factors could explain why Turkey became more confrontational towards 
Israel. Firstly, the changes taking place in the Arab world and Turkey’s need to 
maintain a pro-Palestinian and, therefore, pro-Arab image. Secondly, Turkey’s 
worsening relations with Iran after the breakout of the Syrian crisis and the fact 
that Turkey did not want to challenge them any further.558  
 
International Economic Interdependence 
 
During the “Arab Spring,” not only did the insecurities of the post-Iraq 
war period return in Turkey but also its whole foreign policy doctrine seemed 
to be on the verge of collapse, mainly because there was uncertainty about what 
would follow the transition periods in the countries that experienced the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65477; Melkulangara K. Bhadrakumar, "Israel Catches Turkey in Two 
Minds,"  Asia Times (27/07/2012), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NG27Ak01.html. 
558 As noted repeatedly, it occurs both from the literature and the interviews that Turkish-Iranian 
relations were largely based on Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria while they were partly favoured by 
the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. In that sense, a significant improvement in Turkish-Israeli 
relations could have had a negative impact on Turkish-Iranian relations. Given Turkey’s heavy 
dependency on Iranian exports (especially oil and natural gas), its insecurities about how Iran could fuel 
the Kurdish problem, should the two countries find themselves in friction, as well as the hostility 
between Iran and Israel, it is easy to comprehend why Ankara would want to keep a relative distance 
from Israel. 
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revolts; countries with which Turkey under the AKP had developed very good 
economic and diplomatic relations. In addition to the analysed booming 
economic relations of Turkey with Syria and Iran, Turkey’s overall exports to 
the Middle East (the Levant and the Gulf) increased from 4.8 billion USD in 
2003 to 38.6 billion USD in 2012 while the volume of its regional bilateral trade 
went from 9.5 billion USD in 2003 to 65 billion USD in 2012 – there is a similar 
trend in the country’s imports from the region.559   
In a nutshell, it is clear that both insecurities and economic relations 
affected Turkey’s policy towards the region both prior and after the “Arab 
Spring.” Turkey’s pragmatism could be seen in its initial hesitation to 
immediately cut off highly beneficial ties such as its relations with Syria and 
Libya. Yet once Turkey felt compelled to take the side of the protesters and 
support change, mainly due to security concerns such as the Kurdish issue as 
well as because it wanted to maintain its positive image vis-à-vis the Arab 
world, it decided to take the risk; its threat perceptions changed and then its 
economic interdependencies had to be reconfigured. 
In Libya for example, where Turkey initially opposed a no-fly zone and a 
NATO intervention, more than 25,000 Turkish workers were employed, tens of 
billions of dollars were invested in projects, and the bilateral trade between the 
two countries almost reached 2.4 billion USD in 2010.560 With the outbreak of 
                                                          
559 "Middle East Regional Information,"  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy(July, 2013), 
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&region=4. 
560 "Turkey's Oppostion to Military Intervention in Libya,"  in Terrorism Monitor (The Jamestown 
Foundation, March 17, 2011), 2; Turkish Republic, "Turkey-Libya Economic and Trade Relations," (2011), 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-libya.en.mfa. 
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the Libyan civil war Turkey’s exports to the country went from 1.9 million USD 
in 2010 to 747, 000 USD in 2011 and increased to 2.14 million USD in 2012.561 It 
is worth remembering that after the end of the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya, Turkey granted, among other things, financial help to these countries in 
the form of loans: 250 million USD to Libya, one billion USD to Egypt, and 500 
million USD to Tunisia (one hundred million USD of which was given in the 
form of donation).562 Thereby Turkey got back on track with its regional 
economic relations and acquired the advantageous role of the political advisor 
to those countries. 
Importantly, even before providing loans and financial help, Ankara tried 
to gain indirect influence into these countries through multileveled social and 
political processes. In Kardaş’s words,  
 
Turkish leaders, officials, academics, or representatives from NGOs 
or think-tanks have been frequently touring those countries, and at 
the same time, many delegations from the Arab world have been 
visiting Turkey. President Abdullah Gül’s visit soon after Mubarak’s 
fall and Erdoğan’s Arab Spring tour, on one hand, and Turkey’s 
hosting of the leaders of the Egyptian youth movement, on the other, 
are illustrative examples of this multi-level interaction. 
 
                                                          
561 Data gathered from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), http://www.turkstat.gov.tr. 
562 ""New Tunisia" expects Turkish investments,"  Anadolu Agency(28/12/2012), 
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/headline/115135--new-tunisia-to-open-new-horizons-for-new-investments-
of-turkish-brethren; "Egypt signs $1 billion Turkish loan deal,"  Reuters (20/09/2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/30/us-egypt-turkey-loan-idUSBRE88T0G920120930; 
"Eximbank to extend $750 mln in loans to Tunisia, Libya,"  Today's Zaman (24/01/2012), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-269465-eximbank-to-extend-750-mln-in-loans-to-tunisia-
libya.html. 
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Moreover, Kardaş notes, “What is clear in this interaction is the mutual interest 
in sharing and learning the Turkish, or AK Party, experience. Almost no week 
goes by without a conference or workshop on the subject, either in Istanbul, 
Ankara, Cairo, or Tunis.”563 This shows Turkey’s efforts not only to re-establish 
good relations with the new regimes, but to also acquire a model or guide role 
for these countries.  
In terms of the Syrian civil war, Turkey’s initial cautious stance was not 
only influenced by the fragile balance of power between Turkey and Iran or the 
Kurdish threat. Because their economic relations up to 2011 were excellent, 
Turkey knew that their disruption would cost too much. That proved to be the 
case. Notably, from January to December of 2011, the year that the civil war 
broke out, Turkey’s exports to Syria dropped from 108 to around 72 thousand 
USD. Indicative is also the fact that Turkey’s exports to Syria dropped from 1.8 
million USD in 2010 to 898 thousand USD in 2013.564 It is important that in the 
midst of the economic and security instability of the “Arab Spring,” Turkey 
increased its exports to the EU from 52 million USD in 2010 to 59 million USD 
in 2012. The same increase was noticed in Turkey’s exports to North American 
countries, from 4 million USD in 2010 to 6 million USD in 2012.565 
                                                          
563 Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Coming to Terms with Democracy Promotion?," The 
German Marshall Fund of the United States Policy Brief(2011): 3-4. Dr. Louis Fishman also made that 
point with specific regard to Egypt. Academic Dr. Louis Fishman. Phone interview with the author, 09 
January 2014 Also see, Azeem Ibrahim, "The Turkey Model: Does Turkey Offer a Model for Tunisia and 
Egypt?," Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (April, 2013); Oğuzhan Göksel, "Perceptions of the 
Turkish Model in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia," Turkish Studies (2014).  
564 Data gathered from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), http://www.turkstat.gov.tr. 
565 Ibid. 
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This shows a trend, at least in Turkey’s foreign economic orientation, 
which is characterised by a “return” to the West and echoes Bahadır Kaleağası 
of TÜSIAD who said that Turkey’s economic engagement of the Middle East 
was brief for it was unsustainable due to the political and social turmoil of the 
“Arab Spring.”566 To be sure, the general picture of Turkey’s regional economic 
relations has also been positive but, admittedly, the Middle East was of high 
risk for economic transactions and investments after 2011. 
In this instance, Turkey’s turn to the West at least in terms of its economic 
interdependencies, reflects the impact of the systemic changes of the “Arab 
Spring” which strained Ankara’s relationships with its immediate 
neighbourhood, as well as demonstrate a pragmatic foreign policy approach as 
opposed to a dogmatic ideological one. As such it can be argued that although 
the AKP elite ideology was important in filtering the systemic changes of the 
2000s and leading to closer relations with the Arab world, it did not hesitate to 
return – at least partly – to better economic relations with the West in the midst 
of regional problems. This conclusion contradicts other works that argue for a 
purely ideological TFP, or a fully regionalised TFP in realist terms.567 Yet it does 
not confirm other works that argue for Turkey’s everlasting – if partial – 
commitment to the West,568 as it is seems that, at least in economic terms, 
                                                          
566 International Coordinator and EU Representative, TÜSİAD, Brussels Branch, Dr. Bahadır Kaleağasi. 
Phone interview with the author, 03 October 2013.  
567 See for example, Cornell, "What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?."; Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of 
Turkey’s Foreign Policy." 
568 Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization; Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign 
Policy."; Aras, "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy." 
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Turkey is rather opportunistic and this seems to be mainly because of the 
largely independent role of business interests. 
 
Independent Variables and the AKP’s Middle East Foreign Policy  
 
As repeatedly underlined thus far, the system level variables in question, 
which relate to power changes, threat perceptions, and economic 
interdependency, have an independent impact on TFP behaviour. Moreover, 
the variable that refers to international power changes is primary and, as seen, 
holds the main role in affecting TFP through its impact on the other 
independent variables. Within this framework it has been seen how changes in 
the relative international power of global and regional actors have affected the 
balance of power and, in turn, Turkish security threat perceptions and 
economic interdependencies. This led Turkey to a particular foreign policy 
behaviour that is characterised by two main, and at times contradicting, trends: 
An effort to rebuild its security, economic and diplomatic relations with the 
region; and, a policy of gradual and partial “return” to the West. In terms of the 
latter, apart from the economic evidence already provided, there is also the 
example of Turkey’s installation of a NATO anti-ballistic warning radar system 
in its territories, early in 2012, which upset Iran as well as Russia.569 
Despite this pro-Western attitude, Turkey continued to pursue good 
relations with the region and other actors. Somewhat paradoxically, Turkish-
                                                          
569 The decision was taken in 2010 which also indicates that ties with the West and specifically NATO 
were still favoured over regional issues (e.g. ties with Iran) at least in certain policy sectors such as 
defence. Serkan Demirtaş, "NATO radar system in Turkey up, running,"  Hürriyet Daily 
News(14/01/2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/nato-radar-system-in-turkey-up-
running.aspx?pageID=238&nID=11474&NewsCatID=338. 
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Israeli relations remained in a bad state apart from the economic aspect, whilst 
PM Erdoğan threatened that Turkey would choose to enter the Shanghai 
Cooperation Council – a non-Western organization – instead of the EU.570 Thus, 
it can be suggested that Turkey, faced with a host of insecurities and threats, 
found itself having to rely more on its traditional Western partners, not least 
because it realised its limited capabilities.571 Although some of these changes in 
TFP after the breakout of the “Arab Spring” could be explained, some others 
remain contradictory. To the end of explaining these contradictions with regard 
to the region, more specifically Israel and Syria and, by implication, Turkey-
West (i.e. the US and EU) relations, the next point of analysis is the role of AKP 
elite ideology and domestic interest groups as intervening variables to external 
pressures and developments.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
570 "Erdoğan: Turkey considers Shanghai organization an alternative to EU,"  Today's Zaman 
(25/01/2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-305166-erdogan-turkey-considers-shanghai-
organization-an-alternative-to-eu.html. Even worse, Ankara, in 2013, also decided to cooperate with 
China for the development of an anti-missile system that would also be incompatible with similar NATO 
systems. Serkan Demirtas, "US further presses Turkey over Chinese missile bid,"  Hürriyet Daily 
News(20/12/2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-further-presses-turkey-over-chinese-missile-
bid.aspx?pageID=238&nid=59868. 
571 Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; USAK researcher 
Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013; Chairman of the 
Scientific Committee at International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) Dr. İhsan Bal. Interview 
with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. See also, Osman Bahadır Dinçer and Mustafa Kutlay, 
Turkey's Power Capacity in the Middle East. Limits of the Possible: An Empirical Analysis  (Ankara: USAK, 
June, 2012). e.g. 25. 
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7.2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Syria and Intervening 
Variables 
 
Here, the examination of AKP elite ideology and domestic interest groups vis-à-
vis the case of Syria focuses on the way in which domestic dynamics filtered the 
geopolitical changes of the “Arab Spring,” particularly the Syrian civil war, and 
resulted in Turkey’s change of stance towards Syria. As well, the intervening 
variables shed light on what prevented Turkey from entering a war with Syria. 
The variable of ideology is looked at first and then the domestic interest groups. 
In this case it is seen how ideology – that is, the particular way in which the 
AKP elites see and respond to external, systemic, developments – became 
relatively marginalized by more pragmatic considerations as expressed by 
domestic interest groups. 
 
AKP Elite Ideology 
 
In terms of the geopolitically crucial case of the Syrian crisis the FM, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated in 2011: “We hope that a military intervention will 
never be necessary… However, the Syrian regime has to find a way of making 
peace with its own people to eliminate this option. If the oppression continues, 
Turkey is ready for any scenario.”572 Later, in 2012, when the crisis escalated 
significantly, he said that “A new Middle East is emerging and we will 
                                                          
572 "Turkey ready for 'any scenario' in Syria,"  Al Jazeera(29/11/2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/20111129134450458118.html. 
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continue to lead this. Turkey will pioneer this order of peace… The 74 million 
Turkish people are with the Syrian people and will continue to be.”573 
Generally, after the summer of 2011, when Turkey called on Assad to step 
down, Ankara stepped up its efforts for regime change and the 
internationalisation of the crisis; that is, the involvement of other actors in the 
management of the Syrian civil war.574 It is clear that Ankara sided with the 
Western powers on Syria and that it gradually changed its rhetoric. However 
AKP elites, just like FM Davutoğlu, made a clear distinction between the 
regime and the Syrian people.575 At the same time, according to Davutoğlu’s 
sayings, it was also clear that Turkey wanted to maintain the image of the 
                                                          
573 "FM Defends Syria Policy, Says Turkey to Lead ‘Wave of Change’ in Mideast,"  Today's Zaman 
(26/04/2012), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-278650-fm-defends-syria-policy-says-turkey-to-
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574 Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; academic Dr. 
Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013. Also, Marc Champion, "Turkey 
Threatens Syria with Sanctions,"  The Wall Street Journal (25/11/2011), 
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575 "Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 'A brighter future is awaiting the Syrian people. Turkey stands with them 
in this journey',"  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (22/01/2013), 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-_a-brighter-future-is-awaiting-the-syrian-people_-
turkey-stands-with-them-in-this-journey.en.mfa; "Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 'We will stand by the 
Syrian people until they live with honor in all around Syria',"  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs(09/07/2013), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-we-will-stand-by-the-syrian-
people-until-they-live-with-honor-in-all-around-syria.en.mfa; "Turkish FM Davutoğlu chants slogan in 
Arabic with Syrian refugees,"  Hürriyet Daily News(11/07/2013), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-fm-davutoglu-chants-slogan-in-arabic-with-syrian-
refugees.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50495&NewsCatID=338; "Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 'Turkey, as 
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powerful regional and autonomous country which would take the lead in any 
kind of change.576 
This public attitude of the government was different than the reality on 
the ground, given its reliance on the West, but it corresponded to older 
statements of the Foreign Minister such as one from 2009: “As in the sixteenth 
century, when the Ottoman Balkans were rising, we will once again make the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, together with Turkey, the centre of 
world politics in the future. That is the goal of Turkish foreign policy and we 
will achieve it.”577 Therefore a more assertive foreign policy orientation can be 
identified, at least on a rhetoric level, informed by the Ottoman past, political 
Islamic notions, and paralleled by the projection of the country’s perceived 
capabilities and aspirations rather than its limitations. 
Given the systemic change that the “Arab Spring” itself constitutes, 
Turkey had to be very cautious and try to make the best out of a bad and 
unexpected situation. Although it was unfortunate for the AKP elites that 
Turkey was losing its traditional economic partners in the region, they already 
knew that Arabs looked up to Turkey and its socio-political system. According 
to a 2009 TESEV survey which was conducted in seven Arab countries, 63 
percent of the interviewees saw Turkey’s political system as a successful 
                                                          
576 "FM Defends Syria Policy, Says Turkey to Lead ‘Wave of Change’ in Mideast". 
577 Quoted in, Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby, "Erdoğan’s Grand Vision: Rise and Decline,"  World 
Affairs(March/April 2013), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/erdogan%E2%80%99s-grand-
vision-rise-and-decline. 
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synthesis of Islam and Democracy.578 Turkey tried to capitalise on its popularity 
in the region and to create friendly bonds with the newly elected governments 
anew. After all, as seen in the previous chapter, the Middle East and its peoples 
are perceived by the AKP elites as a geo-cultural space of the former Ottoman 
Empire and, thus, as a geo-cultural sphere of influence of Turkey. In this 
context, also important are Ankara’s efforts to acquire legitimisation for its 
gradually harsher stance towards the Assad regime. For example, the fact that 
its announcement of joining “any economic sanctions that the Arab League 
decides to impose on Syria, should Damascus fail to accept the League's 
proposal to accept international observers,” is indicative of that tendency.579 
In this light, in order for Turkey to be able to change its stance towards 
Syria, it had to separate the Syrian people – “Turkey’s brothers” – from the 
Syrian regime – which went astray; and so it did. In parallel, AKP elites had to 
contextualise this stance within the broader framework of Turkey’s support for 
democracy in the countries of the “Arab Spring;” as they also did. Thus the 
AKP ideology played an important role in filtering the regional systemic 
pressures and shaping the outcome of TFP towards Syria. That was mainly 
displayed in Turkey’s effort to appear as the supporter of the Arab people and 
particularly the Syrian “brothers”. 
                                                          
578 Mensur Akgün, Perçinoğlu Gökçe, and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the 
Middle East  (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010, 2nd Edition). 18-21. It is worth mentioning that 
Turkey’s regional popularity has gradually declined since then; see, Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel 
Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012  (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012). 
579 Champion, "Turkey Threatens Syria with Sanctions". 
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Moreover, if one looks at Turkey’s Syria policy in conjunction with its 
stance towards the 2013 Egyptian coup where it bluntly supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood against the Egyptian military,580 or in conjunction with reports of 
Turkish support to Al Qaeda-related groups operating in Syria, then it becomes 
clear that Turkey’s post-“Arab Spring” policies maintain an ideological 
character which also corresponds to the Sunni-Shia division that we have seen 
emerging after the “Arab Spring.”581 Turkey’s close relationship with the 
transnational Islamic movement of the Muslim Brotherhood is also mentioned 
often – including the Egyptian and Syrian branches.582 Lastly, it seems that 
although the “Arab Spring” circumstances forced Turkey towards a pragmatic 
turn to the West, the AKP elite ideology did not cease to be ideologically 
charged in public. Yet what needs to be kept in mind here is that the AKP elite 
ideology did not prevail over other pragmatic interests or pressures, as also 
seen in the analysis of the next intervening variable.  
 
 
 
                                                          
580 Jonathon Burch, "Turkey's Erdogan slams world's 'double standards' on Egypt,"  Reuters 
(19/07/2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-egypt-protests-turkey-
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581 Nick Tattersall, "Al Qaeda's rise in northern Syria leaves Turkey in a dilemma,"  Reuters (17/10/2013), 
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582 Mohammad Abdel Kader, "Turkey's Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood,"  Al Arabiya Institute 
for Studies(14/10/2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-
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Domestic Interest Groups 
 
The second intervening variable for analysing Turkey’s domestic political 
scene is the role of domestic interest groups. As in the previous cases studies 
that have been examined, in looking at how domestic interest groups influence 
different kinds of policies, both economy related interest groups and groups 
that are either related to the military establishment in Turkey or support similar 
policies are examined – e.g. the republican/nationalist opposition. Further, 
public opinion also needs to be looked at as a factor that policy-makers have to 
take into account at least to some extent in democratic or semi-democratic 
political systems, while it often reflects domestic social and political 
fragmentation. Ultimately, elite responses to pressures from domestic interest 
groups reflect the prevalence of pragmatism not least because these groups, 
more often than not, express and react to external systemic developments. 
As demonstrated repeatedly thus far, economy plays an important role in 
Turkey’s foreign policy-making. In this context a good picture of the role of 
TÜSIAD and MÜSIAD can be drawn based on statements and reports of their 
position, as well as on some other related facts, with regard to the government’s 
Syria policy. It has been made clear that although the two associations claim 
good relations and cooperation between them,583 they have certain, if subtle, 
differences and political orientations: TÜSIAD represents what could be called 
“secular capital,” and has at times found itself at odds with the AKP 
                                                          
583 International Coordinator and EU Representative, TÜSİAD, Brussels Branch, Dr. Bahadır Kaleağasi. 
Phone interview with the author, 03 October 2013; TÜSİAD Brussels branch research associate. Phone 
interview with the author, 03 October 2013. Identity of the interviewee in possession of the author. 
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government; on the other hand, MÜSIAD represents what can be called 
“Islamic capital” and is more closely associated with the AKP.584 
Regarding the case in question, it has been reported that “prominent 
Syrian Turkish businessmen with ties to both the AKP and the [Syrian] Muslim 
Brotherhood,” including a member of MÜSIAD, may play an important role “in 
the next phase of Syrian-Turkish relations” as it is said that Turkey would 
favour a Sunni regime.585 Interplay between elite ideology and pro-government 
business interest can be seen here. This reflects both MÜSIAD’s business 
interests in Syria, its preference for conducting business in the region (unlike 
TÜSIAD that favours a balance between the Middle East and the West), its 
affinity with the AKP elite ideology and policies, as well as a reaffirmation of 
the claims regarding a pro-Sunni tendency in the AKP’s foreign policy.  
On another note, it is important that both associations have warned the 
government that Turkey is “not immune to economic crises” (TÜSIAD),586 and 
that it “should beware of risks that linger before maintaining sustainable 
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growth in the country's economy” (MÜSIAD).587 It is thus suggested that 
despite Turkey’s strong economy and high rates of growth there are still 
problems that need to be addressed and a degree of economic fragility. In terms 
of foreign policy-making this translates to a call for caution. Turkey is the host 
of hundreds of thousands of refugees and is faced with the PKK’s asymmetrical 
threat; an intervention or even an open war with the Syrian regime would 
probably be the worst thing that could happen to Turkey, not just in economic 
terms.588 
For its part, TÜSIAD, via its president, Muharrem Yılmaz, expressed its 
own concerns about Turkey’s management of the Syrian civil war. Yılmaz said, 
“When the Arab Spring began to affect Syria, Turkey made efforts to manage 
this process peacefully. But the civil war couldn’t be prevented. As the crisis 
gained new dimensions, the policy adopted proved to be ineffective and caused 
Turkey to be seen as one of the conflicting parties.” Yılmaz also called for a 
permanent solution without a military intervention in Syria and added: “We 
expect and hope that Turkish foreign policy will be managed in a way to 
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position our country as an agent in solution processes, and not in a 
confrontation, in line with its deep seated pacifist tradition.”589 
Although it has not been possible to directly identify the channels through 
which business elites influence TFP, it has been seen how MÜSIAD would be 
open to more involvement in the Syrian civil war, while, according to evidence, 
it might have increasing benefits from a future Turkey-led regime change in 
Syria. As such, these economic interests could be boosting the AKP’s harsh 
stance towards Syria. On the other hand, neither MÜSIAD nor TÜSIAD favours 
an intervention, international conflict, or regional instability. In their view that 
would have a great and negative impact on Turkey’s economy, on its external 
economic relations.590 Again, the extent to which these views had an impact on 
preventing Turkey from getting militarily and directly more involved in Syria 
are not clearly evident. But deducting from previous evidence about the 
importance the AKP has given to business elites and economic interests, the 
attendance of business conferences by AKP officials, and the fact that Turkey 
has in fact not intervened in Syria, it could be suggested that the economic and 
business interests at stake, at least as expressed by these organisations, have 
been considered by government calculations. 
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Moving to the Turkish main political opposition, a similar stance can be 
observed. The CHP has firmly opposed any intention of the AKP government 
to intervene in Syria. Specifically, CHP’s chairman, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, said 
that “The sovereign powers of the West are preparing the ground to get Turkey 
to enter into Syria for an armed conflict. If Turkey enters, getting out will be 
very difficult. I’m warning the government about this.”591 In a later occasion 
CHP’s Deputy Chairman, Osman Korutürk, characterised the AKP’s policy “a 
failure” and stated that “Turkey has turned into an interventionist country, 
meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbours, instigating war and taking 
part in regional conflicts.” With regard to the Syrian crisis he added that 
“Turkey has become an isolated country within the international community 
due to its Syria policy. It pretended to back Annan’s peace plan but has created 
a perception that it supports a military intervention in Syria.”592 
Importantly, CHP’s Deputy Chairman, Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, said that 
his party’s opposition, its “calls for peaceful solution” and its “concrete 
proposals to end the conflict” had a positive impact in preventing Turkey from 
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http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/14/turkey-qaeda-erdogan-assad/4471453/. 
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entering a full-scale war with Syria.593 Although it is difficult to verify whether 
the AKP has indeed been influenced by CHP, as CHP officials suggest, it has 
been frequently argued that domestic political pressure has made it difficult for 
AKP to convince the public opinion for its regime change goals in Syria.594 
Similarly, the MHP maintained the same stance towards the AKP’s Syria policy 
saying that “What is happening in Syria may pit Turkey against Iran 
eventually” and that the Arab Uprisings are exploited by the world powers for 
their own interest.595 On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish BDP, the political 
wing of the PKK, disagreed with the AKP’s policy towards Syria arguing that it 
was causing tense relations that could lead to war; it also opposed the 
government’s anti-Kurdish policies since most of its votes come from the south-
eastern Kurdish-majority provinces of Turkey.596 
The opposition’s stance demonstrates a clear domestic pressure against 
the AKP’s policies towards Syria. Although it cannot be argued that domestic 
political pressure has played a primary role in affecting the AKP’s Syria policy, 
it is argued that along with public opinion attitudes, as seen below, it has 
contributed to the general domestic sentiment which was against a more 
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aggressive stance towards Syria. Therefore, it is maintained that there is a 
significant correlation between the overall opposition to the AKP’s Syria policy 
and especially its impact on public opinion attitudes and the AKP’s decisions 
on Syria.597 
A similar sentiment regarding the AKP’s Syria policy is prevalent among 
the Kemalist military elites. Like the CHP, the traditional military establishment 
represents the Kemalist paradigm of TFP of status quo maintenance and non-
adventurism. This was reflected, among other occasions, when Turkey did not 
allow American troops to enter Iraq through its territories during the 2003 
invasion; the military played a key role in that decision. Similarly, in the case of 
Syria, the military would prefer to follow a policy of non-intervention especially 
at a time when the PKK attacks and the Kurdish problem within Turkey  
intensified.598 
Yet it has to be reminded, once again, that because of the more tense civil-
military relations since 2007/08 and the numerous imprisonments of military 
generals, there is significant consensus that the political power and decision-
making influence of the military has been reduced to a great extent – if not 
lost.599 The replacement of the Kemalist Generals with the appointment of 
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commanders loyal to the government actually led the armed forces to even 
support the AKP on Syria, and specifically the cutting of ties between Turkey 
and Syria.600 
No matter how important the economy, military, political elites and 
opposition are, as stated earlier policy-makers cannot neglect public opinion. In 
this light Turkey’s stance towards the Syrian crisis could be explained to a great 
extent once one looks at public opinion polls.601 A 2012 survey conducted by 
TNS on behalf of the Centre for Economy and Foreign Policy Researches 
(EDAM) showed that 56.2 percent of the respondents opposed an intervention 
in Syria while only 11.3 percent supported it. It is worth noting that 62.6 percent 
of the pro-BDP respondents opposed a military intervention in Syria while 42.1 
percent of the pro-MHP, 41.7 percent of the pro-CHP, and 39.9 percent of the 
pro-AKP respondents voted against an intervention in Syria.602 
This explains to some extent the stance of the government. That is, the 
AKP’s Syria policy did not even appeal to its electoral base which according to 
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the 2011 elections was close to 50 percent.603 That is not to say that the AKP 
always cares about public opinion attitudes in terms of domestic or foreign 
policy. Quite the contrary, for the AKP has frequently demonstrated a 
majoritarian approach over the past years.604 But the AKP’s majoritarianism 
would not work in this instance if not only the majority of public opinion but 
also a large percentage of its own conservative constituency opposed its 
policies. In that sense, as Christopher Phillips notes, “Syria could prove a 
serious vote-loser for the ruling party,” especially if taken into account that, in 
another poll, 67.1 percent of Turks viewed the steps taken by the government in 
relation to the Syrian conflict negatively.605  
Finally, another problem in terms of public opinion is the Kurdish issue 
and Turkey’s PKK policy which links to the BDP’s stance against the 
government as well. In other words the AKP’s disregard of and belligerent 
stance towards the Kurds of Syria – and of Turkey – exacerbate the negative 
perception of the AKP government among the public opinion of Turkish 
Kurds.606 The renewed efforts of the AKP to resolve the Kurdish issue in 2013 
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could be understood within this framework, although they are not limited to 
that.607 
Overall, there seems to be a correlation between the opposition of the 
public to a Turkish intervention in Syria – or the AKP’s threatening stance 
against the country – and the fact that Turkey has not carried out its threats 
against Syria. Although no AKP or government official has said so, this 
suggests that social and political opposition has been taken into account by the 
AKP in taking decisions regarding Syria, mainly because its policies were 
opposed across parties and political loyalties among the society. After all, that 
the AKP needed the greatest public support possible in order for its re-election 
to be possible in the next local and presidential elections of 2014 should not be 
disregarded. Thus, the Turkish government seems to become more sensitive to 
public opinion when elections are forthcoming, given that it is not always 
sensitive to public opinion. 
 
Intervening Variables and Turkey’s post-“Arab Spring” Syria Policy 
 
The analysis of the two domestic intervening variables highlighted three 
features with regard to Turkey’s Syria policy. First, it has been suggested that 
AKP elites have a certain ideology which, along with other factors, prevented 
them from being quick in turning against Syria. Once they did, they made sure 
to maintain a “politically correct” stance which distinguished the Assad regime 
                                                          
607 See, for example, Johanna Nykänen, "Identity, Narrative and Frames: Assessing Turkey’s Kurdish 
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from the “Syrian brothers” while they became openly more assertive and 
threatening in the context of their regional leadership and their responsibility 
towards their brotherly neighbours. That is partly because Syria is still part of 
the regional imagination of their worldview. This was also evident in Turkey’s 
broader Middle East – or better, Arab – policy after the “Arab Spring” during 
which it tried to gain the support of the Arab countries. 
Indeed, this particular worldview was one of the reasons Turkey 
eventually turned against Assad. That is, after the conflict reached a point 
where the Syrian regime seemed to be unable to reverse the situation or 
appease the rebels, Turkey found itself having to take sides. The only logical 
decision given the relationship it wanted to develop with the broader region 
was to support the opposition – as it did in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt – thus 
strengthening its image as a democracy-promoter and maintaining good 
relations with the new governments of post-“Arab Spring” countries. Turkey 
took this decision regardless of the further instability that it entailed especially 
with regards to the Kurdish issue and Syria’s expected support for the PKK 
against Turkey. At that point it was a “necessary evil.” Material and ideological 
relations with the region outmatched these challenges; and yet they had to be 
dealt with as Turkey was losing Syria and insecurities were intensifying. It was 
then that TFP took advantage of the situation, by trying to turn an unfortunate 
challenge into opportunity and adopted the revisionist foreign policy goal of 
regime change. 
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Second, despite the AKP’s assertiveness and ideologically charged 
rhetoric, it did not carry out any of its threats – e.g. imposition of no-fly zone, 
military intervention. Calls for restrain in combination with pressure from 
domestic business, political groups and the public opinion seem to have played 
a role in that as there was a widespread consensus among these forces that 
Turkey should not get more engaged in the Syrian conflict. The AKP could not 
afford to alienate the business elites by not taking into account calls for caution 
with regard to damaging economic prospects, the opposition parties and the 
public opinion altogether. That would lead it with great certainty to failure in 
the 2014 elections, not to mention that it could open the Pandora’s Box of the 
region with Iran, Israel, Russia and the West getting openly and directly 
involved in Syria. 
Third, Turkey’s limited capabilities in bringing about regime change or 
dealing with the multiplying threats to its national security (independent 
variables), along with its inability to act due to domestic pressure despite its 
proclaimed assertiveness (intervening variables), constrained its foreign policy 
towards Syria and led it once again closer to its Western allies. This is a complex 
interpretation of Turkey’s Syria policy that understands the external and 
domestic dynamics of TFP better than other works that focus on either the unit 
or the system level or are concerned with either security or economic 
motivations.608 Moreover, it ultimately establishes causal roles to each factors, 
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or identifies correlations, rather than listing different factors without a 
hierarchy of significance.609 The causal chains that led to this foreign policy 
behaviour are elaborated and clarified in the next chapter. 
 
7.3. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Israel and Intervening 
Variables 
 
After the “Arab Spring,” Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated further. As 
explained, systemic changes in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean 
played a primary role in that. Yet Turkey’s stance towards Israel remains 
largely incomprehensible in the context of its bandwagoning with the West and 
the common threat perceptions that had once again developed between Turkey 
and Israel – i.e. Syria. One could argue that such an expectable rapprochement 
took place in March 2013, when, after Obama’s mediation, Israel apologised to 
Turkey about the Gaza flotilla incident and negotiations to settle the problem 
began.610 
However not only were the problems not resolved but a number of new 
ones emerged. Turkey accused Israel of being both behind the anti-government 
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protests that took place in Turkish urban centres in the summer of 2013, as well 
as the military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that took place at 
around the same time.611 The two countries also disagreed on Israel’s 
compensation for the victims of the raid on Gaza flotilla, which meant their 
negotiations ended in stalemate.612 In sum, despite efforts for reconciliation and 
partial resumption of cooperation in some sectors,613 Turkey’s stance, especially, 
remained provocative and demanding. This shows either lack of motivation or 
willingness for an essential rapprochement with Israel. To decode Ankara’s 
policy its post-“Arab Spring” behaviour is looked at and especially the 
September 2011 turning point when the UN Palmer report was released and 
Turkey downgraded its diplomatic and military relations with Israel. The 
analysis of the intervening variables flushes out the role of both ideology and 
pragmatism in Turkey’s stance. 
 
AKP Elite Ideology 
 
Ankara’s Israel policy is a complex and yet interesting issue to be 
examined through the lens of AKP elite ideology, though such an approach is 
inadequate in itself. As seen, one could attribute Turkey’s gradual policy 
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change toward the West and Israel, since 2002, to structural factors and changes 
in its threat perceptions. On the other hand, it seems impossible to touch upon 
these issues without exploring the ideological outlook of AKP elites. Some anti-
Semitic tendencies have already been identified in the rhetoric and ideology of 
AKP elites. In addition, it has been suggested that AKP elites have a close 
ideological affinity to the geo-cultural space of the Middle East which creates 
the need for Ankara to distance itself from Israel in order to approach the Arab 
and Muslim world. 
Indicative are, again, relevant remarks from Davutoğlu’s book, Strategic 
Depth. There, Davutoğlu writes that Turkey should “maintain a flexible stand in 
foreign policy practice” in order to adapt to the regional dynamics and avoid 
being identified with Israel’s strategies.614 In the same book he stated that “the 
dominance over the Middle East has been the most important and necessary 
step for every state that wishes to dominate globally,” adding that the Middle 
East is the region where Islamic civilisation and culture predominate.615 More 
examples about the expression of anti-Israeli sentiments by Turkish officials, 
like the outburst of PM Erdoğan at Davos, have already been mentioned. 
These ideological features among AKP elites provide the framework 
within which the role of ideology in Turkey’s, and particularly PM Erdoğan’s, 
reaction to the UN Palmer report can be analysed. The report was first leaked 
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by The New York Times616 and then President Abdullah Gül was quick to 
question its legitimacy; that was mainly because it found that Israel’s naval 
blockade of Gaza was legal.617 After that Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador 
and suspended its military agreements with Israel, waiting on Tel Aviv’s 
apology. Later, PM Erdoğan lashed out at both the UN and Israel. Following 
Israel’s refusal to apologise he “announced that Turkey is completely 
suspending military and commercial ties with Israel and will impose further 
sanctions on the Jewish state”618 while he “threatened that Turkish gunboats 
would accompany Turkish ‘humanitarian’ vessels the next time they set sail for 
Gaza.”619 What could explain Erdoğan’s belligerent rhetoric and, as one could 
argue, overreaction against an important ally like Israel? 
Two things related to elite ideology seem to explain this stance. The first 
one is purely ideological. Tulin Daloglu, writing about the Gezi Park protest of 
2013, notes the rising anti-Semitism among the AKP elites: “It’s mind-boggling 
trying to figure out how overt anti-Semitism has crept into the political 
discourse of some Turkish politicians to blame the Jews and Israel for 
everything that goes wrong in the country.”620 In conjunction with previous 
mentions about these AKP ideological predispositions, this shows a widespread 
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anti-Semitic tendency not only in foreign relations but also in domestic politics; 
evidence of ideological drivers. 
The second one relates to another driver, both ideological and pragmatic: 
Turkey’s need for anti-Israeli rhetoric to approach the Arab world. It is known 
that the “Arab Spring” gave rise to pro-Islamic governments that expressed 
anti-Semitic and anti-Western feelings at the social and political level. This was 
demonstrated both at the public opinion level, through surveys in Arab 
countries, as well as at the political level with anti-Semitic remarks such as 
Egypt President’s (2012-2013), Mohamed Morsi.621 As seen from rhetoric in 
Ankara, this development was seen as “fertile ground” by Turkey, which 
means that it was both positive for its ideological outlook and with the potential 
of increasing material benefits. In this context it is important to note that 
Erdoğan’s threats towards Israel were made a few days before a trip that he 
was going to have in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.622 
The case under examination shows that ideological features are salient in 
the AKP’s foreign policy while it underlines a shift in Turkey’s domestic politics 
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that, considering the AKP’s and Erdoğan’s growing power, 623 increasingly calls 
for more individual-level approaches in some cases – e.g. political psychology. 
However it must not be neglected that such ideological features have been 
evident throughout the AKP’s governance and thus they do not only concern 
the PM. Lastly it can be seen that ideology, and ideologically informed rhetoric, 
has both the role of a foreign policy driver as well as of a communicative tool 
that serves Turkey’s regional or international image and maintains the balances 
between non- and pro-Western policies and discourse. Although there is also a 
material aspect to that, which concerns the good relations of Turkey with the 
neighbourhood and  regional security and stability, it is not unrelated to the 
AKP’s ideological vision for and perception of the Middle East; a different 
vision and perception than the one of the previous Kemalist military-
bureaucratic establishment. This suggests that ideology does indeed filter 
systemic developments and shapes interests and foreign policy behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
623 Especially after the AKP’s second election in 2007 and its success in the 2010 referendum about the 
new constitution, as noted in previous chapters (see, e.g. Chapter 3). Aaron Stein, "Explaining Erdogan’s 
Decision-Making,"  Turkey Wonk (25/03/2014), 
http://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/2014/03/25/explaining-erdogans-decision-making/; John Hannah, 
"The End of Erdogan?,"  Foreign Policy (20/12/2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/20/the_end_of_erdogan; Halil Karaveli, "Erdogan Loses 
It,"  Foreign Affairs(09/02/2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140726/halil-karaveli/erdogan-
loses-it. Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; USAK 
researcher Osman Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013; academic Dr. 
Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; academic Dr. Nikos Moudouros. 
Interview with the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 August 2013; academic Dr. Ahmet Sözen. Interview with 
the author, Famagusta, Cyprus, 26 December 2013. 
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Domestic Interest Groups 
 
It has been seen that the AKP elite’s response to the UN Palmer report has 
been to completely suspend Turkey’s commercial, military and defence ties 
with Israel which, as explained, was very much a product of elite ideology and 
particularly the frustration of PM Erdoğan. However, later on the same day of 
PM Erdoğan’s remarks, other Foreign Ministry officials said that the PM was 
referring to the commercial aspect of defence relations, and that “commercial 
ties will not be affected.”624 Commercial ties remained indeed unaffected since, 
as elaborated in the previous chapter, the trade between the two countries has 
increased over the last years and “in 2011 Turkey became Israel’s sixth export 
market overall.”625 The question that could be asked here is: what domestic 
factors drove the PM’s actions and the making of the final 
decision/announcement by the Foreign Ministry?  
It has been suggested that the PM might not have been fully aware of the 
volume of trade between his country and Israel.626 This could explain Ankara’s 
need to moderate the PM’s remarks. Whether that corresponds to reality or not 
it is clear that, in one way or another, material – and more specifically, 
economic – factors played a role. Apart from the trade volume, cases in point 
are the recorded reactions to the AKP’s stance from the business community. 
For example, a former chairman of a pipeline company clearly noted the 
independent dynamics that drive Israel’s oil supply from Turkish ports: “The 
                                                          
624 Zaman, "PM: Turkey to impose more sanctions on Israel, boost presence in east Med". 
625 Çağaptay and Evans, "The Unexpected Vitality of Turkish-Israeli Trade Relations," 2. 
626 Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013. 
274 
 
Turks cannot stop the flow of oil through the pipeline or prevent oil tankers 
arriving at Ceyhan to take on shipments [to Israel] without being sued and 
suffering a serious blow to their credibility in the eyes of the business 
community.”627 This refers to both the international treaties that safeguard such 
practices as well as to the role of the business communities in Turkey. 
Furthermore, major Turkish companies, such as Yilmazar Construction Group 
and Zorlu Group, do not seem to be willing to abandon their profitable 
businesses in Israel for foreign policy purposes.628 
After the Mavi Marmara raid and Turkey’s reaction, not only did the 
aforementioned two companies refuse to halt their business but Yilmazar 
Group’s CEO also threatened to sue the Prime Minister “for hurting its business 
by increasing political tensions between the two countries.”629 In this light, the 
constant pressures and importance of the business community in Ankara’s 
efforts not to cut off economic ties with Israel become clearer. 
Also important is that associations that represent these businesses 
advocate for good relations with Israel. One such example is TÜSIAD which at 
an important press conference referred to Israel as a top priority in its 
international strategic economic planning.630 Although TÜSIAD officials do not 
think that their overall policy played a primary role in Ankara’s stance, they do 
                                                          
627 Amiram Barkat, "Turkey Cannot Block Israel's Oil Supply,"  Globes (22/09/2011), 
http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000685052. 
628 Çağaptay and Evans, "The Unexpected Vitality of Turkish-Israeli Trade Relations," 3. 
629 Benjamin Harvey, "Turkish Builder to Sue Erdogan for Israeli Spat After Business Damaged,"  
Bloomberg(23/07/2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-23/builder-to-sue-erdogan-s-
government-for-comments-hurting-israel-business.html. 
630 "Top Bosses Eye Smart Investments,"  Hürriyet Daily News (21/03/2012), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/top-bosses-eye-smart-
investments.aspx?pageID=238&nID=16499&NewsCatID=345. 
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highlight that their association advocated for the sustainability of Turkish-
Israeli economic relations despite the political rift.631 
As the economic backbone of the AKP, MÜSIAD, and its investments, is 
also important. That is why then Minister of Economy, Zafer Çağlayan, tried to 
appease the association. In one of his meetings with a MÜSIAD delegation, 
soon after the 2011 diplomatic crisis with Israel, he said: “we are going to carry 
out our commercial relations with Israel in the level of counsellor. But there is 
not an interruption in our commercial relations,” adding that, “Actually, Israel 
has lost one of its good commercial partners.”632 His statement tried on the one 
hand to reassure the association that their businesses will not be interrupted 
while on the other hand tried to blame Israel for the occurred problems in an 
effort to avoid negative reactions from the businessmen towards the 
government.633 All evidence points to the fact that economic ties with Israel and 
the AKP’s relations with the business community were too important to 
jeopardise. It can thus be said that PM Erodğan’s reaction, although genuine, 
did not take into account these realties and, therefore, had to be altered. 
Further into Turkey’s domestic political scene, the primary opposition, 
CHP, had also firmly opposed the AKP’s Israel policy. Referring to the overall 
failure of TFP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, stated that, “Iran and Syria were enemies of 
                                                          
631 International Coordinator and EU Representative, TÜSİAD, Brussels Branch, Dr. Bahadır Kaleağasi. 
Phone interview with the author, 03 October 2013; TÜSİAD Brussels branch research associate. Phone 
interview to the author, 03 October 2013. Identity of the interviewee in possession of the author. 
632 "Turkey Recalls Chief Commercial Counsellor,"  Anadolu Agency (07/09/2011), 
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/s/24711--turkey-recalls-chief-commercial-counsellor. 
633 This also correlates to comments saying that politics are largely dissociated from economy and that 
AKP politicians try to avoid interfering in economic relations. Academic Dr. Louis Fishman. Skype 
interview with the author, 09 January 2014; Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, 
Ankara, 26 September 2013. 
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Israel. Now Iran, Syria and Israel are enemies of Turkey. Is this successful 
foreign policy?”634 With regard to the AKP’s Israel policy, the nationalist MHP 
maintained the same stance characterising its “zero problems” approach 
“bankrupt”.635 On the other hand the pro-Kurdish BDP’s opinion of the 
government’s Israel policy can be summarised in one of its candidates 
statements: “We have a prime minister who is very close to Israel when the 
issue is Kurdish people, and the same prime minister turns into a hawk when 
the issue is Hamas.”636 
Generally, opposition political parties played a role in pressuring the AKP 
both inside and outside the parliament. Although it seems that their calls have 
been taken into account by the AKP, they did not have a primary impact since 
                                                          
634 "CHP, AKP row over Israel policy worsens,"  Hürriyet Daily News(09/11/2011), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=chp-akp-row-over--israel-policy-
worsens-2011-09-11. 
635 "Israeli rift shows zero problems policy failed, MHP leader says,"  Today's Zaman (06/09/2011), 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-255920-israeli-rift-shows-zero-problems-policy-failed-mhp-leader-
says.html. 
636 Emine Kart, "BDP-led bloc's foreign policy refers to Atatürk's motto of peace,"  Today's Zaman 
(01/06/2011), 
http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=245844. Although 
Israel follows a pro-Kurdish policy, especially in terms of Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, it had in the past helped 
Turkey in its fight against the PKK. However, after the deterioration of their relations many reports said 
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perhaps trying to present a victimised image of the Kurds in order to oppose the government. See, Ofra 
Bengio, "Surprising Ties between Israel and the Kurds," Middle East Quarterly (Summer, 2014): 1-12; 
Robert Olson, "Turkey and Syria Since the Gulf War: The Kurdish Question and the Water Problem," in 
The Kurdish Conlict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, ed. Ferhad Ibrahim and 
Gulistan Gurbey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 137-38; Sedat Laciner, "Why is Israel Watching the 
PKK?,"  Al-Monitor(10/01/2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/01/israel-
monitoring-pkk.html#; "Israeli Herons give intelligence to PKK, intelligence officers say,"  Today's 
Zaman(17/01/2012), http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_israeli-herons-give-intelligence-to-pkk-
intelligence-officers-say_268815.html; Annie Robbins, "Israeli Drones are Reported Spying on Turkey for 
the Kurdish Group PKK,"  Mondoweiss(18/01/2012), http://mondoweiss.net/2012/01/israeli-drones-are-
reported-spying-on-turkey-for-the-kurdish-group-pkk. 
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the AKP holds the dominant role.637 In the same vein, CHP’s Deputy Chairman, 
Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, said that “CHP Deputies asked many parliamentary 
questions on this issue [AKP’s Israel stance].” He then added that “PM Erdoğan 
played a double game. In the domestic sphere, he wanted to appear as a strong 
voice against Israel. But in reality, he knew that he could not cut off ties with 
Israel completely.”638 This suggests that the AKP’s rhetoric was adopted for 
communicative reasons. Yet as seen, the AKP’s communication policies are not 
dissociated from the ideology of its elites. Lastly, the fact that PM Erdoğan 
knew he could not completely cut off Turkish-Israeli ties points to forces that 
would not allow something like that; such as the ones examined here. 
As far as the military is concerned, just like in other cases, after the late 
2000s, it was very much controlled by the government and therefore had 
limited to no role in decision-making. What is worth mentioning is the gradual 
rise of other actors, such as think tanks. For example, two interviewees from the 
Turkish think tank International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) 
argued that their pressure, along with the pressure of other civil society and 
political actors, had a role in preventing Turkey from taking part in the second 
flotilla to Gaza through analyses and advise that they provided to the 
government. Although this goes beyond the analytical framework, it suggests 
                                                          
637 Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Oktay Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 June 2013; academic 
Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; USAK researcher Osman 
Bahadır Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
638 CHP Deputy Chairman, Osman Faruk Loğoğlu. Interview with the author, Ankara, 30 September 2013. 
Academic Dr. Özlem Tür. Interview with the author, Ankara, 23 September, 2013; Academic Dr. Gokhan 
Bacik. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013; and USAK researcher Osman Bahadır 
Dinçer. Interview with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013. 
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that, according to the case at hand, civil society could contribute to domestic 
pressure and eventually affect foreign policy behaviour. However, as the 
interviewees noted, the final decision lays with Erdogan.639 
On the public opinion front different polls and studies show a rise of anti-
Semitic feelings in Turkey throughout the 2000s and especially after the Mavi 
Marmara incident.640 Although such predispositions are prevalent within 
Turkish society, half of the interviewees of one survey added that “Israel's 
actions have a ‘major influence’ on their opinions about Jews.”641 Given these 
public opinion attitudes, one can see how public opinion and elite ideology are 
compatible on this subject; that is, AKP ideological expressions find fruitful 
grown in public opinion. 
As seen earlier, the rise of anti-Israeli sentiments coincided, not 
accidentally, with the rise of anti-Americanism following the US policies in the 
Middle East after 9/11.642 Moreover, throughout the last years, and especially 
since Israel’s Gaza assault, there has been an even more profound rise of anti-
Semitism in Turkey. This was not only reflected in statements made by 
government politicians but also in multiple incidents that occurred at the 
societal level and triggered tensions between the Jewish community and groups 
in  Turkish society.643 Lastly, Israel’s 2010 raid on the “Gaza flotilla” had 
                                                          
639 Osman Bahadır Dinçer and Dr. Ihsan Bal. Interviews with the author, Ankara, 25 September 2013; 
Turkish Ambassador (ret.) Oktay Aksoy. Interview with the author, Ankara, 13 June 2013. 
640 USAK, USAK II. Foreign Policy Perception Survey. 
641 "Global survey finds 2 in 3 adults in Turkey anti-Semitic". 
642 Grigoriadis, "Friends No More? The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey."; Erdoğan, "The 
Missing Element." 
643 Zaman, "After Gaza: Rising anti-Semitism in Turkey?." 
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exacerbating effects while at that time anti-Semitism had become not only a 
Turkish but a global phenomenon as well, as a reaction to Israel’s actions that 
have been perceived as wrong and illegitimate.644 It is also noteworthy that in 
line with growing regional anti-Semitism amidst the “Arab Spring,”645 a 2014 
Pew survey showed that 86% of the Turks have an unfavourable opinion of 
Israel. This makes Israel the country that is looked upon unfavourably the most 
in Turkey (only 2% of the respondents expressed favourable opinion) without 
that, however, indicating necessarily anti-Semitic attitudes.646 
As in other cases of Turkey’s Israel policy examined thus far, Turkish 
public opinion seems to be highly receptive to the AKP’s anti-Israeli rhetoric. 
And while it has proven to be against Turkey’s engagement in conflicts, it 
favours anti-Semitic ideologically charged discourse. This also reflects the 
importance of the AKP’s electoral constituency which lies in Turkey’s large 
conservative population, as well as the fact that the AKP’s roots are in that very 
constituency. Therefore, there is truth in that AKP elites use that kind of 
rhetoric for domestic strategic purposes; yet, they are essentially targeting the 
audience out of which they emerged, and that makes their references at least to 
some extent genuine, not merely populist. 
 
Intervening Variables and Turkey’s post-“Arab Spring” Israel Policy 
                                                          
644 "Gaza flotilla raid increased global anti-Semitism, study finds"; Farkash, "Jews flee Turkey over anti-
Semitism". 
645 Goldberg, "Praise Arab Spring, Except for Anti-Semitism"; "The NSC and the Secretariat General of 
the NSC within the Framework of the 1982 Constitution". 
646 Jacob Poushter, "The Turkish People Don't Look Favorably Upon the U.S, or any Other Country, 
Really,"  Pew Research Centre(31/10/2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/31/the-
turkish-people-dont-look-favorably-upon-the-u-s-or-any-other-country-really/. 
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The intervening variables have examined how elite ideology and domestic 
interest groups have filtered systemic changes in the Middle East and 
particularly Israeli policies. Through focusing on the AKP’s reaction to the 
release of the UN Palmer report, a few things have become evident. First, the 
AKP elite ideologically informed rhetoric and foreign policy practice are, more 
often than not, inconsistent.647 That is, despite Erdoğan’s remarks and 
Davutoğlu’s stated ideas, the relations between Turkey and Israel may have 
deteriorated on certain levels but trade relations are strong, let alone that their 
bilateral strategic agreements have not been officially cancelled. 
However the two countries remained in diplomatic crisis, even after 
Israel’s apology, which means that ideology-informed policies and rhetoric, as 
well as the role of the PM’s personality, hinder cooperation or reconciliation 
with Israel at least in some sectors; even in the midst of the “Arab Spring.” At 
the same time, domestic interest groups, especially the business sector, seem to 
be playing a significant part in moderating the AKP’s short-tempered stance, at 
least with regard to economic policies, which means that they filter external 
developments differently largely because of their material interests at stake. 
Evidence shows that if the AKP did not have to take into account these groups 
and their interests in making foreign policy, TFP behaviour would have been 
less pragmatic and perhaps more radical.648  
                                                          
647 Dr. Gökhan Bacık, shared the same view. Academic Dr. Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, 
Ankara, 26 September 2013. 
648 Again, this is a product of deduction and correlation rather than direct causation. It does, however, 
remain important as it provides a valid explanation about the constraints in Turkish foreign policy-
making. 
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Something that has occurred repeatedly in the post-2011 period is the 
frequent gap between security and economic interests. Just like business elites 
would not like further destabilization in Syria and a full scale war, they did not 
favour bad relations with Israel. This conclusion would not have been possible 
to draw had the thesis focused on security interests alone – as neo-realists do – 
or only on economic interests – like neoliberal approaches.649 Most significantly, 
neorealist approaches have focused on the role of common security threats and 
power changes in the formation of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, on the lack of 
such factors in the deterioration of their relations, as well as predicted that the 
bilateral relationship would improve due to the growing insecurities of the 
“Arab Spring.”650 Thus far, neorealist predictions have not been realised while 
Turkish-Israeli relations remain highly deteriorated amidst significant mutual 
regional security threats such as the Syrian civil war. Therefore, the NcR 
approach of this thesis has provided a more valid explanation of this 
relationship as it suggests that domestic factors influenced Turkey’s 
                                                          
649 Spyridon N. Litsas, "Bandwagoning for Profit and Turkey: Alliance Formations and Volatility in the 
Middle East," Israel Affairs 20, no. 1 (2014): 125-39; Tarik Oğuzlu, "The Changing Dynamics of Turkey-
Israeli Relations: A Structural Realist Account," Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 2 (2010): 273-88; André 
Bank and Roy Karadag, "The Political Economy of Regional Power: Turkey under the AKP," GIGA 
Research Unit Institute of Middle East Studies, no. 204 (September, 2012); John McSweeney, "The 
‘Turkish Model’ for the Middle East: Reproducing Neoliberal Hegemony?,"  E-International 
Relations(23/08/2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/23/the-turkish-model-for-the-middle-east-
reproducing-neoliberal-hegemony/; Çiğdem Nas, "Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy and the 
EU," Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2010): 117-31.  
650 Suha Bolukbasi, "Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View," Journal of Palestine Studies 
XXIX, no. 1 (1999): 21-35; Daniela Huber, "Turkish-Israeli Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment " 
Istituto Affari Internazionali Commentary 05(September, 2012); Inbar, "The Resilience of Israeli-Turkish 
Relations," 593; Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, "Changing Relations: Turkish - Israeli - Arab Triangle," 
Centre for Strategic Research - SAM (March-May, 2000): 1-3. 
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inconsistent Israel policies by filtering systemic developments in particular 
ways. 
Furthermore, the interplay between AKP elite ideology and public 
opinion, has allowed for the assessment of the AKP’s response to public 
attitudes as well as identifying common ideological features between the AKP 
and society that sometimes make the conduct of foreign policy easier for the 
AKP. The significance of each factor in the making of TFP is clarified further in 
the final chapter.  
 
7.4. Conclusions 
 
Based on the material presented, it can be concluded that the “Arab Spring” 
and other systemic changes in the Eastern Mediterranean affected TFP to a 
great extent. With regard to the cases in question, they changed Turkish-Syrian 
relations from amity to enmity and they exacerbated the Turkish-Israeli crisis, 
or prevented it from reaching substantive reconciliation after the Israeli 
apology. From that perspective, the importance of the intervening variables 
surfaces once more as AKP elite ideology gave a distinctive character to TFP 
reaction and behaviour towards these systemic changes. Thus it could be 
speculated that, had a Kemalist government been in power, different foreign 
policies would have been followed – e.g. less assertive behaviour towards Syria, 
greater reliance on the West, and significantly less crisis prone attitude towards 
Israel. Not because ideology is primary over systemic factors, but because 
283 
 
systemic changes would have been understood and dealt with differently by 
the previous dominant elite ideology. 
However this does not mean that AKP elite ideology is independent from 
other domestic interests, although at times it does demonstrate independence 
from external pressures. Such an observation is important given that in the 
literature on TFP AKP ideology is often decoupled from pragmatism and 
rationality.651 But as stated at the very beginning of this thesis, rationality is 
relative and, as the examination of AKP elite ideology showed, pragmatism or 
material incentives are not static but linked to ideas and beliefs. 
As such, material interests are filtered and shaped by ideology. For 
example, economic interests, national security threats, and public opinion 
considerations, may vary depending on the ideology of the policy-maker (or 
policy-making elites). Thus material and ideological incentives are, more often 
than not, intertwined. In many cases, the AKP’s elite ideology stems from and 
targets these elements; a fact that, in turn, blurs the line between ideological and 
material incentives. Lastly it should be remembered that the external level 
remains the primary driver that feeds the elites with information and allows for 
this dynamic process and interplay between material interests and ideas. 
                                                          
651 See, for example, Alexander Murinson, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century," Mideast Security 
and Policy Studies 97(September, 2012); Carol Migdalovitz, "AKP’s Domestically-Driven Foreign Policy," 
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The achieved combination of levels and foreign policy interests as well as 
the plurality of factors accounted for domestically and their specific connection 
to related independent variables, complements even those existing studies that 
try to integrate the two levels and their different drivers by fleshing out and 
specifying the relationship and interaction between levels and drivers.652 Nearly 
no other comprehensive effort to analyse TFP has taken into account these 
levels and factors in such a systematic way. This view has allowed for a 
dynamic analysis of Turkey that is especially appropriate given the many 
changes that both the region and the country have undergone during the past 
decade or so. 
Moreover, it allowed for a comprehensive account of domestic actors and 
factors in the context of a globalized world and economy as well as the rise of 
non-state actors based on debates in the existing literature on TFP. Overall, it is 
argued, that this multileveled and multidimensional approach is more 
appropriate in analysing today’s TFP. Also, it is suggested that it is even more 
complete than other “third way” and even NcR attempts that employ less 
variables, specifically because it accounts in detail for each external and 
domestic factor while illuminating to the extent possible the – often causal – 
relationship between ideational and material factors in different policy sectors – 
                                                          
652 See, for example, Altunişik and Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
under AKP," 569-87; Han, "Paradise Lost," 55-69; Özel, "Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: Turkey’s 
Strategic Quest."; İşeri and Dilek, "The Limitations of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Activism in the 
Caucasian Regional Security Complexity," 41-54; Faruk Yalvaç, "Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A 
Critical Realist Analysis," Turkish Studies 15, no. 1 (2014): 117-38. 
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i.e. security and economy.653 Lastly, it can be suggested that the inclusion of 
different variables at the system and unit level has allowed for the better 
explanation of apparent paradoxes in TFP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
653 Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea; Özel, "Waves, Ways and 
Historical Turns: Turkey’s Strategic Quest."; İşeri and Dilek, "The Limitations of Turkey's New Foreign 
Policy Activism in the Caucasian Regional Security Complexity."; Han, "Paradise Lost." More specifically, 
this thesis provides a more complex approach and understanding of TFP than, for example, these cited 
studies, as it looks deeper into the domestic level examining different domestic interests, as expressed 
by the government and various groups, and integrates them into a system-level analysis. It also goes 
beyond the construction of a historical narrative that focuses on a small number of factors and thus 
provides an analysis that does not only explain what the drivers of TFP under AKP are but also their 
functions and complex relations. 
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8. Comparative Analysis: Drivers, Causal Chains, and 
Foreign Policy Behaviour 
 
In line with the overarching methodology followed to answer the central 
question “what are the foreign policy-making dynamics under the AKP?,” the 
thesis turns to what can be considered as its most important part. The logic, as 
explained in the theoretical and methodological sections, is to put the foreign 
policy drivers identified in each case study in comparative perspective. In 
general two kinds of comparisons are made: Cross-Case (CC) and Cross-Time 
(CT). Cross-Case analysis compares causal chains (between the independent 
and intervening variables) that lead to TFP behaviour (dependent variable), 
which may vary between revisionism and status quo, and it does so for the two 
different time periods. Cross-Time analysis compares the results of CC analysis 
from both periods in order to reach more general and generalizable conclusions 
with regard to Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy drivers, its behaviour and 
issues of continuity and change. 
The analysis for each period of the case studies has already been 
conducted in the previous chapters and it is here summarised based on some 
common denominators between the case studies; mainly, Turkey’s economic 
and security policies. As analysed earlier, the division of the timeframe into two 
periods (2002-2011 and 2011-2013) is based on the “most similar” comparative 
method which suggests that change in one variable divides the cases. It is 
argued that this variable is the primary independent variable, namely, 
international power changes, which, in turn, impacts the other independent and 
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intervening variables. This corresponds with NcR’s premise that the 
international system is the primary determinant of foreign policy. 
The CC analysis starts with summaries of the case studies findings for 
each period, separately. Thereby, the first section draws CC conclusions for the 
2002-2011 period while the second section for the 2011-2013 period. According 
to the theoretical framework, in the summaries of the CC analysis the different 
strategies employed by Turkey in each case can be identified so as to determine 
variation in TFP behaviour. Moreover, these strategies are presented as foreign 
policy outcomes that occur after causal chains between foreign policy drivers 
(independent and intervening variables) for each foreign policy sector 
(economic or security). These processes are summarised in tables that also 
include counterfactual estimations of what the foreign policy outcome would be 
under the previous political establishment. The tables include only the variables 
or factors at play in each case. 
Consequently, the respective CC conclusions of the two periods are 
compared in order for a CT comparison to be made and patterns and 
differences in causal chains and foreign policy outcomes and behaviour to be 
identified. More general comments and discussion about the findings, the 
strengths and limitations of this thesis can be found in the concluding chapter. 
 
8.1. Cross-Case Analysis 
 
The CC analysis starts with the first period (2002-2011) and then the 
second one (2011-2013). Going back to the empirical analysis of the two case 
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studies, and the sub-case studies, the drivers behind Ankara’s foreign policies 
for each case are broken down in order to eventually compare the variation in 
foreign policy behaviour thus identifying causal chains and patterns of 
behaviour. The results are evaluated in comparison to the next period through 
the CT analysis.  
 
8.1.1. 2002-2011: System-Level and Unit-Level Variables 
 
The period between 2002 and 2011 is one that could be generally described 
as glorious for Turkey, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. Its 
economy as well as its democratisation process thrived while externally it 
operated in a relatively benign environment; an environment that despite its 
challenges favoured TFP outwardness and its efforts to acquire a new 
multileveled role. Indeed, Turkey’s foreign relations had known great success 
with many of its traditionally tough relations, such as Syria and Iran, being 
normalised. 
The two cases explored in this study are different from each other in that 
they did not both have a positive development vis-à-vis TFP. Whereas Syria 
turned into an ally for Turkey, Israel had gradually become an enemy. Taking 
this into account in conjunction with the fact that Israel represents in many 
ways Turkey’s relations with the West while Syria represents an anti-Western 
camp, could be helpful in extrapolating important insights about Turkish 
foreign policy-making dynamics. 
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During this period, Turkey was operating within a broader international 
and regional context as explained through the independent variables. The 
Global War on Terrorism and the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war, EU-Turkish 
relations, as well as the economic crisis were the four primary system-level 
factors which affected TFP, as analysed. At the regional level specifically, the 
two wars changed the balance of power (first independent variable) by 
weakening Iraq, empowering Iran, and giving more prominence to Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Consequently new threats emerged for Turkey (second independent 
variable) such as the US regional involvement, Kurdish separatism, Israel and 
to a lesser extent Iran – due to its Shiite regional networks and influence as well 
as its appeal to Arab states through its support of the Palestinians. 
Ultimately these developments had an impact on Turkey’s decisions 
regarding alliance formations and foreign economic relations (third 
independent variable), albeit with some divergence between economic and 
security policies in the case of Israel. Thus these independent variables 
necessitated a shift in TFP which after the intervening role of domestic factors 
shaped Turkish policies and led to close cooperation and alliance with Syria 
and Iran654 with the parallel adoption of an anti-American and anti-Israeli 
stance. Turkey’s noteworthy turn to the Middle East, at the obvious expense of 
                                                          
654 Despite Turkey’s insecurities towards Iran – its nuclear program, its regional influence and relative 
power, and its appeal to the Arab world – it chose to ally with it due to pragmatic and ideological 
reasons. In terms of the former one could cite Turkey’s great energy dependency on Iran’s supply, their 
common concern about the Kurdish separatist threat, and their historical regional hegemonic rivalry 
which Turkey would not want to exacerbate, not least because of the close geographic proximity 
between the two countries. In terms of the ideological reasons, as analysed in previous chapters, the 
overarching Islamic identity played a role although there were still underlying intra-religious differences 
(Sunni vs. Shia). This, as well as Turkey’s Israel policy, is one of the decisions of Turkish foreign policy 
which becomes clearer when seen though an NcR lens. 
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its relations with the West, was favoured by other systemic factors such as the 
deteriorating Turkish-EU relations and the global economic crisis which 
affected European and Western markets. A more complete explanation about 
TFP behaviour can be achieved once systemic factors are correlated with 
domestic constraints and dynamics. 
 
8.1.2. Turkey-Syria (2002-2011) 
 
What follows is an examination of the causal chains that led to TFP 
behaviour towards Syria in terms of economic and security policies. It is worth 
reminding the reader that the inclusion of economic policies, in addition to 
security considerations and together with the examination of domestic 
dynamics (intervening variables), is an advantage of NcR that also differentiates 
it from neorealism and its strands. 
The intervening variables to be considered are AKP elite ideology and 
domestic interest groups (i.e. business associations, opposition political parties, 
military elites, and public opinion). 
 
Economic Policies 
 
Turkey’s economic relations with Syria during the 2000s boomed within 
the broader framework of its improved relations with the Middle East and the 
Arab world in particular. The signing of the free trade agreement in 2004 and 
the abolishment of visa requirements in 2009 were primary examples. It has 
already been seen that the systemic factors that pushed Turkey in the direction 
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of increasing relations with the Middle East and Syria, respectively. However, 
in the face of regional power changes and threats, Turkey’s closer economic 
relationship and alliance with Syria represented the opposite to the will of its 
traditional Western allies given that Syria was an anti-Western country against 
which the US and European countries maintained a hard stance. In that sense 
the motivations of TFP should also be sought in the country’s domestic scene. 
In the case of economic policies in particular, it has been observed that 
AKP elite ideology and the role of business associations – especially the 
conservative ones – are intertwined. On the one hand, the elites of AKP are 
characterised by a (political Islamic) ideology which sees the Middle East as a 
post-Ottoman geo-cultural space under the potential influence of Turkey. 
Although this understanding of the Middle East is not necessarily Islamic, it is 
expressed in the particular political Islamic worldview of AKP elites as a 
component of the Turkish historical experience and development of Turkish 
political Islam. At the same time it is based on an overarching Islamic identity 
which transcends national boundaries and other regional identities thus 
establishing a historically and religiously rooted affiliation with the region and 
its peoples. Syria is only part of that vision. It is within this framework that PM 
Erdoğan and FM Davutoğlu repeatedly called the Syrians and the peoples of 
the Middle East, “brothers”. 
On the other hand, the rise of the “Anatolian tigers” (or “Islamic capital”) 
which was mainly represented by conservative business associations such as 
MÜSIAD, played an important role in the economic orientation of the AKP’s 
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ideological and political vision the last twenty years or so. The affiliation of the 
AKP with these business circles gave economic development and Turkey’s 
foreign economic relations an ideological character. As such economic – as well 
as diplomatic and other – relations with the geo-cultural space of the Middle 
East acquired prominence, sometimes at the expense of economic relations with 
the West. After all, as seen, Davutoğlu highlighted the importance of the 
economy in TFP on a few occasions while Anatolia, from where Islamic capital 
originates, constitutes the backbone of the AKP’s electoral constituency. 
From that perspective, AKP elite ideology together with the economic 
needs and ideological orientation of the rising Anatolian business elite 
channelled the aforementioned systemic pressures in a way that resulted in a 
foreign policy outcome that differed from Turkey’s traditional pro-Western 
foreign policy orientation, that is, the alliance with Syria and Iran (See, Table II). 
Other domestic interest groups such as the more secular business 
association TÜSIAD, military elites and opposition parties did not oppose 
better economic relations with Syria and the region insofar as they did not 
challenge Turkey’s relations with the West. Similarly, public opinion was 
receptive to improved relations with Syria not least because of the rise of anti-
Americanism, the closer cultural and geographical relations with Syrians and 
the Arabs more generally, as well as economic growth and development due to 
the AKP’s economic policies. In that sense, other domestic interest groups had a 
neutral or a positive passive role in this case. 
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What can be suggested is that if it were not for the ideology of the AKP 
elites and their politico-ideological affiliation with the rising conservative 
business elites the foreign policy outcome would have been different, in that, 
we would expect Ankara to bandwagon with the US (see Table II below). The 
systemic variables remain the primary drivers for a foreign policy shift, in that 
it was external changes and dynamics that initially called for foreign policy 
decisions to deal with the various challenges of the 2000s.  
Lastly, the strategies employed with regard to Turkey’s economic policies 
can be described as soft balancing. Given the fact that changes in economic 
policies (economic interdependence) depend largely on systemic changes 
(power changes), soft balancing refers to the outcome of foreign economic 
policies which, however, is not completely dissociated from security issues. In 
that sense, economic policies were a means of responding to the overall 
systemic changes, and specifically the results of US unilateralism in the Middle 
East after 2001. Soft balancing describes Turkey’s foreign policies where means 
other than military, such as diplomacy, economy and business meetings, were 
used. As soft balancing is not a revisionist strategy, but rather one employed 
because of limitation in capabilities to alter the status quo and deal with greater 
powers, TFP behaviour in this specific sub-case study was status quo oriented. 
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Table II: Turkey-Syria: Economic Relations, Causality and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
Most Probable Foreign Policy Outcome under Previous 
Political Establishment (Counterfactual) 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Bandwagon with the US/West 
OR 
- Balance against threats with the US/West 
Systemic Drivers 
1st 
Intervening 
Variable 
(AKP elite 
Ideology) 
2nd Intervening 
Variable 
(Domestic Interest 
Groups) 
Foreign Policy 
Outcome 
 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Greater 
affiliation 
with the M.E. 
 
- Prone to 
revisionism 
in the post-
Ottoman 
space 
MÜSIAD 
Favoured/pushed 
for a M.E. opening 
 
 
- Soft Balancing in 
dealing with systemic 
changes 
 
- Anti-Western 
selection of alliances 
 
- Defensive but more 
autonomous Status 
Quo Behaviour 
System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD pressures = Soft Balancing & Status Quo 
Behaviour 
 
Security Policies 
 
For the examination of Turkey’s security policy towards Syria, the role of 
Iran has been looked at. Specifically, the question answered was, “Has Turkey’s 
relations with Iran played a role in bringing Turkey and Syria closer together?” 
As was noted, Iran is important for the analysis because it is a vital strategic ally 
of Syria, because of its part in the trilateral partnership with Turkey and Syria, 
and because it poses a major threat to Israel. With regards to the overarching 
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question about TFP drivers and motivations, this case facilitated the 
identification of TFP drivers, especially when it comes to security relations. 
The systemic variables played again a primary role in the Turkish-Iranian 
rapprochement which started gradually in 2000 and deepened under the AKP. 
As AKP was not yet in power in 2000, it was clear that security concerns, most 
importantly the Kurdish issue, drove the betterment of relations. However, in 
the rest of the 2000s the relations between Turkey and Iran improved 
remarkably, just like the ones between Turkey and Syria. Given Western 
concerns about this rapprochement and the fact that Iran, together with Syria, 
were parts of the “axis of evil,” makes TFP decision more difficult to explain 
and thus calls for the need to look at the intervening variables. 
It has been found that AKP elite ideology (1st intervening variable) had a 
twofold role. First, it replaced the Kemalist ideology which posed obstacles in 
improved relations between Turkey and theocratic Iran and, second, it filtered 
external pressures, as in every case examined, thus leading to deeper bilateral 
relations. Although there were obvious pragmatic considerations, such as the 
Kurdish threat and economic reasons, which were invoked by FM Davutoğlu as 
well, the ideological affinity was also clear in AKP elite statements which 
depicted Iran as a brotherly country. Moreover, Turkey’s practical indifference 
about the Western stance towards anti-Western Iran and Syria was a product of 
ideological considerations. 
It has to be remembered that prior to the 2007 re-election of the AKP, the 
political manifestations of the party’s ideology were limited, due to the 
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dominance of the Kemalist establishment, and therefore Turkish-Iranian 
relations during that time were primarily based on pragmatic, security and 
economic, considerations. When after 2007 the AKP managed to gradually 
marginalise the Kemalist military and bureaucracy, relations between Turkey 
and Iran deepened further. This also means that the freer the AKP ideology was 
to manifest itself, the more assertive and confident Turkey became. In this 
context it was expected that, given the strong alliance between Iran and Syria, 
the betterment of relations between Ankara and Tehran would also advance 
Turkey-Syria relations. 
In terms of the second intervening variable and the various domestic 
interest groups, it has been shown that business associations played an 
important part in Turkish-Iranian relations. MÜSIAD was once more a salient 
driving force since it saw economic relations with Iran as a priority while this 
could be also understood within the broader framework of MÜSIAD’s support 
of economic relations with Islamic countries. TÜSIAD, on the other hand, 
appeared supportive of all economic openings for Turkey as part of a profit-
driven policy and thus did not pose any obstacles to Turkish-Iranian relations; 
it rather supported them. 
As far as the main political opposition was concerned (i.e. CHP and MHP) 
they supported a closer relationship with Iran despite ideological differences 
because the Kurdish secessionist threat was very important to them and Iran 
was an important ally to have in dealing with it. The BDP, as a pro-Kurdish 
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party, was indeed opposed to that aspect of Turkish-Iranian cooperation, but its 
influence and pressure was weak. 
This was also the case with Kemalist military elites. Since national unity 
and homogeneity was one of the main ideological features of Kemalism and its 
primary carrier, the military-bureaucratic elites, the Kurdish issue and the 
threat of secessionism was one of their greatest insecurities which had to be 
alleviated by all means. From that perspective, for the Kemalist generals, 
partnership with Iran was a means to a vital end. 
Lastly, Turkish public opinion did not mind Turkey’s rapprochement with 
Iran. On the contrary, surveys showed that in mid-2000s public opinion 
perceived Iran as less of a threat than the US or Israel. Thus it rather favoured 
the AKP’s decisions. 
The conclusion is that better relations between Turkey and Iran had 
indeed played a positive role in Turkish-Syrian relations, and the causal 
connection remains similar to the case of Turkish-Syrian economic relations 
(see, Table III). The primary drivers were related to the independent variables. 
Security in the early 2000s, and specifically threats such as Kurdish separatism, 
was of great importance. This created the initial need for some sort of 
reactionary foreign policy. Turkey, under the previous establishment, 
responded by putting aside ideological differences and approaching Iran. At 
that point a relative balance was struck between Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-
US relations. 
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However, in the coming years, with 2007 being the turning point, the more 
the AKP consolidated its power and ideological orientation the deeper its 
relations with Iran and Syria became – despite Western anxiety and calls for 
caution. To this contributed the pragmatic approach of business groups in 
general and the pro-Islamic world orientation of MÜSIAD in particular, while 
public opinion saw this turn positively. When AKP policies gradually collided 
more with the Kemalist establishment – military elites and opposition parties - 
the latter’s power to adequately oppose them or change them was limited. 
Lastly, TFP behaviour in this instance, through its regional balancing 
strategies,655 remained a status quo one. In addition to Turkey’s soft balancing in 
the region, military means were also employed at times, especially when 
Turkey collaborated with Iran and Syria against the Kurdish threat; thus 
Turkey also used balancing strategies against regional threats and power 
changes, which are also status quo oriented as they attempted to maintain the 
regional balance and Turkey’s role. At the same time, Turkey’s occasional 
opposition or disregard of Western policies rendered it gradually more 
assertive and challenging to the status quo. This reality is more evident in the 
case of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
655 Turkey formed an alliance with Syria and Iran mainly to balance against regional threats – primarily 
the Kurdish one – and factors that played an exacerbating role, such as the US and Israel. 
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Table III: Turkey-Syria: Security Relations, Causality and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
Most Probable Foreign Policy Outcome under Previous 
Political Establishment (Counterfactual) 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Bandwagon with the US/West 
OR 
- Balance against threats with the US/West 
Systemic Drivers 
1st 
Intervening 
Variable 
(AKP elite 
Ideology) 
2nd Intervening 
Variable 
(Domestic 
Interest Groups) 
Foreign Policy 
Outcome 
 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Greater 
affiliation with 
the M.E. 
 
- Prone to 
revisionism in 
the post-
Ottoman space 
MÜSIAD 
Favoured/pushed 
for a M.E. 
opening. Pro-Iran. 
 
 
- (Soft) Balancing 
against regional and 
international threats 
 
- Anti-Western 
selection of alliances 
 
- Defensive but more 
autonomous Status 
Quo Behaviour 
System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD pressures = Soft Balancing & Status Quo 
Behaviour 
 
8.1.3. Turkey-Israel (2002-2011) 
 
The case of TFP towards Israel shows the other side of the coin. Whereas 
relations with Syria (and Iran) improved greatly under the AKP, relations with 
Israel entered a period of gradual deterioration and, eventually, turned from 
amity to enmity. It is important that Turkey’s relations with Israel are also 
indicative of Turkey’s relations with the US as the three countries have been 
maintaining a strategic alliance which has been instrumental for serving 
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Western interests in the Middle East. For Israel’s case two questions were 
answered: why would Turkey under the AKP compromise its most important 
regional alliance? And, did Turkish-Israeli relations and Turkey’s relations with 
non-Western or anti-Western regional allies had to be mutually exclusive? 
Through the independent and intervening variables of the NcR 
framework economic and security policies are looked at, first by examining the 
gradual deterioration of bilateral relations and, second, by examining the role of 
Iran. TFP behaviour towards Israel is thus identified and, by extension, the 
similarities and differences between this case and the one of Syria. 
 
The Deterioration of Turkish-Israeli Relations 
 
In chapter 4 and 6 it was argued that the primary systemic factors which 
influenced TFP under the AKP towards Israel were: the alleviation of the 
common Syrian threat, the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the early 
2000s, the deterioration in Turkish-American relations in the aftermath of the 
Iraq war, and Turkey’s increasing threat perception of Israel. However, it has 
been noted that Turkey could have maintained a more balanced stance which 
would not put its strategic alliance at risk. Contrary to such an approach, the 
AKP’s Turkey became increasingly short-tempered with Israel thus leading 
their relations to a stalemate in 2010, after the Gaza flotilla incident. 
As seen in the first intervening variable, about AKP elite ideology, Israel 
was seen by the AKP elites as a non-Muslim country in the region and was 
treated as such. In other words Turkey under the AKP related more to its Arab 
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and Muslim neighbours, rather than to the West or Israel, due to its political 
Islamic ideology. And although pragmatic incentives were at play as well, such 
as the need to approach the Arab world, they seemed intertwined with and 
surpassed by ideological considerations. In that sense ideology played a central 
role as it created a preference for Turkey to engage the Arab world as a 
response to systemic changes. From there on it followed that Turkey should 
distance itself from Israel to achieve that end. During the previous 
establishment, this would not have been the case; it is more probable that a 
balance would have at least been sought between Turkey’s relations with Israel 
and the Arab world – the disagreements of Kemalist elites with the AKP’s 
policies confirm this. 
Despite the gradual deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, one of the 
important things to be taken into account is that the economic relations of the 
two countries improved greatly throughout the 2000s. The two main business 
associations examined have had somewhat different approaches to the matter. 
On the one hand, TÜSIAD showed a more pragmatic face by embracing and 
promoting better relations with Israel while on the other hand, MÜSIAD 
maintained a rather anti-Israeli stance, in line with the AKP, although trends of 
Europeanization in the 2000s made it more prone to a pragmatic approach. In 
this context the general betterment of economic relations regardless of the 
worsening diplomatic relations, suggests that business circles are at least to a 
certain extent dissociated from politics, thus being able to put pressure on the 
government towards undisrupted economic relations or simply disregard 
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political turmoil. At the same time the overall importance the AKP gives to 
economy and economic policies should not be neglected; after all, economic 
development and growth was one of the components of its success story. 
The opposition parties and Kemalist military elites kept an overall 
negative stance towards the AKP’s hard rhetoric and policies vis-à-vis Israel. 
Although they did not have the power to alter the AKP’s policies,656 it has been 
found that their pressures along with pressures form civil society contributed to 
the AKP’s decision to refrain from endorsing the second Gaza-bound flotilla.657 
For its part, public opinion was rather supportive of the AKP’s rhetoric about 
Israel as there were growing anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli feelings in the society, 
especially after Israel’s attack against Gaza (2007/08) and the Gaza flotilla. 
However, there is no evidence to support whether public opinion was 
concerned with Turkish-Israeli economic relations; it seems that it was rather 
concerned with the salient diplomatic rivalry. 
The inconsistency in Turkey’s policies towards Israel is obvious: good 
economic relations versus bad diplomatic relations. This is not unrelated to the 
largely independent role of economic dynamics within the Capitalist system as 
mentioned in the section on economic interdependence (third independent 
variable). At the same time, there is something to say about the role of ideology 
as well. The anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli predispositions of the AKP’s political 
Islamic ideology and its pro-economy orientation which was intertwined with 
                                                          
656 It is here reminded that Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated most notably after 2008 and, therefore, 
at a period when the Kemalist military-bureaucratic elites were already weakened. 
657 The traumatic experience of the previous Gaza flotilla should not be neglected as a discouraging 
factor for the endorsement of the second flotilla. 
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business elite interests, could provide another explanation for the contradiction 
in Turkey’s Israel policies. It should be noted, however, that given the 
increasing authoritarianism of the AKP after 2007 and Erdoğan’s increasing 
indifference of domestic pressures, it is more likely that Turkish-Israeli 
economic ties remain largely unaffected mostly due to the former reason, the 
great autonomy of business circles from politics. 
This understanding is partly affirmed by Ayşe Buğra and Osman 
Savaşkan who present a dynamic government-business relationship where 
business associations should be also seen as political actors. This, together with 
the fact of the AKP “government’s selective empowerment of business 
associations,”658 could also suggest that it is possible that the pro-business 
element of AKP elite ideology trumped any ideological hostility towards Israel. 
As such, the interplay between ideological and material incentives surfaces 
again.  
To clarify the causal chain that led Turkey to maintain good economic 
relations with Israel, each variable needs to be attributed a causal significance 
(or insignificance). As NcR’s theoretical assumptions suggest, the independent 
variables played a primary role. The primary and independent variables when 
filtered by domestic variables and mostly importantly the AKP elite ideology, 
led Turkey to its anti-Israeli stance. However, it could be argued that if the AKP 
ideology were the only intervening variable, Turkish-Israeli relations might 
have deteriorated at all levels, including economic relations. Thus the role of 
                                                          
658 Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, 
Religion and Business  (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2014). 110, 71. 
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business circles and the AKP’s relationship with some of them prevented the 
ideological drivers from completely dominating policy-making. Lastly, 
opposition parties, military elites and the public opinion played a very limited 
role and ultimately had no real impact on policy-making in this instance. It is 
worth noting that AKP Israel policies found fruitful ground in public opinion. 
As such, Turkey followed a balance of interest approach by which the cost 
of sacrificing its security and diplomatic relations with Israel was a small price 
to pay in relation to its expanding relations with the region (i.e. its endeavour to 
extend its values), while economic relations were not affected due to domestic 
constrains. At the same time it employed the revisionist strategy of subversion 
which sought to discredit and demoralise Israel. In this case, Turkey’s 
revisionist behaviour lies in the fact that the AKP pursued an altered regional 
status.659 That is, despite the good economic relations, Turkey’s already 
developed alliance with Syria and Iran and the interruption of its alliance with 
Israel signified a change to the regional balance of power with Turkey claiming 
the leadership of the Arab world through its support of the Palestinian cause 
and its opposition to Israel – an end both ideological and pragmatic. 
In that sense, when Turkey’s Syria policy seen compared to Turkey’s Israel 
policy, it cannot merely be described as status quo since the two policies in 
conjunction with one another, reveal efforts of altering the regional status quo to 
                                                          
659 It should reminded to the reader that, with regards to the Balance of Interests theory, a state’s 
preference to pursuing something that it does not have at the expense of the status quo, as the case in 
question, points to revisionist behaviour. 
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Turkey’s favour (see Table IV and V). More evidence of Turkey’s revisionist 
behaviour can be found in the next section which focuses on the role of Iran. 
 
Table IV: Turkey-Israel: Declining Relations, Causality and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
Most Probable Foreign Policy Outcome under Previous 
Political Establishment (Counterfactual) 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
 
- Balanced relations between Arabs and Israeli’s 
- (sustainability of Turkish-Israeli alliance with 
perhaps better economic relations with Arab world) 
- Status Quo Behaviour 
 
Systemic Drivers 
1st Intervening 
Variable (AKP 
elite Ideology) 
2nd Intervening 
Variable 
(Domestic 
Interest Groups) 
Foreign Policy 
Outcome 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
International Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Greater 
affiliation with 
the M.E. 
 
- Prone to 
revisionism in 
the post-
Ottoman space 
MÜSIAD- 
TÜSIAD 
In favour of good 
economic 
relations 
 
- Balance of Interests 
(Retaining economic, 
sacrificing security 
relations) 
 
- Subversion 
 
- Revisionist 
Behaviour 
System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD & TÜSIAD pressures = Balance of 
Interest/Subversion & Revisionist Behaviour 
 
The Role of Iran in Turkey’s Israel Policy 
 
From previous chapters it is known that regional power changes and 
changing threat perceptions gave rise to a stronger relationship between Turkey 
and Iran, even before the AKP’s rise to power and throughout its first term. It 
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has been seen, however, that this relationship deepened further especially after 
2007 and 2008, with the marginalisation of the Kemalist military elites. 
Within the context of the relatively limited manifestations of the AKP’s 
ideology during the party’s first term, security concerns stemming from threat 
perceptions, and secondly economic reasons, were the drivers of the Turkish-
Iranian rapprochement. As noted, the ideological change made things easier 
and contributed to the sustainability and prolongation of the bilateral 
cooperation between Turkey and Iran. Once the AKP predominated over the 
previous Kemalist establishment if felt more convenient to follow its own 
foreign policy vision and thus achieved closer relations with Iran and Syria and 
greater distance from Israel. On the one hand, the AKP’s consolidated ideology 
favoured deeper relations with Iran and looser relations with Israel while on the 
other hand the deepened Turkish-Iranian relations were perceived negatively 
by Israel. Thus overall, in terms of ideology, TFP towards Iran had a negative 
impact on Turkish-Israel relations, albeit mainly post-2008. 
Business associations kept playing a role in the maintenance of Turkey’s 
relations with Iran as an extension of the good diplomatic relations. At least as 
far as the business sector is concerned, it seems that economic relations with 
Iran were not favoured over economic relations with Israel or vice versa. Once 
again this points to the pragmatism of the businessmen and the role of the 
private economic sector which is largely dissociated from politics. 
In terms of the political opposition, the CHP maintained a balanced stance 
vis-à-vis Iran; it did not oppose better relations with Iran, although it appeared 
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to be against the AKP’s Israel policy. The MHP was not against good relations 
with Iran, despite ideological differences, mainly because of the Kurdish 
security threat and fears that Israel supported the PKK. The BDP welcomed 
Israel’s help but maintained a pessimistic view as to whether Israel or Iran 
wanted the Kurdish issue to be resolved. Throughout the 2000s, there was a 
general tendency of supporting better relations with Iran but no party 
suggested better relations with Iran at the expense of Israel. However the 
analysis also leaves room to suggest that from the AKP’s second term onwards, 
along with military elites, political opposition was not particularly influential as 
regards governmental policies; not only because of the AKP’s consolidated 
power, but also because the Kemalist military-bureaucratic establishment had 
been largely neutralised. 
In the same spirit, public opinion mattered for the AKP but not in its 
entirety. As it becomes more evident in later years, the AKP adopts a 
majoritarian approach to democracy by which it mostly cares about its own 
conservative electoral constituency.660 In this case public opinion reinforced and 
legitimised Turkey’s policies by favouring the anti-Israeli and pro-Iranian 
approach.  
As in the previous case of Turkey’s Israel policies, the AKP demonstrates 
revisionist foreign policy behaviour. The changed security relations of Turkey 
with Israel and Iran, with Turkey clearly siding with Iran661 and freezing its 
                                                          
660 According to the interviews and secondary literature, that is increasingly the case especially after 
2010 and AKP’s victory on the constitutional referendum of September 2010. 
661 See, e.g. Turkey’s support of Iran’s nuclear programme in the UN. 
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security and diplomatic relations with Israel are evidence of willingness for a 
different status quo. This is also evident in Turkey’s ideological – and at the 
same time pragmatic – policy of approaching the Arab world through the 
support of the Palestinians and by turning against Israel. Although Turkey was 
always a supporter of the Palestinian cause, it never before had such close 
relations with the Arab world, especially not at the expense of Israel and this 
should be understood as result of the effect of the AKP elite ideology (balance 
of interests). It should also be kept in mind that Turkey was the first Muslim-
majority country to recognise the Israeli state (see, Table V). 
More specifically, and in line with the analysis in the previous section, 
after 2008, the Gaza war, and the “Mavi Marmara” incident, Turkey had in fact 
employed revisionist strategies towards Israel, such as subversion which tried 
to undermine Israel’s credibility and morality by calling it, for example, a 
terrorist state. TFP did not display a defensive behaviour but a rather 
aggressive one.662 Israel, on the other hand, seemed to be looking for ways to 
balance Turkey’s efforts to assert itself by initiating strategic cooperation with 
Greece and Cyprus. The emerging alliance also had a military aspect which was 
supported in joint exercises by the US as well.663  
                                                          
662 Israel’s aggressiveness towards the Palestinians or the Gaza flotilla should not be neglected. 
However, contrary to Ankara’s Israel policies, it was not directly threatening to Turkey. President of 
Strategy International Dr. Marios Efthymiopoulos. Interview with the author, Nicosia, Cyprus, 26 January 
2013. 
663 Andreas Stergiou, "Greece, Cyprus and Israel change the military balance in the Mediterranean,"  
Geopolitical Information Service(04/12/2013), http://www.geopolitical-info.com/en/geopolitics/greece-
cyprus-and-israel-change-the-military-balance-in-the-mediterranean. 
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In the next section the two cases are analysed in a comparative perspective 
– i.e. CC analysis. Thereby the patterns and differences in the cases of Syria and 
Israel for the 2002-2011 period become clear, the most important drivers of TFP 
are highlighted and TFP behaviour for this period determined and explained. 
These conclusions are later compared to the respective conclusions for the 2011-
2013 period within the framework of the Cross Time analysis. 
 
Table V: Turkey-Israel: The Role of Iran, Causality and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
Most Probable Foreign Policy Outcome under Previous 
Political Establishment (Counterfactual) 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
 
- Balanced relations between Iran and Israeli 
- Maintenance of Turkey-Israel alliance 
- Status Quo Behaviour 
 
Systemic Drivers 
1st Intervening 
Variable (AKP 
elite Ideology) 
2nd Intervening 
Variable 
(Domestic 
Interest Groups) 
Foreign Policy 
Outcome 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
International Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Greater 
affiliation with the 
M.E. 
 
- Prone to 
revisionism in the 
post-Ottoman 
space 
MÜSIAD- 
TÜSIAD 
In favour of good 
economic 
relations 
 
- Balance of 
Interests 
 
- Subversion 
 
- Revisionist 
Behaviour 
System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD & TÜSIAD pressures = Balance of 
Interests/Subversion & Revisionist Behaviour 
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8.1.4. Conclusion – Cross-Case Comparison (2002-2011) 
 
In this section the two case studies during the first period (2002-2011) are 
compared in order for the most important drivers of TFP to be identified and its 
foreign policy behaviour to be determined. In confirmation of the theoretical 
framework’s assumption regarding the dependent variable (foreign policy 
behaviour), Turkey displayed variation in foreign policy outcomes vis-à-vis the 
two case studies. Overall, Turkey’s Syria policy appeared to be status quo 
oriented, while its Israel policy revisionist. 
First, it should again be made clear that systemic changes in early 2000s 
drove Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy; particularly international and 
regional power changes, as well as external threat perceptions. International 
economic interdependencies did not always follow changes in other 
independent variables, as seen in the case of Israel, and this has been attributed 
to the role of business elites and interests as largely autonomous from 
diplomatic and political developments. 
To further clarify the relationship between the systemic and unit levels, 
the reader is reminded that the intervening variables (the AKP elite ideology 
and domestic interests groups) did not by themselves bring about change in 
TFP after 2002; their role was secondary to systemic changes. Thus it is 
highlighted that, to begin with, in the hierarchy of foreign policy drivers 
systemic factors are primary and domestic factors secondary. However, 
analysing TFP only from the perspective of systemic factors leaves a lot of 
issues unexplained such as Turkey’s alignment with Syria and Iran and its 
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disrupted relations with Israel. These were some of the issues dominating the 
debate which tried to comprehend and explain Ankara’s moves during the 
2000s. 
On the other end of the spectrum, much of the discussion was indeed 
deterministic in that it attributed, for example, TFP re-orientation under the 
AKP to ideological or, more generally, ideational factors.664 Some tried to find 
the middle ground by citing a number of systemic and domestic factors,665 but 
causal chains that would explain Turkey’s behaviour have not been established 
– as far as this author is aware. The linkage between systemic and domestic that 
is suggested here is one that attributes the primary role of bringing about 
change to systemic factors. However, domestic factors intervene and ultimately 
determine how the state will respond to external pressures. Therefore, the 
degree and character of the state’s response to systemic dynamics – which may 
be policy change or a more moderate management – depends on domestic 
ideological and material interests. 
As such, Turkey was led to closer relations with the Arab world and Syria 
and Iran in particular not merely because of systemic changes and dynamics 
but because that was how AKP elite ideology and some domestic interest 
groups thought that Turkey should operate within that particular geopolitical 
environment. This was also the case with respect to the decline in Turkish-
Israeli relations. The interplay between the independent and intervening 
                                                          
664 McNamara, Cohen, and Phillips, "Countering Turkey's Strategic Shift."; Çağaptay, "Turkey’s Flip". 
665 Hinnebusch and Tür, "Conclusion."; Özel, "Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: Turkey’s Strategic 
Quest."; Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea; Altunişik and Martin, 
"Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP." 
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variables was seen in both the economic and security policies of Turkey 
towards Syria and Israel; and it was achieved in an effort to stray from 
traditional neorealist analysis by going beyond security considerations and also 
be inclusive of literature debates about economic issues. 
In terms of Turkey’s economic policies towards the two countries, a 
pattern can be identified. Pragmatic business interests, as expressed by 
MÜSIAD and TÜSIAD, prompted Turkey to a more outward economic policy 
of the likes of Özal’s export oriented policy during the 1980s. Indeed, especially 
during the first two terms of the AKP, Turkey displayed a gradual preference 
for the Middle East and the Muslim world when it came to trade relations not 
least because of the rise of “Islamic capital,” its close affiliation to the AKP and 
their preference for trade with the Muslim world. In any case, although 
MÜSIAD and TÜSIAD had their own preferences as to with whom Turkey 
should trade, they did not oppose economic openings since they are ultimately 
profit driven organisations. 
What also becomes clear is the fact that business relations were more able 
to indirectly influence politics, through their economic and ideological 
preferences, than vice versa. This is particularly clear in the case of Israel where 
business elites opposed the deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations but were able 
to maintain good trade relations with Israel despite of them. They were not 
affected by the diplomatic crisis while they also tried to limit the damage in the 
relations of the two countries. 
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In any discussion about Turkish policies from the AKP’s second term 
onwards, the gradual neutralisation of Kemalist military, bureaucratic and, by 
extension, political elites, is significant. On the one hand it rendered them 
unable to effectively oppose the AKP or influence policy-making while on the 
other hand it enabled the AKP to further consolidate its power and thus become 
more authoritarian. As a result, decision-making by 2011 revolved largely 
around PM Erdoğan in particular. Generally, the opposition parties and 
military elites, had little to no role to play throughout the 2000s; indeed, even 
when the AKP’s policies became more concerning for the Kemalist 
establishment (e.g. bad relations with Israel and deeper relations with Iran and 
Syria), they were unable to react effectively. 
Turkey’s security policy shows the importance of systemic factors in 
conjunction with the AKP elite ideology as well. By taking into account the role 
of Iran in Turkey’s relations with both Syria and Israel it becomes clear that it 
had a different effect in each case. Turkey’s choice to align with Syria and Iran 
over maintaining its strategic alliance with Israel and balanced relations with 
the US, points to an overall strategy to assert itself in the region and bring about 
a different regional order in which Israel and American influence would be 
marginalised and Turkey would emerge as a leader among more closely 
affiliated Arab and Muslim states. 
Thus, despite the fact that in the case of Syria Turkey’s economic and 
security policies are status quo oriented and characterised by defensive 
strategies such as soft balancing and balancing, it occurs that in conjunction 
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with Turkey’s Israel policies Turkey aimed for a different regional status which 
would be favourable to itself, especially if seen through the lens of the AKP elite 
worldview. 
Based on the above and the comparison of the two case studies, it has been 
determined that the overall foreign policy of Turkey towards the Middle East 
during the 2000s was revisionist despite variation in foreign policy behaviour 
towards the two cases. After all, that was one of the purposes of this thesis 
which could only be achieved through comparative analysis: to produce at least 
some generalizable conclusions in terms of TFP towards the Middle East under 
the AKP. In the existing literature, there are works arguing that TFP is 
revisionist666 but most of them are of limited scope and more often than not lack 
a comparative perspective. Therefore, not only can their conclusions not be 
generalised but they also miss much of the complexity of why and when 
Turkey is revisionist, thus presenting a rather simplistic view of TFP 
(revisionist) behaviour. 
The other, and indeed overarching, purpose was to clearly identify the 
drivers of TFP towards the Middle East under the AKP as well as the 
combinations of drivers that lead to different foreign policy behaviours. If the 
                                                          
666 For studies seeking to determine TFP behaviour, see for example, Nora Fisher Onar, "Neo 
Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy," Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy 
Studies Discussion Paper Series, no. 2009/03 (October, 2009); İhsan Dağı, "Why is Turkey Going 
Revisionist?,"  Today's Zaman (25,08,2013), http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/ihsan-
dagi_324503_why-is-turkey-going-revisionist.html; Murinson, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st 
Century."; Constantinides, "Νέο-Οθωμανισμός: Έννοια Κλειδί για την Κατανόηση της Σημερινής 
Τουρκίας [Neo-Ottomanism: A Key Concept for Understanding Today’s Turkey]."; Ozden Zeynep Oktav, 
ed. Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Litsas, 
"Bandwagoning for Profit and Turkey: Alliance Formations and Volatility in the Middle East," 125-39; 
Cornell, "What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?." 
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causal chains for each case study (see below) are taken into account the first 
thing to be noted is the independent and primary role of systemic variables 
(underlined in the chains). AKP elite ideology has a secondary role which is 
always at play as the dominant ideology of Turkey’s political establishment, 
especially from the party’s second term onwards. Yet it has to be noted that 
although the ideology remains the same, the foreign policy outcomes produced 
in each case after its intervening role are different since the respective countries 
have a different place in the AKP elite ideology and worldview.  
From that perspective and given the limited role (neutral, supportive or 
marginalised) of other domestic interest groups, AKP elite ideology emerges as 
the most important intervening variable, at least in this period; one that plays a 
key role in filtering systemic dynamics and leading to the foreign policy 
outcome (dependent variable) each time. 
Business groups had a secondary intervening role mainly by pushing for 
increasing economic relations in general and with the Arab/Muslim world in 
particular (MÜSIAD). This was in line with the great emphasis the AKP gave on 
economic policies and relations which were largely driven by conservative 
business elites since they were part of the rising political Islamic movement out 
of which the AKP emerged and the two were thus closely affiliated socially, 
politically and ideologically. However, both business associations proved more 
pragmatic than the AKP. On the one hand they favoured, supported and drove 
the better relations with Arab neighbours and Iran while on the other, they 
resisted the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations at all levels, most notably 
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the economic. Just like they were able to bring Turkey closer to the region with 
regard to economic and trade relations, they were also able to maintain good 
trade relations with Israel in the midst of the diplomatic crisis. 
This means two things. First, that the autonomy of business associations 
allowed them to maintain their profitable businesses. And second, that 
although the AKP may be open to pressures on issues that it is already 
predisposed to accept (such as better relations with the Middle East), it is not 
willing to allow (private) economic interests to intervene in political decisions 
and diplomatic relations. That is why, whereas trade between the two countries 
remained largely unaffected, with the AKP’s contribution (approach and 
policies) as well, pressures from business elites did not manage to contain the 
diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel. 
 
Table VI: Causal Chains in Comparative Perspective (2002-2011) 
Syria (economic policies): System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD pressures = Soft 
Balancing & Status Quo Behaviour 
 
Syria (Iran/security policies): System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD pressures = Soft 
Balancing/Balancing & Status Quo Behaviour 
 
Israel (deteriorating relations): System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD & TÜSIAD 
pressures = Balance of Interest/Subversion & Revisionist Behaviour 
 
Israel (Iran/security policies): System + Elite ideology + MÜSIAD & TÜSIAD pressures  
= Balance of Interests/Subversion & Revisionist Behaviour 
 
From the above it occurs that the only driver which leads to revisionist 
foreign policy behaviour is the one already predisposed towards revisionism, 
i.e. AKP elite ideology. Indeed, although the analysis of different cases might 
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show a different outcome, the overall foreign policy of Turkey cannot be 
understood through isolated cases; one of the advantages of the comparative 
analysis is that it sheds light on the bigger picture. From this perspective, TFP 
was revisionist as it fit Morgenthau’s definition that revisionism is “a policy 
which aims at the overthrow of the status quo, at the reversal of the power 
relations between two or more nations.”667 
Moreover, it also fits the third goal of revisionism set by Morgenthau, that 
is, localised preponderance of power;668 this can also be associated with the 
AKP’s vision for the region and the role it sees Turkey having as a leading 
power. Importantly, Israel is another regional power, though non-Muslim, 
which constitutes a power competitor for Turkey. As such, Turkey’s overall 
Middle Eastern foreign policy, its role as a “prime mover of alliance 
behaviour”669 in the region with anti-Israeli and anti-Western actors, and the 
specific strategies it has employed towards Israel, also suggest revisionist 
behaviour. 
Lastly, whatever the systemic changes, Turkey’s eventual foreign policy 
outcome depends on their filtering by the dominant political ideology. Because 
Turkey’s dominant (elite) ideology under the AKP has been revisionist, as 
elaborated from the beginning, the outcome tends to be revisionist unless 
constrained by other domestic or systemic factors. Examples from the 2011-2013 
period provide further evidence for this claim. In line with one of the initial 
                                                          
667 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace: 27. 
668 Ibid., 36-38. 
669 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 105. 
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propositions of this thesis, it can also be suggested that AKP elite ideology leads 
to revisionism primarily when triggered by system-level changes. In the 
absence of such changes, it has not been observed that the AKP elite ideology 
leads to revisionism though the possibility cannot be excluded. What is more 
likely is that systemic changes provide the opportunity – not only the trigger – 
for revisionist tendencies to be expressed. 
The next section follows the same methodology in the CC comparison of 
TFP towards Syria and Israel for the 2011-2013 period. Causal chains are once 
more established, foreign policy behaviour identified, and the appropriate 
significance is attributed to each foreign policy driver. The CC comparison 
findings for the two time periods are compared in the last section on Cross-
Time comparison and analysis.  
 
8.1.5. 2011-2013: System-Level and Unit-Level Variables 
 
During the 2011-2013 period three major systemic changes influenced the 
foreign policy calculations of Ankara; the “Arab Spring”, the completion of the 
withdrawal of American troops from Iraq (2011), and the developing alliance 
between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Although the former two drivers have 
been considered as the most important ones, all three contributed to the 
changing structure of the regional and international system. 
The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq widened the power vacuum in the 
region which emerged since the 2003 war and which the US partly filled up to 
2011. Apart from exacerbated ethno-religious tensions within Iraq and between 
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states (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran), the result was a power struggle between 
states like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia over who would fill this gap. The 
most important power poles in the region left were Turkey and Iran (as well as 
Saudi Arabia);670 countries such as Israel and Egypt were relatively weaker. In 
addition, the events of the “Arab Spring” and particularly the Syrian civil war 
had a significant effect on the regional balance of power because of its strategic 
relationship with Iran and its part in the Iran-Syria-Turkey alliance. When 
Turkish-Syrian relations moved from amity to enmity in late 2011, Turkey lost 
an important regional partner while Iran’s overall power was weakened as the 
sustainability of Bashar al-Assad’s regime was under threat. 
The US withdrawal from Iraq, together with the largely ineffective 
Western management of the “Arab Spring” point to a decreasing Western role 
in the Middle East and a global power shift that renders the regional level more 
important and gives rise to regional powers as potential leaders and proxy 
actors of greater powers. One such case was Turkey which was favoured by 
these changes and acquired more prominence in American and European eyes 
as well as was able to seek a more autonomous role as a regional power. 
The above-mentioned power changes affected Turkey’s external threat 
perceptions in three ways. First, Turkey and Syria saw again each other as a 
                                                          
670 The examination of Saudi Arabia’s role in the geopolitics of the region prior or after the “Arab Spring” 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. What should be noted is that it played an important role both in Iraq 
and post-2011 Syria, not least by fuelling, according to many, sectarian tensions. For more on this issue 
see, Ayoob, "The Arab Spring," 84-97; Joshua Teitelbaum, "Saudi Arabia, Iran and America in the Wake 
of the Arab Spring," BESA Center Perspectives Paper, no. 140 (2011); Mehran Kamrava, "The Arab Spring 
and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution," Orbis 56, no. 1 (2012): 96-104; Guido Steinberg, "Leading the 
Counter-Revolution: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring," German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs SWP Research Paper, no. 7 (June, 2014); F. Gregory Gause III, "Beyond Sectarianism: The New 
Middle East Cold War," Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, no. 11 (July, 2014). 
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threat; second, the Kurdish issue re-emerged as a security threat because of the 
Syrian civil war; third, sectarian tensions in Iraq and the power struggle 
between Iran and Turkey increased the latter’s threat perceptions towards the 
former two. Moreover, the exacerbated diplomatic crisis between Turkey and 
Israel in September, 2011, increased the threat perceptions between the two 
countries. Israel’s response was the gradual formation and deepening of an 
alliance with Greece and Cyprus; in that sense the three countries balanced 
against a mutually perceived threat.   
In turn, changes in power relations and external threat perceptions, 
affected Turkey’s regional and economic interdependencies. For example, its 
trade volume with “Arab Spring” countries such as Libya decreased radically – 
although it improved once the civil war ended. Similarly Turkey’s highly 
beneficial economic and trade relations with Syria were disrupted because of 
the friction that the civil war caused despite the fact that Ankara took a while 
before opposing the Assad regime, precisely to give their bilateral relations and 
the Syrian war a chance. At the same time that Turkey’s economic and more 
specifically trade relations with the region declined due to the “Arab Spring”, 
its respective relations with the EU and North American countries improved. 
This, along with undisrupted Turkish-Israeli economic relations point to 
Turkey’s pragmatic approach when it comes to economic policies as well as to 
their importance in Turkish foreign relations. 
Turkey’s economic return to the West, without though abandoning the 
Middle East, was coupled with a similar shift in security and strategic terms. 
321 
 
However this change did not improve Turkish-Israeli relations – at least not 
until mid-2013, when they initiated negotiations – nor did it lead, for example, 
to a stronger commitment to the EU. These contradictions are looked at below 
in each case study and by examining the intervening variables in conjunction to 
the systemic level, Turkey’s strategies and foreign policy are identified and 
compared to each other. 
 
8.1.6. Turkey-Syria: Economic and Security Policies (2011-2013) 
 
Turkish foreign policy towards Syria between 2011 and 2013 relates 
essentially to Turkey’s response to the break out of the Syrian civil war. The 
place of Syria in the AKP’s ideological and geo-cultural vision of the region has 
been analysed. The affinity that the AKP saw between Turkey and Syria could 
not in itself explain its eventual hostile stance against the latter. Systemic 
pressures and threat perceptions in conjunction with the intervening role of the 
AKP elite worldviews dictated that change. It should also be reminded that the 
AKP made a distinction between the brutal Assad regime and the Syrian 
“brothers”; an action that rationalised Turkey’s stance so as to fit its ideological 
framework and reassure the Arab and domestic public opinions of its peaceful 
intensions and strengthen its regional image as a democracy promoter (see, 
chapter 7). 
At the same time the AKP’s rhetoric on Syria included references to the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s leading role in the Middle East; evidence of the 
AKP’s (revisionist) aspirations. Yet these aspirations remained only at the 
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rhetoric level as they were constrained by other domestic factors, as seen below. 
Although the analysis provided explanations for both the shift in Turkey’s 
policy towards Syria from amity to enmity and the non-involvement of Turkey 
despite its belligerent proclamations, this section is concerned with the latter as 
that would allow for a more focused analysis and the establishment of clearer 
causal chains. Thus the role of elite ideology and domestic interests groups is 
seen from that perspective. 
Fearing broader regional and domestic (economic) instability, business 
associations wanted to avoid a full scale war with Syria and therefore were 
against a military intervention by Turkey. Both MÜSIAD and TÜSIAD 
favoured a political solution to the problem although MÜSIAD seemed to have 
aspirations for political and economic involvement in a post-Assad Syria 
provided that the regime would be replaced by a pro-Turkey Sunni (e.g. 
Muslim Brotherhood) one. Although it is not clear whether the AKP took these 
particular calls for caution into account, it was rather the overall anti-war 
domestic environment that prevented it from more confrontation. 
In this context all major opposition parties (CHP, MHP and BDP) were 
also against the AKP’s Syria policy and its conflictual tendencies. Their criticism 
was harsh and in line with public opinion surveys that showed widespread 
opposition to any Turkey-driven escalation to the crisis and war with Syria. The 
latter, that is, the role of public opinion, is considered the most important of the 
domestic drivers in this instance. If one takes into account the fact that the AKP 
did not hesitate to escalate the crisis with Israel, it is clear that the only factor 
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that could really influence the AKP’s decision-making was the public opinion – 
due to election considerations – as other groups were neutralised or 
marginalised, while the influence of business elites did not go beyond economic 
policies. Yet public opinion was receptive to the AKP’s particular management 
of the crisis with Israel. Once public opinion – in addition to all other domestic 
groups – appeared not to be receptive of the idea of a Turkish military 
intervention in Syria, the AKP did not proceed according to its declarations and 
aspirations. 
This means that although the product of the AKP elite ideology’s filtering 
of systemic pressures (Syrian civil war) was the projection of revisionist 
aspirations and rhetoric, the above-mentioned domestic factors filtered these 
developments differently and therefore adopted a different stance. They were 
then factored in by the AKP government which did not carry out its threats. 
Evidence of Turkey’s overall revisionist stance towards Syria during that time 
was also the policy of regime change671 which was a clear attempt to alter the 
regional status quo especially if the post-Assad regime in Syria was pro-Turkey 
or, even better, ideologically similar to the AKP, just like the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt or the conservative governments in Tunisia and Libya. 
Moreover, Turkey also used other revisionist strategies such as 
subversion, blackmail672 and bandwagon-for-profit as it rode “free on the 
                                                          
671 According to Gökhan Bacık, this was the first time that Turkey adopted such as policy. Academic Dr. 
Gökhan Bacık. Interview with the author, Ankara, 26 September 2013 
672 Turkey used blackmail and threats of war with Syria in 1998 as well. However those are considered 
defensive strategies if the great threat that Syria posed to Turkey through the support of the PKK and its 
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offensive efforts of others to gain unearned spoils”673 when it turned to its 
traditional allies in NATO, the EU and US for help in overthrowing Assad. 
Lastly, Turkey’s indirect involvement (aid of opposition groups, i.e. subversion) 
and “willingness to manipulate events in Syria to its own purposes” was 
documented in a long investigative report by Seymour Hersh and a much-
discussed leaked discussion between the FM, the Deputy Chief of General Staff, 
and the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.674 It should be noted that, according 
to the tape, the legitimacy of which is disputed, logistical and tactical problems 
were mentioned as reasons Turkey did not go ahead with war plans on Syria. 
Even though Turkey did not intervene in Syria, the abovementioned 
strategies it employed still served revisionist goals which, however, have yet to 
be accomplished. The table (VII) below presents the most important drivers that 
constrained Turkey’s military involvement in Syria. The next section looks at 
Turkey’s policies towards Israel during the same period (2011-2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
militant operations within Turkey is taken into account. That behaviour is different than the use of 
blackmail to the revisionist aim of regime change in this instance. 
673 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 74-75, footnote no. 11. 
674 Seymour M. Hersh, "The Red Line and the Rat Line," London Review of Books 36, no. 8 (2014): 21-24; 
"Leaked Turkish War Plans Against Syria," YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GhL0N1HLhNs. 
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Table VII: Turkey-Syria: Non-intervention, Causality and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
Most Probable Foreign Policy Outcome under Previous 
Political Establishment (Counterfactual) 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Bandwagon with the US/West 
OR 
- Blackmail (defensive) 
Systemic Drivers 
1st Intervening 
Variable (AKP 
elite Ideology) 
2nd Intervening 
Variable (Domestic 
Interest Groups) 
Foreign Policy 
Outcome 
 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International 
Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Greater 
affiliation with 
the M.E. 
 
- Prone to 
revisionism in 
the post-
Ottoman space 
All domestic groups 
pressured for non-
involvement 
 
Public opinion 
(most important 
domestic group) 
- Blackmail 
- Subversion 
- Bandwagon for 
profit 
- Regime Change 
 
- Revisionist 
Behaviour 
but not 
involvement 
System + Elite ideology (constrained) + domestic group pressures = 
Blackmail/Subversion/Bandw. for Profit/Regime Change & Revisionist 
Behaviour 
 
8.1.7.  Turkey-Israel: Economic and Security Policies (2011-2013) 
 
The analysis of TFP towards Israel for the 2011-2013 period, focuses on the 
further escalation in the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel due to 
the release of the UN Palmer report on the “Gaza flotilla” incident. 
As noted in chapter 7, there have been identified two main reasons that 
could explain Turkey’s, and particularly PM Erdoğan’s, harsh and threatening 
stance towards Israel post-2011. The first is the AKP anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic 
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ideology. The second is the already mentioned balance-of-interests approach of 
Turkey which used its bad relations with Israel in order to develop closer 
relations with the Arab world. This was a pragmatic as well as an ideological 
approach since material interests seemed to be intertwined with ideological 
preferences. Given the conservative governments that came to power in the 
Arab world after the revolts, one could understand how regional environment 
was favourable to Turkey and why it tried to capitalise on it. 
The role of domestic interest groups remains similar to the one they had 
during the 2000s, especially after 2007. That is, business groups on the one hand 
pressured the government not to cut off economic ties as that would harm their 
businesses. Some business companies had actually threatened to sue the PM for 
intending to disrupt Turkish-Israeli economic relations. However, even though 
bilateral economic relations were preserved, the influence of business groups, 
specifically MÜSIAD and TÜSIAD, was not able to go beyond economy and 
affect political relations as well. This showed that the AKP was concerned with 
satisfying domestic business interests insofar as it had control over politics and 
diplomatic relations. 
In line with the latter conclusion, opposition political parties did not have 
any influence on the AKP’s foreign policy towards Israel despite their 
disagreement with governmental policies and their attempted pressures. Their 
limited power and the AKP’s increasing authoritarianism made sure of that. 
Lastly, public opinion, just like in the case of other crises between Turkey and 
Israel in the 2000s, was receptive to belligerent rhetoric and anti-Israeli 
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behaviour as such feelings already existed at large within Turkish society. From 
this perspective, the AKP’s Israel policy, the cut off diplomatic ties, the imposed 
sanctions and the threats did not undermine public support of government, at 
least among its own constituency. 
Overall, a number of revisionist strategies were employed by Turkey vis-
à-vis Israel during that time (Table IX). Balance-of-interests was again one of 
them, especially in the midst of the “Arab Spring” regional changes, and 
Turkey’s effort to upgrade its regional status and image. Subversion was also 
on the list as in the previous case study, while blackmail, or coercive diplomacy 
through sanctions and threats for naval action, was added. Moreover, as 
Spyridon Litsas argues in one of the few theoretical accounts of recent Turkish-
Israeli relations, Turkey has tried to undermine its relations with Israel in order 
to improve its own status by bandwagoning-for-profit with the US. One of 
Litsas’ conclusions is that Ankara’s revisionist goal was to upgrade its value for 
Washington and undermine the US-Israel alliance.675 
However, based on this study’s findings, Turkey’s efforts to soft-balance 
with anti-Western actors against the US; the clashing American and Turkish 
interests in the 2000s especially over Iraq; its social and political anti-
Americanism; the AKP’s ideological affinity with the Arab world and the role it 
played in shaping Turkey’s regional policy; its efforts for greater foreign policy 
autonomy; the largely uninterrupted Turkish-Israeli economic relations; and, 
perhaps most importantly, the gradual Turkish-Israeli reconciliation process 
                                                          
675 Litsas, "Bandwagoning for Profit and Turkey: Alliance Formations and Volatility in the Middle East," 
125-27, 36. 
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which started in 2013, show that Litsas’ assumption is in terms of empirical 
evidence not entirely accurate though it may be theoretically sound. That is 
mainly because his interpretation does not take into account how domestic 
drivers (as the ones cited here) filtered system-level changes (e.g. in power 
relations, threat perceptions or economic interdependencies); a fact which 
justifies once again the selection of this thesis’ theoretical framework. 
As seen from the “Arab Spring” Syria case, Turkey did indeed bandwagon 
for profit with the US but it did so later, late 2011 to early 2012, and not to the 
end of undermining US-Israeli relations, but rather to exploit Western support 
for regime change in Syria and thus an altered regional status. As such, 
Turkey’s behaviour in this instance has been revisionist, albeit not for reasons 
such as the ones cited by Litsas. The AKP elite ideology towards Israel was 
again the primary intervening variable which filtered systemic changes and led 
to the revisionist foreign policy outcome. Other domestic drivers were either 
not able to reverse the AKP’s policy due to their marginalised or neutralised 
role, or supportive of AKP policies (public opinion). Lastly, it is noted that 
Turkey’s security and economic policies were once again dissociated since 
despite the deteriorated bilateral relations and Ankara’s revisionist behaviour, 
business elites managed to sustain economic relations (see, Table VIII). 
The next section conducts the CC analysis for the 2011-2013 period, by 
comparing the conclusions and causal chains of the case studies on Syria and 
Israel. The next and final section deals with the Cross-Time analysis and draws 
the final conclusions of this chapter.  
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Table VIII: Turkey-Israel: 2011 Deterioration, Causality and Foreign Policy 
Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
Most Probable Foreign Policy Outcome under Previous 
Political Establishment (Counterfactual) 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Balanced relations between Iran and Israeli 
- Maintenance of Turkey-Israel alliance 
- Balance with Israel against “Arab Spring” 
challenges 
- Status Quo Behaviour 
Systemic Drivers 
1st Intervening 
Variable (AKP 
elite Ideology) 
2nd Intervening 
Variable (Domestic 
Interest Groups) 
Foreign Policy 
Outcome 
 
International Power 
Changes 
+ 
External Threat 
Perceptions 
+ 
International Economic 
Interdependencies 
- Greater 
affiliation with 
the M.E. 
 
- Prone to 
revisionism in 
the post-
Ottoman space 
MÜSIAD/TÜSIAD  
(pressured for 
uninterrupted 
economic relations) 
  
CHP/MHP/BDP 
(Marginalised)   
 
Public opinion 
(receptive) 
- Blackmail 
- Subversion 
- Balance of 
Interests 
 
- Revisionist 
Behaviour 
 
System + Elite ideology + domestic group pressures = 
Blackmail/Subversion/Balance of Interests & Revisionist Behaviour 
 
8.1.8. Cross-Case Comparison 
 
This section compares and contrasts the cases of Syria and Israel in TFP for 
the 2011-2013 period. Once again the drivers behind TFP are identified and its 
foreign policy behaviour for this period determined. An important difference 
identified in TFP behaviour of this period, one that will be further analysed in 
the CT analysis, is the fact that it appears to be revisionist with regard to both 
Syria and Israel; contrary to the previous period where Turkey adopted a 
revisionist policy towards Israel and a status quo one towards Syria. 
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It is reminded that the division of TFP into two periods was based on 
changes in the primary independent variable (power relations) and therefore on 
the changes brought about by the “Arab Spring.” According to this thesis’ NcR 
theoretical framework, these (power) changes were primary in affecting the 
other two independent (systemic) variables at first (external threat perceptions 
and economic interdependence). In turn, these changes were filtered by 
domestic factors which intervened in the production of foreign policy outcomes 
and behaviour (dependent variable). 
The case of Syria was examined through the lens of the AKP’s eagerness to 
get more involved in the country’s civil war and its eventual non-involvement 
directly and militarily. For the case of Israel, Turkey’s management of the 2011 
deterioration of bilateral relations after the release of the UN Palmer report was 
analysed. In both cases the role of economic and security policies in the 
aforementioned foreign policy outcomes was looked at simultaneously, while 
the relationship between the two was also addressed. 
In the midst of the “Arab Spring,” it seemed that the role of Syria and 
Israel in TFP became more significant than ever. In accordance with the AKP’s 
ideological vision for the region, Turkey tried to capitalise on the “Arab Spring” 
changes and emerge as a leading actor. To that end, Israel had to be 
marginalised both because of its non-Muslim nature and instrumental role in 
Turkey’s approach of the Arab world. On the other hand, the “Arab Spring” 
allowed Turkey to pursue a regime change policy on Syria in order to change 
the regional status for its own benefit, while the distinction it drew between the 
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Assad regime and the Syrian people fit its ideological approach of historical and 
brotherly relations with regional peoples. 
As the dominant ideology of Turkey’s political establishment, and as seen 
earlier, the AKP elite ideology emerges as the primary intervening variable. Its 
revisionist content has become even more salient as a result of the regional 
changes and the domestic processes of growing authoritarianism which began 
in the previous decade. Based on the case study analyses of this period, the 
AKP ideology was not merely the most important intervening variable; it was 
also the most powerful as it only seemed receptive or open to business groups 
or public opinion constraints. What is more, business groups have only been 
able to influence economic policy and, therefore, not high level political 
relations. As such, public opinion has proved to be the only domestic factor – at 
least of those examined in this thesis – that could constrain the AKP’s 
revisionist aspirations. 
Turkey’s revisionist tendencies in this period’s case were expressed 
through strategies such as blackmail, subversion, bandwagon-for-profit and 
regime change in Syria as well as blackmail, subversion and balance-of-interests 
in the case of Israel. It has been explained, that in the case of Syria systemic 
changes such as changes in regional power relations and in external threat 
perceptions affected Turkey’s policies. Economic interdependencies were one of 
the most important reasons why Turkey delayed the shift in its policy but, 
eventually, the other two independent variables affected economic policies as 
well, and Turkish-Syrian relations moved from amity to enmity. 
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From that point onwards the AKP elite ideology’s intervening role led to 
an offensive revisionist stance rather than a defensive one. However, it has been 
argued that Turkey did not go through with its threats of war against Syria 
mainly because of domestic concerns. Although, in this case, all domestic 
groups opposed the AKP’s belligerent rhetoric and intensions, the highly 
negative public opinion has been identified as the most important factor that 
prevented further Turkish engagement in Syria since the party’s electoral base 
has always been essential for its stay in power.  
Similarly, in the 2011 case of Israel, political, diplomatic and security 
policies had deteriorated even further than in 2010 as the two countries had 
moved from amity to enmity as well. There, not only did public opinion not 
pose any obstacles to the AKP’s revisionist strategies but it also favoured them. 
Business elites, as seen from the examination of the two business associations, 
refused to sacrifice their interests at the altar of political disputes and their 
government’s offensive reaction. Their pressures as well as their autonomy at 
large as private capital, allowed them to retain Turkish-Israeli economic 
relations. As such Turkey was benefiting both economically and politically – at 
least in the AKP’s eyes. 
On the contrary, due to the global outcry and the practical difficulties that 
the civil war posed, economic ties between Turkey and Syria could not be 
preserved, while both MÜSIAD and TÜSIAD had condemned the Assad regime 
for its brutal practices. There was not opposition by business groups against the 
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disruption of all ties, only against the AKP’s intension to get militarily involved 
in Syria as the calculated risks and costs were too high. 
These are important findings and they have only been made possible 
because of the comparative analysis: the comparison of each case study’s causal 
chains (see Table IX). This kind of systematic and CC comparative analysis has 
not only allowed for the identification of inter-level relations (systemic and 
unit) but also for establishing a hierarchy of significance among the different 
domestic and external drivers and variables. 
 
 Table IX: Causal Chains in Comparative Perspective (2011-2013) 
 
Syria: System + Elite ideology (constrained) + domestic group pressures = 
Blackmail/Subversion/Bandwagon for Profit/Regime Change & Revisionist 
Behaviour 
 
Israel: System + Elite ideology + domestic group pressures = 
Blackmail/Subversion/Balance of Interests & Revisionist Behaviour 
 
The overall conclusion about this period’s TFP behaviour is that it became 
revisionist in both cases. In other words, its revisionist behaviour increased 
without that meaning, however, that it managed to accomplish its goals. Thus, 
revisionism refers to the pursued goals and undertaken strategies (foreign 
policy outcome), not their success or failure. Moreover, this theoretical 
framework and methodology supports the drawing of dynamic and complex 
conclusions with regard to the drivers of TFP towards the Middle East, Syria 
and Israel in particular. No other work – at least of those reviewed or cited in 
this thesis – has established causal chains of TFP drivers or, more importantly, 
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has identified what is the causal significance of each factor. The importance of 
such a task lies in the fact that it provides a better understanding of the drivers 
that are most important in shaping TFP, or identifies the foreign policy 
behaviour that tends to be produced when certain drivers dominate decision-
making. This, in turn, enables at least limited predictions. 
As such, the contribution of this thesis to the existing literature advances 
the understanding of the role of each of the examined systemic and domestic 
factors as well as of the relationship between them. As noted in the previous 
chapter, it also contributes to the debate about TFP behaviour by providing a 
detailed answer, which is further substantiated below. 
Therefore, at this point it can be said that the selection of the NcR 
theoretical framework was justified and served its purpose since it has helped 
greatly in the identification of TFP drivers under the AKP towards the Middle 
East which was the overarching goal of this thesis. However, in order to reach 
the final conclusions, according to the methods of analysis employed in this 
thesis, one more step remains to be made; that is, the Cross-Time (CT) 
comparative analysis as elaborated in the next section.  
 
8.2. Conclusions: Cross-Time Analysis 
 
The final and shorter section of this chapter focuses on the Cross-Time 
comparative analysis. Specifically, its goal is to compare and contrast the 
conclusions of each period’s CC analysis in order to draw more generalizable 
conclusions about TFP drivers and behaviour, as well as to address the debate 
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about continuity and change in TFP, respectively. The analysis is divided into 
four categories, based on four theoretical parameters: the relationship between 
the system and unit level, between the economic and security policy sectors, the 
hierarchy of TFP drivers, and the relationship between revisionist and status quo 
behaviour (dependent variable). This final step of analysis will lead to a 
comprehensive answer in the initial question of the thesis in terms of the 
foreign policy-making dynamics and foreign policy behaviour under the AKP 
with specific regard to the Middle East (Syria and Israel). 
 
Independent and Intervening Variables – System vs. Unit Level 
 
The independent and intervening variables as suggested in the theoretical 
framework have proved valuable and instrumental in both analysing the case 
studies and drawing complex and specific conclusions about TFP drivers and 
behaviour. Importantly, the systematic analysis and (comparative) methods 
have led to findings that address the systemic and unit level in an integrative 
way as well as the relationship between the two. As well, the independent 
variables, and specifically the primary one (power changes), have helped in the 
understanding of change in TFP and in the methodological division of the case 
studies into two periods according to systemic changes (“Arab Spring”). 
As it has been repeatedly noted, the system level and its three 
independent variables (international power changes, external threat 
perceptions, and economic interdependence) had a primary role in driving TFP. 
However, the inclusion of different kinds of variables (e.g. security and 
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economy based) has allowed, as stated from the beginning, to address the 
interplay between the system and unit level as well as address the relationship 
between Turkey’s foreign security and economic policies. The latter bears a 
particular significance given the strong tendency in the literature by different 
scholars to evaluate the overall TFP on the basis of the one or the other policy 
sector thus being led to misapprehensions.676 
Yet, the independent variables by themselves would not have been 
adequate in drawing such conclusions. By introducing intervening variables at 
the unit level, in line with the NcR theoretical framework and according to the 
identified debates and gaps in the literature, it has been made obvious that 
domestic actors play an important role in defining the final foreign policy 
outcomes of Turkey. In fact, without accounting for the intervening role of 
factors such as the AKP elite ideology or some domestic interest groups, TFP 
would have been very difficult to understand, as often happens in the literature. 
Moreover, the integration of the two levels has not only allowed the 
analysis to go beyond security issues (as a classical or neo- realist analysis 
would do), but it also favoured the inclusion of both material and ideational 
factors (i.e. ideology) and therefore avoided the trap of either material or 
ideational determinism; another problem that has been identified in the 
literature at the beginning of this thesis. 
                                                          
676 Hasan Kösebalaban, "Turkey and the New Middle East: Between Liberalism and Realism," 
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs XVI, no. 3 (2011): 93-114; Tarık Oğuzlu, "Realism versus 
Liberalism in Turkish Foreign Policy: What does the Arab Spring herald?," Ortadoğu Analiz 5, no. 56 
(2013): 39-51; Hakan Fidan, "A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy," Middle East Policy 20, 
no. 1 (2013): 91-96. 
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It has been argued that TFP is driven neither solely by ideological 
concerns nor by material ones. Rather, it has been elaborated that material and 
ideological interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Economic 
development, for example, or neoliberal accumulation of capital and general 
power increase, does not necessarily contradict the AKP elite ideology; in fact 
many argue that the AKP expresses an “Islamic” version of neoliberalism.677 
However, the AKP elite ideology plays a primary domestic role in filtering 
systemic pressures, material concerns and interests, through its own lens. Thus 
it orientates or re-orientates Turkey towards a foreign policy path through 
which those interests would be served in accordance to the party’s particular 
ideological vision as analysed in the section about the AKP’s political Islamic 
ideology. 
In what follows, specific attention is first paid to the economy versus 
security nexus. The above-mentioned observations regarding the levels and 
variables of analysis, together with the observations about Turkey’s security 
and economic policies, are employed in the last section of this chapter which 
seeks to analyse the variation in TFP behaviour as well as Turkey’s overall 
foreign policy behaviour towards the Middle East under the AKP, through a CT 
comparison.  
 
 
                                                          
677 Moudouros, "The 'harmonization' of Islam with the Neoliberal Transformation. The Case of Turkey."; 
Atasoy, Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism; Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in 
Turkey: The Case of the AKP. 
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Economy vs. Security 
 
There were two main reasons why these two kinds of Turkish policies 
(economic and security) were explored in this thesis. First, there was the need to 
relax the traditional neorealist approach within the framework of NcR as 
security alone could not explain TFP, not least because much of the literature 
takes into account the economic aspect of Turkey’s external relations as well. 
Second, the analysis of security policies would be able to address issues brought 
up by mostly realist literature, while economic policies would similarly address 
more economy-related analyses and particularly liberalist approaches. 
Security concerns have been mostly seen through the prism of AKP elite 
ideology in conjunction with the second independent variable (external threat 
perceptions) which is, however, affected by changes in the first and primary 
independent variable (international power changes). Economic interests have 
been associated with the interests of business elites (as expressed through 
MÜSIAD and TÜSIAD) in conjunction with the third independent variable 
(economic interdependence). The examination of these independent and 
intervening variables for the 2002-2011 and 2011-2013 periods showed the role 
that each one played in TFP as well as their respective significance. 
As the hierarchy of the independent variables shows, security has been 
more important than economy. Moreover, changes in security concerns and 
threat perceptions tend to affect Turkey’s international economic 
interdependencies, albeit not always. During the first period (2002-2011), as 
changes in the international and regional power relations led Turkey closer to 
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the Middle East, stronger economic ties with this region were also established. 
Both AKP elite ideology, which favoured closer relations with its neighbours, 
and business interests, played their own role. 
This was especially the case with the conservative business association, 
MÜSIAD, the interests and ideology of which were largely intertwined with 
those of the AKP, and that pushed for better relations with the region. The more 
secular business association of TÜSIAD as well as political opposition parties 
and public opinion, were open to better economic relations with the region. As 
such, material and ideological interests were interconnected; they filtered 
structural power and security changes thus leading to Turkey’s so called new 
foreign policy with a focus on the Middle East. 
Throughout the decade, it seemed that Turkey’s overall foreign policy in 
the region was in line with business and economic interests, while other 
domestic groups did not seem to have a problem with Ankara’s outward 
economic policies. However, domestic developments, notably in 2007 and 2010 
as analysed, resulted in a gradually more authoritarian stance by the AKP 
which paid little to no attention to pressures from other domestic groups, apart 
from public opinion, and somewhat less attention to business associations. This 
strengthened the filtering role of the AKP ideology and therefore pushed for 
more ideological driven policies – e.g. better relations with Iran and Syria, and 
worse relations with Israel. 
Security policies had again surpassed economic ones in the sense that 
political relations were mainly based on the former, not the latter. That is, 
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economic interdependencies, such as the one with Israel, did not prevent the 
disruption of diplomatic relations. In contrast, it seemed that developments in 
security or political relations were more likely to go forward or be prevented 
depending on the support or disapproval of public opinion, respectively.  
The same pattern can be seen in the 2011-2013 period. Despite flourishing 
economic and specifically trade relations between Turkey and Israel, diplomatic 
and security relations deteriorated even further than in 2010. On the one hand, 
this highlights the primacy of security policies in TFP while on the other hand, 
it shows the ability of business groups to influence economic policies as well as 
their relative autonomy from political developments, as noted repeatedly. 
Security has emerged as the most important issue in the 2011-2013 case of Syria 
as well. Although the strong economic (and other) interdependence between 
Turkey and Syria was the main reason behind Turkey’s delay to turn against 
the Assad regime, Turkey eventually adopted one of the harshest stances seen 
vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war. It did so due to the irreversible point that the civil 
war reached and all the issues that this entailed. It was a mixture of rising 
security concerns and ideological incentives such as “democracy promotion” 
(i.e. regime change) and everything that came with it (see, chapter 7). In other 
words, Turkey’s democracy promotion mainly served as a communicative or 
populist strategy which was directed towards the Arab world and domestic 
public opinion.678  
                                                          
678 Although in late 2014 these attitudes may have changed due to the rise of the so called “Islamic 
State” (or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) and the role the Assad regime played in fighting them, polls 
between 2011 and 2013 show a clear tendency in favour of regime change in Syria. In 2011 most poll 
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If, therefore, security is the primary concern of TFP, though veiled under 
the AKP elite ideology, it then follows that economy, and specifically 
(neo)liberal philosophy, is not the primary driving force behind TFP towards 
the Middle East as has been claimed in part of the literature.679 However, this 
should not distract from the fact that generally the AKP has paid a lot of 
attention to economic growth and development as well as to external economic 
relations specifically with the Middle East. 
Overall, the discussion about Turkey’s security and economic policies has 
shown what kinds of interests are more important and in that sense helped in 
the establishment of a hierarchy in which economic interests are secondary to 
security and also largely independent within the framework of a liberalised and 
decentralised domestic and global economy. The different external and 
domestic drivers analysed were instrumental in this analysis as without 
accounting for the one sector or the other through the appropriate drivers (from 
a CC and CT comparative perspective) it would not be possible to address this 
relationship and establish a hierarchy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
respondents were against the Syrian government and believed that Turkey was playing a positive role 
(Arab American Institute Foundation poll). In a 2012/2013 survey these attitudes were not much 
different as 77% of the respondents still wanted regime change in Syria and 66% thought it was possible 
(Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies poll). In fact, it has also been reported that, by extension, 
Iran’s image in the Arab world has also been harmed because of its support for Assad’s regime in Syria. 
See, "Arab Attitudes Toward Syria: 2011," Arab American Institute (2011): 3-4; "The ACRPS Announces 
the Results of the 2012/2013 Arab Opinion Index,"  Arab Center for Rsearch & Policy Studies(June, 2013), 
http://english.dohainstitute.org/content/af5000b3-46c7-45bb-b431-28b2de8b33c7; Barbara Slavin, 
"Poll: Sectarianism, Syria Drive Negative Image of Iran,"  Al-Monitor(05/03/2013), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/zogby-poll-negative-arab-attitudes-iran-syria.html#. 
679 E.g., Habibi and Walker, "What Is Driving Turkey’s Reengagement with the Arab World?."; Kutlay, 
"Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign Policy’: A Political Economy Explanation." 
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Hierarchy of Foreign Policy Drivers– Systemic vs. Domestic 
 
Before looking at TFP behaviour and issues of continuity and change, the 
external and domestic drivers that have been analysed throughout the thesis in 
the form of (independent and intervening) variables are here summarised in 
brief and put into a hierarchical order (see, Figure III).  
Firstly, the systemic variables have an overall primary role in impacting 
TFP. However, the primary independent variable is international power 
changes. Therefore changes in international power relations affect the second 
independent variable in the hierarchy which is external threat perceptions. In 
turn, international economic interdependence, which is the third intervening 
variable, undergoes change, albeit not always due to the fact that economic 
interests and therefore policies are to a great extent dissociated from other 
diplomatic and security changes. 
At the unit level, it has been determined that the AKP elite ideology is the 
most important and therefore the primary intervening variable that plays a key 
role in the foreign policy outcome. The second most important intervening 
variable was public opinion as it was the only one able to constrain TFP; 
similarly, the AKP was able to pursue certain policies with ease only when 
public opinion was supportive of or not against them. The next domestic 
variable in line is the one of business associations (specifically, MÜSIAD and 
TÜSIAD) since they have emerged as able to greatly influence Turkey’s 
economic policies (yet not politics per se), despite political instability, and thus 
render Turkey’s external economic relations largely autonomous. 
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Opposition parties (CHP, MHP, and BDP) as well as Kemalist military 
elites are at the bottom of the hierarchy of foreign policy drivers as they have 
played a limited or no role. That was not because they did not oppose or not try 
to pressure the government, but because their efforts were not successful. What 
can be said, however, is that during the first years of the AKP’s governance, the 
still powerful Kemalist opposition (both the military elites and the political 
parties, especially the CHP) was one of the reasons why, the AKP was relatively 
moderate domestically and externally in relation to its post-2007 domestic and 
foreign policy behaviour. 
Lastly, there are some links between independent and intervening 
variables that should be mentioned. That is, causal links between drivers that 
mainly have to do with specific policy sectors. First, the first and second 
independent variables are mostly associated with the primary intervening 
variable (the AKP elite ideology) as well as with the public opinion. If for 
example changes occur in power relations and threat perceptions, the AKP elite 
ideology would be the primary filtering variable at the unit level which would 
determine the response of TFP, unless public opinion opposes the AKP’s 
intentions. Similarly, economic interdependence is linked to the interests of 
business associations, as well as to the AKP elite ideology. The political and 
military opposition is concerned with all these issues but, as noted, it has 
limited role in Turkish foreign policy-making. 
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The analysis now turns to the final section and the dependent variable 
which concerns primarily TFP outcomes and behaviour as well as patterns of 
continuity and change. 
Figure III: Hierarchy of Turkey’s Foreign Policy Drivers 
 
Revisionism vs. Status Quo – Continuity and Change 
 
The final comparison that needs to be made is between TFP behaviour in 
different periods. This Cross-Time comparison of foreign policy behaviour 
draws upon the results of the Cross-Case comparative analysis for the two 
System Level - Independent Variables (Primary Drivers) 
 
International Power Changes 
(Primary Ind. Variable) 
 
External Threat Perceptions 
 
International Economic Interdependence 
(Occasionally unaffected from other independent variables) 
Unit Level – Intervening Variables 
(Secondary-Intervening Drivers) 
 
The AKP elite Ideology 
(Primary Interv. Variable) 
 
Public Opinion 
(Second most important interv. variable) 
 
Business Associations (MÜSIAD & TÜSIAD) 
(Third most important interv. variable) 
 
Opposition Parties & Military Elites 
(Little to no role or complementary to the 2nd & 3rd interv. variables) 
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periods in question, respectively (2002-2011 and 2011-2013). Thereby Turkey’s 
overall foreign policy behaviour is evaluated in conjunction with a discussion 
about continuity and change. In other words, variation in TFP behaviour across 
time cannot be dissociated from questions about continuity and change, despite 
the role of different external and domestic drivers. 
As concluded in the CC analysis of both periods, TFP behaviour has been 
revisionist in both cases. Although during the 2002-2011 period Turkey 
maintained a status quo behaviour towards Syria, it has been deducted that due 
to its revisionist Israel policies and its overall projected revisionist aspirations, 
TFP behaviour was revisionist. Between 2011 and 2013 this became even clearer 
since Turkey adopted revisionist behaviour towards both Syria and Israel. The 
primary reasons for Turkey’s change towards Syria in particular, were the 
systemic changes brought about by the “Arab Spring” and, by extension, the 
Syrian civil war. 
Although TFP has been overall revisionist, its employed strategies during 
the first period, as opposed to those of the second period, point to a less hostile 
stance and more peaceful relations with the region; Israel was perhaps the 
exception. In both cases the revisionist AKP elite ideology played an important 
role in responding to systemic changes in a revisionist way. However, TFP 
behaviour would be better understood if the systemic context of each period 
was looked at. In this regard the regional and international structure of the 
system is significant in understanding how revisionism was enabled or 
constrained. 
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As Lesser notes about the first period, 
 
‘Zero problems with neighbors’ may have been a self-defined 
caricature, but it has been a reasonably accurate description of the 
benign regional environment facing Turkey over the last decade. 
This was also a highly permissive environment in economic terms, 
encouraging a significant expansion of Turkey’s commercial ties with 
Middle Eastern and Eurasian neighbors, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and above all, Russia.680 
 
Turkey’s closer ties with the region were not only part of the revisionist vision 
of the AKP elite ideology nor were they merely driven by the interplay between 
systemic pressures and intervening elite ideas. They were also permitted by a 
relatively benign environment in which the most important problem was the 
issue of Iraq over which Turkey and the US disagreed and saw their 
relationship deteriorating. This environment with its limited problems allowed 
Turkey to build up a regional anti-Western alliance, it allowed it to adopt anti-
Western policies and soft balance against the US. It also allowed it to strongly 
oppose and challenge Israel as its ideology and affiliated material interests 
dictated. 
In other words, Turkey’s external environment after 2002 helped it to set 
in motion its vision for the region mainly without having to use offensive 
strategies, apart from the case of Israel. The case of Israel underpins this point 
as it was the only state in the region that really posed an obstacle to the AKP’s 
                                                          
680 Lesser, "Turkey's Third Wave," 2. 
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vision of an integrated Middle East under Turkish leadership, both because of 
its high power status and its non-Muslim nature. Thus, it had to be confronted. 
After 2011, the systemic context was different. When the “Arab Spring” 
broke out it caught Turkey by surprise and forced it to manage a threatening 
environment. This process made Turkey’s revisionist intensions clearer and that 
is because its response to systemic changes was a matter of will and choice. Its 
foreign policy was failing not because it changed but because the regional 
setting was changing. The revisionist vision of AKP elite could no longer be 
implemented through the same policies employed during most of the 2000s. 
Thus after 2011, Turkey chose to adopt more revisionist strategies in order to be 
able to implement the AKP elite ideological vision. As such it declared that it 
would lead the change in the Middle East, it pursued regime change in Syria 
and became even more hostile towards Israel. The AKP’s goals could no longer 
be pursued with relatively benign strategies; more drastic strategies had to be 
followed for the achievement of a different regional status, one that would be 
more favouring to Turkey. 
In addition, Turkey amidst such regional instability realised that it could 
not bring about the change it wanted by itself without facing a backlash of high 
security risks (e.g. Kurdish separatism) and thus tried to capitalise its 
relationship with the US and NATO. It was then that Turkey bandwagoned for 
profit with the US in its effort to overthrow the Assad regime. As said earlier, 
Turkey’s “Arab Spring” revisionist behaviour (which is in itself an important 
finding) reaffirms its revisionist tendencies during the first period as well, and 
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this observation is an advantage provided by the CT analysis. Moreover, it has 
to be remembered that Turkey’s increasing revisionist behaviour can be also 
attributed to the gradually consolidated and dominating power and ideology of 
the AKP. The more powerful and autonomous it became, the more it projected 
and employed revisionist aspirations and strategies, respectively. 
At this point an observation needs to be made about the role of the AKP 
elite ideology in order to address another one of the initial goals of this thesis 
which was to identify the extent to which TFP is driven by material or 
ideational motivations. To begin with, this thesis has argued that material 
systemic pressures are the primary drivers. However it has also been argued 
that these material interests are seen and filtered through the prism of the AKP 
elite ideology and therefore the two are intertwined. As made clear by now, an 
ideology exists at the elite level and that is political Islamism. It also plays a 
primary domestic role towards the formation of foreign policy outcomes. 
However, this ideology is not always able to influence policy-making, it is not 
always able to respond to systemic changes in the way that it would like. That 
is because it is occasionally constrained by domestic factors such as public 
opinion and business elites or system-level factors. 
Generally, the AKP displayed a continuity in its revisionist aspirations, 
albeit they became more vocal and confidently pursued after its second election 
to power. The change therefore does not lie in aspirations or goals but in the 
employed strategies. And the employed strategies changed into a more 
offensive and confrontational form in accordance to changes in the independent 
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variables. This is again a reaffirmation of the initial assumption that change is 
primarily prompted by systemic changes. 
With regard to continuity and change in TFP before and after the AKP’s 
election to power, the comments that can be made for the pre-AKP foreign 
policy of Turkey towards Syria are limited as they have not been examined in 
detail. In that sense the overall goals of previous governments are difficult to be 
compared with the ones of the AKP. If however the widespread argument that 
Turkey has diachronically pursued to become a regional power is considered, it 
could be argued that there is a great degree of continuity. 
Yet, apart from exceptions of conservative governments or coalitions in 
Turkey’s history, Kemalist governments did not aspire to a geo-culturally 
integrated region with Turkey as its leader. Their vision was rather based on 
material power capabilities. On the contrary, it could be argued that the AKP’s 
aspirations are more concurrent with a role that involved power elements other 
than material capabilities; mostly resembling a hegemonic role – one that this 
thesis does not comprehensively account for.681 Moreover, Kemalists were 
known for their isolationist and status quo orientation; they rarely decided to 
challenge the status quo and those attempts are still debated today. 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the AKP’s revisionist efforts have not 
been particularly successful. Turkey’s status and role has improved but it has 
rather been driven by and reacting to changes than been able to influence the 
developments and the regional status or distribution of power. Revisionist 
                                                          
681 Mufti, "A Little America: The Emergence of Turkish Hegemony." 
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efforts were made, strategies employed and ideas expressed but revisionist 
goals in the Middle East have not been achieved, at least not yet. This has at 
least partly to do with the fact that such revisionist efforts are not well-received 
in the region (e.g. from Israel, Iran or Egypt) and, among other things, produce 
political and diplomatic resistance. As well, it is important that Turkey’s 
revisionist aspirations did not entirely decouple Turkey from the West. It is still 
an EU candidate member-state, a US ally, and a NATO member despite 
occasional tensions or anti-Western Turkish rhetoric and policies.  
The implications of these findings about Turkey’s broader foreign policy 
orientation and particularly its relations with the West are addressed in the 
concluding chapter along with a discussion about this thesis’ theoretical and 
empirical strengths and limitations, and suggestions for improvements and 
further research. 
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9. Conclusions 
 
Having as a starting point Turkey’s much debated foreign policy, this thesis 
sought to address the central and overarching question, what are the foreign 
policy-making dynamics under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – 
with specific reference to the Middle East? To that end it reviewed important 
works in the literature on TFP and found gaps which concern the ideational-
material drivers, security-economic policies, and the system-unit level nexus. In 
order for these issues to be addressed, a NcR theoretical framework was 
employed which integrates both system and unit levels by introducing 
domestic intervening variables in addition to system-level independent 
variables.  
The theoretical framework also covers the divide between ideational and 
material foreign policy drivers as it addresses both ideological (AKP elite 
ideology) policy-making issues as well as material ones (external power 
relations, domestic political and economic interests, foreign economic policies). 
Lastly, it allows for the analysis to go beyond traditional realism’s focus on 
security and involve economic factors thus bridging to a certain extent realist, 
liberalist, and political economy approaches to TFP. 
But the contribution of this theoretical framework, and ultimately of the 
thesis, does not only lie in its ability to integrate levels of analysis, drivers and 
policies; it also lies in its ability to facilitate the establishment of causal chains 
between systemic and domestic foreign policy drivers and correlate them with 
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specific foreign policy outcomes. The case study and comparative methodology 
also contributed to this task. Through a Cross-Case and Cross-Time 
comparative analysis of the case studies it has been made possible to draw 
conclusions about the causal weight of certain drivers as well as identify the 
causal chains both in each case study and in the overall TFP towards the Middle 
East. As such, and in addition to the findings of the comparative analysis 
(chapter 8), it is now possible to provide answers to the overarching question of 
the thesis and the sub-questions, and at the same time address the propositions 
that were suggested in chapter 3. The answer to the overarching question also 
reflects the central argument of the thesis. 
 
What are the foreign-policy making dynamics under the AKP? 
 
As noted throughout the main analysis of the thesis, there are both 
material and ideational dynamics in Turkish foreign policy-making. Building 
upon existing approaches to TFP and according to the NcR theoretical 
framework, it has been argued that system-level dynamics are primary in 
influencing TFP. In addition, and as initially stated in the proposed hierarchy of 
drivers in chapter 3, the three most important systemic drivers have been 
identified as being the changes in international relative power, external threat 
perceptions of Turkey, and the country’s international economic 
interdependencies, in this order. The domestic drivers (AKP elite ideology and 
domestic interest groups) have a secondary and intervening role. In that sense, 
domestic drivers do not have a direct or independent impact on TFP; they 
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rather play the role of filtering external-systemic dynamics and changes thereby 
contributing to the foreign policy outcome. 
It is maintained that systemic drivers compel a state to act. Although this 
means that TFP is propelled by changes and developments in its external 
environment, it does not mean that the foreign policy outcome is always the 
same. As the analysis of the case studies has shown, the pressures of domestic 
drivers have their own part to play as, for example, elites with different 
ideologies would deal with an external challenge in different ways. Similarly, 
different domestic interest groups have their own interest to secure and, 
depending on how democratic a political system is, they may or may not exert 
pressure successfully over the government towards accomplishing their own 
goals. This latter point was affirmed in the thesis as it occurred that domestic 
interest groups – and particularly business associations – had more influence 
when Turkey was more democratic. Once the AKP’s rule took an authoritarian 
turn, their role was diminished. At the same time, as also proposed at the 
beginning, the fact that Turkey’s external economic relations have been largely 
unaffected by political relations should be also attributed to the liberalisation 
and decentralisation of the state and economy. 
To directly answer the initial and overarching question in accordance to 
the above-mentioned, it should be said that the foreign policy-making 
dynamics under AKP (2002-2013) have been primarily the power changes that 
occurred post-2003 (Iraq war) and post-2011 (“Arab Spring”). In turn, Turkey’s 
threat perceptions were altered as well as much of its economic 
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interdependencies. The ideology of AKP elites is particularly noteworthy as it 
was the most important domestic driver; one that gradually differentiated TFP 
decisions from the previous Kemalist establishment. As the analysis showed, 
AKP elite ideology has more often than not predominated over pressures from 
domestic interest groups, though business associations kept some influence 
over economic issues; also, it can be suggested that public opinion was taken 
into account by the AKP, especially during the relatively few times that it 
expressed opposite preferences than those of the AKP. 
More details about the foreign-policy making dynamics under the AKP 
have been provided in the case studies and the comparative analysis. To the 
end of providing a more complete picture of TFP, certain sub-questions are 
answered so as to address pivotal issues regarding TFP debated in the 
literature. 
 
Is there evidence of revisionism or Islamic ideological incentives in TFP? 
 
One of the central discussions in the literature about TFP – and one of the 
central arguments of this thesis – regards TFP behaviour; namely, whether it is 
revisionist or not. As seen in the literature review, the case for Turkey’s 
revisionism is often intertwined with arguments about an ideologically-driven 
foreign policy. That is one of the main reasons this thesis sought to examine 
both TFP behaviour and the role of ideology. The short answer is that there is 
indeed evidence of Islamic ideological incentives in TFP and of revisionist 
tendencies. 
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This conclusion is based on the definitions that were given about the 
AKP’s elite ideology and revisionism in the context of the theoretical 
framework. Having in mind that in general terms revisionism entails the 
pursuit of changed international power relations for the benefit of the country-
undertaker, then the features of the political Islamic worldview of AKP elites 
render it revisionist. That is mainly because the vision they have for the Middle 
East is one where Islamic identity unites the peoples of the region under the 
leadership and hegemony of Turkey; a position which, according to their belief 
system, rightfully belongs to Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. 
However, the fact that the AKP’s elite ideology is revisionist does not 
necessarily mean that TFP is revisionist. The case study and comparative 
analysis have shown that whenever the circumstances – namely, amidst little to 
no external or domestic effective opposition – allowed AKP policy-makers to 
act according to their ideologically-informed rhetoric, TFP behaviour has been 
revisionist; this also corresponds to one of the central propositions made at the 
beginning of the thesis about the role of AKP elite ideology. Such behaviour 
was demonstrated in TFP towards both Syria and Israel, especially after 2011. 
On the contrary, whenever AKP was subjected to pressure from external 
realities, public opinion and, to a lesser extent, from business elites, it 
maintained a largely status quo foreign policy behaviour despite revisionism-
prone rhetoric. It should be reminded that in this thesis foreign policy 
behaviour is classified as revisionist (or status quo) based on specific criteria 
that have been elaborated in the theoretical framework (see, chapter 3). 
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Overall, even though there is evidence of political Islamic ideological 
incentives in TFP and tendencies for revisionism, the thesis argues that Turkey 
is neither always nor primarily ideologically-driven. Moreover, although the 
CC and CT comparative analysis supports the argument that Turkey under 
AKP is more of a revisionist than a status quo state, it has also been made clear 
that revisionist and ideological tendencies can also be constrained by external 
and domestic material – e.g. economic, security, public opinion – 
considerations. This conclusion is in itself an important contribution to the 
debate on TFP as it determines TFP behaviour and particularises not only the 
role of ideology but also the extent to and the circumstances under which TFP is 
revisionist. 
 
Has Turkey been promoting peace and cooperation, or have its policies created 
polarisation between international actors? 
 
The next issue that needs to be addressed is Turkey’s efforts for peace and 
cooperation; that is, the other side of the debate on TFP which maintains that 
Turkey under AKP has been a promoter of peace, cooperation and stability, in a 
rather neoliberal sense. Such arguments could easily be made especially during 
the first two terms of AKP in office, roughly up to 2011. Indeed Turkey tried to 
play the role of a regional mediator, a facilitator of peace. The AKP’s enhanced 
economic and trade relations with the region and specifically the Arab and 
Muslim world, have been a remarkable and noticeable achievement as well; one 
that brought Turkey closer to its neighbours than ever before. 
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But while Turkey was building up better relations with the Middle East, it 
paid less attention to the West. As such, Turkey may have tried to promote 
peace and cooperation in the region but, ultimately, it did not manage to play a 
successful mediating role between the Middle East and the West. It rather sided 
with Iran on the issue of its nuclear program and with the Palestinians (and the 
Arab World) at the expense of its relations with Israel and the West. Instead of 
acting as a bridge between East and West, as Turkish politicians often argued 
and Western politicians wished, it contributed to the tensions between the two 
sides. 
This thesis argues that after 2011 and the beginning of the Arab uprisings, 
regional instability and power changes forced Turkey to seek Western support 
once again, particularly in the case of Syria’s civil war. This policy of double 
standards – which is not uncommon among states of the international system – 
caused problems for Turkey and further destabilised the region. One such 
example is the shift in Iranian policy towards Turkey due to the latter’s pro-
Western stance on Syria. The realities of the “Arab Spring” revealed Turkey’s 
limitations since its ability to act as a regional promoter of peace and 
cooperation was hindered by its attachment to its own self-interests that led it 
to turn against countries such as Israel, Syria, Iraq, and later Egypt. 
In other words, it was Turkey’s revisionist tendencies and employed 
strategies, as analysed in this thesis, which brought it at odds with regional and 
international actors, despite the signs and evidence of partial cooperation at the 
regional level during the first years of its governance. While this sheds some 
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light on the discussion about Turkey’s peace-promoting role, it does not clarify 
whether Turkey is leaving the West or not. 
 
Is Turkey turning away from its traditional Western allies? 
 
When it comes to evaluating Turkey’s relationship with the West, one 
thing should be acknowledged first: Turkey has neither officially abandoned its 
EU candidacy nor has it left NATO, or any other Western organisation. At the 
very least, this indicates a certain degree of commitment with regard to its 
relations with its traditional Western partners. And yet there has been much 
suspicion in the US and Europe about TFP orientation since the early 2000s. Its 
opposing stance during the 2003 US-led invasion into Iraq and its increasing 
focus on the Middle East gave rise to an ongoing and heated debate about 
whether Turkey was “leaving the West” or not. 
This thesis found that Turkey turned to its own region because of how the 
AKP elite understood and chose to react to systemic developments (e.g. Iraq 
war). As explained before, this is primarily a product of systemic pressures and 
secondarily a product of the ideology of the policy-making elites. Within this 
context, Turkey often either ignored or disregarded Western, and particularly 
American, policies. Moreover, it threatened to abandon its EU candidacy for a 
membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and made a number of 
provocative statements against the EU and Western policies. 
As noted, the AKP’s rhetoric on this issue was more linked to its policies 
during the pre-“Arab Spring” period; a period which favoured, relatively 
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speaking, TFP and which was characterised by a fairly benign geopolitical 
environment. It should be added that such declarations by the AKP correlates 
with its political Islamic ideology as defined in this thesis. Yet, as the regional 
and international systemic context began to change with the “Arab Spring,” 
Turkey’s policies became more dissociated from its rhetoric. Its proclamations 
that signified a more autonomous and independent role from the West were 
mitigated by its rapprochement with the US, NATO, and the EU in the security 
as well as in the economic sector, as the case studies have shown. 
Hard evidence point to the fact that Turkey has not turned away from its 
Western allies, not least because it cannot do so; that is, it would be very 
difficult for Turkey to deal with international security and economic realities, 
especially in such a volatile region, without the support of these partners. 
However, this does not mean that Turkey would not like to be more 
autonomous or to acquire a leading role in shaping the power and other 
dynamics of the region. It has made that clear both through policies and 
rhetoric. 
In this light, identifying the AKP’s aspirations in terms of its foreign policy 
is important for analysing today’s Turkey and estimating or evaluating its 
future decisions. Thus, one of the policy-relevant accomplishments of this 
thesis, is the suggestion that, provided the right circumstances (e.g. relative 
regional stability and strong economic relations), the AKP’s Turkey would seek 
as autonomous a role as possible, which would most probably be independent 
from or even opposite to Western interests in the region. This assumption is 
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based not only on the aspirations stemming from the AKP’s elite ideology but 
also on the record of TFP as analysed in the previous chapters. 
 
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
Just like every study, this one has its own limitations and weaknesses. 
And although one of the central aims of the thesis was to reconcile and 
integrate different approaches to TFP, a theoretical framework could never 
account for every aspect of a country’s foreign policy. Moreover, apart from 
theoretical limitations, there have also been methodological and empirical 
limitations.  
As stated in the introduction and methodology of the thesis, the social and 
political turmoil Turkey was experiencing during the time of the research 
rendered the conduct of interviews difficult both because Turkish politicians 
were harder to reach and more reluctant to speak on sensitive issues (e.g. their 
ideology or particular political events) such as the ones under examination in 
this thesis. Although this limitation was mitigated by a number of other 
primary sources, the empirical aspect of the thesis would have been stronger if 
AKP interviewees were to provide first-hand accounts of their beliefs and own 
version of certain policy decisions. 
Theoretically, the chosen NcR theoretical framework was adequately 
sound to address the problematique identified at the beginning of the thesis as 
well as to answer the questions that have been posed. Throughout the course of 
the analysis, however, certain actors and factors were identified that could not 
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have been accounted for by the theoretical framework but may have a role to 
play in TFP. First, it has been made clear that between 2002 and 2013 Turkish 
Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has played an increasingly central role 
in shaping TFP. In that sense, especially after 2007/08, the AKP elite ideology 
intervening variable revolved very much around Erdoğan’s personality, his 
ideology and even psychology. To account for the role of these aspects in 
relation to Erdoğan, an individual-level approach is needed, at least when it 
comes to a certain time period and specific events – such as the 2010 and 2011 
diplomatic crises with Israel; that is, an approach that could facilitate a purely 
ideological or political psychological analysis of the Prime Minister and his 
decisions. 
Second, the analysis demonstrated in places that other domestic actors or 
groups have had a noteworthy role to play in certain instances. Whereas the 
selected domestic groups remain the most important ones in Turkey’s political 
scene, at least for the most part, it seems that an examination of the influence of 
think tanks and research centres on policy-making might provide interesting 
results. This assumption occurs specifically from evidence that independent 
experts and researchers along with other domestic interest groups (e.g. 
opposition parties) played a role in preventing the AKP from endorsing a 
second Gaza flotilla towards breaking the naval Gaza blockade. In addition, the 
grassroots Hizmet movement of the Turkish Islamic cleric Fetullah Gülen, a 
former ally of the AKP which found itself increasingly at odds with PM 
Erdoğan especially after 2010, has become an important actor in Turkey. 
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Indeed, future studies of post-2010 TFP that want to take into account the 
country’s domestic politics should include Fetullah Gülen in their analysis as 
well.682 
Lastly, this thesis has not examined the AKP’s cultural policies such as 
efforts to further Turkey’s presence in the states of the region through the 
promotion of Turkish language, arts and Turkish studies, and the foundation of 
Turkey-related institutes and so on. Such an approach could potentially 
strengthen the argument about whether TFP is revisionist or not since, as 
explained in the theoretical framework, revisionist behaviour is not only 
expressed through military means but also through economic, cultural and 
other means. Moreover, looking at Turkey’s cultural policies could be another 
way to examine the relationship between the AKP’s ideology, rhetoric and 
policies. This aspect of TFP would also fall into the framework of the more 
critical body of literature on the so called “Turkish Model” and Turkish 
hegemony. 
These aspects could be either explored independently or be integrated into 
a theoretical framework. Importantly, they could constitute variables of a 
different version of NcR and this is arguably an important advantage of this 
                                                          
682 For the increasing significance of this movement see, "An Interview with Fethullah Gülen," The 
Muslim World 95(2005): 447-67; Sami Faltas, "The General, the Prime Minister and the Imam: Civil-
Military Relations in Turkey Today," Turkish Policy Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2012): 133-43; Galip Dalay, "The 
Structural Roots of Turkey's Power Struggle," The German Marshall Fund of the United States On 
Turkey(04/02/2014); Fevzı Bılgın, "Corruption Scandal and Ensuring Political Crisis," Rethink Institute 
Washington D.C. Rethink Brief 03(January, 2014); Kadır Ustun and Erol Cebecı, "AK Party-Gulen Split: 
Political Fallout From Corruption Probe," The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C. SETA 
Perspective(January, 2014); Günter Seufert, "Is the Fethullah Gülen Move-ment Overstretching Itself?," 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Research Paper 2(January, 2014). 
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theoretical approach; namely, the fact that it can be adapted to the research 
questions and to the particularities of the phenomenon under examination. 
 
The Turkish Foreign Policy of Tomorrow 
 
Finally, the theoretical framework and the empirical findings of the thesis 
allow for some predictions with regard to TFP. First, given that systemic 
geopolitical changes in the early 2000s and 2011 played a primary role in 
shaping TFP, it can be assumed that changes in the international or regional 
balances of power, such as the rise of new threats or new alliances, will bring 
changes to the AKP’s foreign policy. Within this framework, it is possible that 
Turkey will keep up its efforts of becoming a regional power, and leader of the 
Arab-Muslim world; the maintenance of a pro-Palestinian and an anti-Assad 
stance with regard to Syria will contribute to these efforts. At the same time, the 
region’s volatility and instability will force Turkey to switch back and forth in 
its alliance with the West, whilst in terms of Israel a full reconciliation would be 
more possible if Israel were to improve its stance towards the Palestinians. 
Otherwise, economic and commercial ties683 will be the only thread keeping 
them together.   
In this respect, Turkey is also likely to face a number of challenges given 
that its revisionist tendencies and efforts to improve its geopolitical status create 
reactions. Among others, one such challenge has been the reassertion of 
Egyptian power and Egypt’s hostility towards Turkey since the anti-Morsi 
                                                          
683 Possibly even energy ties in the case that private economic interests prevail over political tensions 
and security considerations. 
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coup. Also, the Kurdish element will continue to pose a challenge both in 
Turkey and in neighbouring countries as long as a settlement with regard to 
Turkey’s Kurdish issue is not reached. Relations with Iran can also prove 
problematic, not only because of Turkey’s stance towards Syria, but also 
because of Iran’s nuclear program. Another challenge would be the negative 
relations with Israel especially given the latter’s multileveled partnership with 
Cyprus and Greece and the natural resources dispute in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  
Second, as long as the AKP remains in power and seeks to solidify its 
control over the state and society at the expense of democratic consolidation, 
TFP will maintain revisionist tendencies. Similarly, if geopolitical or domestic 
socio-political turbulence leads to a change in government and the rise of a pro-
Kemalist party, TFP will likely change and once again become more status quo 
oriented.684 However, in that case it would be also likely to observe more 
willingness from the government’s part to maintain in some degree the AKP’s 
enhanced relations with the Arab world; not only for economic benefits but also 
for public opinion purposes. In this scenario, the public’s anti-Israeli, anti-
Western, and pro-Arab tendencies might lead Kemalist elites to an ideological 
and thus political transformation as well.  
Third, Turkey’s external economic interdependencies will continue to be 
largely independent from its diplomatic or security relations. It is thus very 
                                                          
684 Other kinds of government are not likely to emerge in the near future, apart from the scenario of a 
broader coalition government which will be, however, dominated by the Kemalist and nationalist elites 
of CHP and MHP. 
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likely for future inconsistencies to arise between the country’s economic and 
other external relations. This will be the case if business elites continue to have 
influence over most of the Turkish economy. If this reality changes, for example 
due to protectionist policies or political intervention in the economy, Turkey’s 
economic interdependencies will become dependent on diplomatic relations 
and security considerations. This is a development which could have a negative 
impact on the country given that its economic sector is perhaps the most 
expanded and that which keeps it connected to the region and the world. 
Overall, Turkey is a complicated country the foreign policy of which is 
subject to the constantly changing regional realities. Moreover, it is a country 
that is undergoing a significant domestic transformation which despite its great 
success, has recently polarised society and increased social, economic and 
political instability. Indeed, no matter how committed Turkey may be to 
contributing to a more stable and peaceful Middle East, or how much it aspires 
to a leading regional role, the international and regional system is something 
that it cannot control; just like any other country. This means that Turkey 
should always be prepared to deal with the multitude of problems that could 
arise in its volatile neighbourhood. 
But in order for a country to be able to successfully manage threats, 
bilateral relations, or play a meaningful and constructive role in its external 
environment, it should first deal with the problems within reach and the issues 
that it can address; namely, the domestic social, political and economic scene. 
When outstanding issues, such as the country’s democratic consolidation, its 
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human rights record, the Kurdish question and the treatment of other 
minorities get on a track to resolution, then Turkey’s domestic contradictions 
will be minimised. In turn, TFP can become less vulnerable to conflicting 
domestic interests. At the same time, despite the fact that Turkey has developed 
greatly in many respects under the AKP, such positive changes would lead to a 
more stable democratic state and, therefore, to a clearer foreign policy 
orientation. 
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Title Name 
Affiliations Type of 
Interview 
Base of 
Interview(ee) 
Year 
Dr. Özlem Tür 
Department of International Relations, Middle East 
Technical University 
In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
23 September 
2013 
Dr. 
Nikos 
Moudouros 
Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies, 
University of Cyprus. Previously, special advisor to 
former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitris 
Christofias, on Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot issues 
In Person 
Nicosia, 
Cyprus 
25 August 2013 
Dr. Gökhan Bacık 
Department of International Relations, İpek 
University. Columnist, Today’s Zaman newspaper 
In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
26 September 
2013 
Dr. İhsan Bal 
Chairman of the Scientific Committee, International 
Strategic Research Organization (USAK) 
In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
25 September 
2013 
Mr. 
Osman Bahadır 
Dincer 
Researcher, International Strategic Research 
Organization (USAK) 
In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
25 September 
2013 
Dr. 
Ambassador 
(ret.) 
Ali Engin Oba 
Head of Department of International Relations, Çaǧ 
University. Advisor to Chairman of Turkish Asian 
Centre for Strategic Studies. 
In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
12 June 2013 
Ambassador 
(ret.) 
Oktay Aksoy Foreign Policy Institute In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
13 June 2013 
Ambassador 
(ret.) 
Reşat Arim Foreign Policy Institute In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
13 June 2013 
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Dr. 
Osman Faruk 
Loğoğlu 
Deputy Chairman, Republican People’s Party (CHP) Via email 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
30 September 
2013 
Mr. Kivanç Ozcan 
Parliamentary Advisor to the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) 
In Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
24 September 
2013 
Dr. 
Bahadır 
Kaleağasi 
International Coordinator and EU Representative, 
Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association 
(TÜSİAD), Brussels Branch 
Over the 
phone 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
03 October 
2013 
-- 
Identity of the 
interviewee in 
possession of 
the author 
Research Associate, Turkish Industrialists' and 
Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), Brussels 
Branch 
Over the 
phone 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
03 October 
2013 
Dr. Ahmet Sözen 
Chair of the Department of Political Science and 
International Relations and Director of the Cyprus 
Policy Center, Eastern Mediterranean University 
In Person 
Famagusta, 
Cyprus 
26 December 
2013 
Dr. 
Marios P. 
Efthymiopoulos 
Founder and CEO of Strategy International, think 
tank; Visiting Scholar, Harriman Institute, University 
of Columbia, New York 
In Person 
Nicosia, 
Cyprus 
26 January 
2013 
Dr. Louis Fishman 
Assistant Professor, History Department, Brooklyn 
College, City University of New York 
Skype 
Istanbul, 
Turkey 
09 January 
2014 
 
Turkish 
Academic no. 1 
 
Conversation 
in Person 
Ankara, 
Turkey 
13 June 2013 
 
Turkish 
Academic no. 2 
 
Conversation 
in Person 
Istanbul, 
Turkey 
13 October 
2012 
 
